Author Topic: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII  (Read 19169 times)

Offline humble

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #105 on: April 06, 2008, 01:19:22 AM »
I dont care what "it says", you cant finish what you never started and garbage in is garbage out. The numbers I quoted are the actual production numbers as verified both by actual docmentation, interview and interrogation immediately at wars end. The numbers you posted are somebodies pipe dream.

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Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #106 on: April 06, 2008, 01:34:29 AM »
Heh, if you don't care why continue to post? ;)

I'm afraid the British study is far more thorough than you'd like to believe.





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Offline humble

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #107 on: April 06, 2008, 02:49:37 AM »
The numbers you post show an increase in overall production of aviation fuel in June 1944, the same month that numerous sources clearly identify as the worst month for the production of aviation fuel. Speer himself says in writing aviation fuel production is down 92%. I dont care who the source is or when/how its compiled since we can clearly show that its off by so much at a critical time that its overall validity is most certainly very questionable. There is no way that production of aviation fuel is up in June of 1944.

Production from the synthetic plants declined steadily and by July 1944 every major plant had been hit. These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September. Production recovered somewhat in November and December, but for the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output.



The story of Leuna is illustrative. Leuna was the largest of the synthetic plants and protected by a highly effective smoke screen and the heaviest flak concentration in Europe. Air crews viewed a mission to Leuna as the most dangerous and difficult assignment of the air war. Leuna was hit on May 12 and put out of production. However, investigation of plant records and interrogation of Leuna's officials established that a force of several thousand men had it in partial operation in about 10 days. It was again hit on May 28 but resumed partial production on June 3 and reached 75 percent of capacity in early July. It was hit again on July 7 and again shut down but production started 2 days later and reached 53 percent of capacity on July 19. An attack on July 20 shut the plant down again but only for three days; by July 27 production was back to 35 percent of capacity. Attacks on July 28 and 29 closed the plant and further attacks on August 24, September 11, September 13, September 28 and October 7 kept it closed down. However, Leuna got started again on October 14 and although production was interrupted by a small raid on November 2, it reached 28 percent of capacity by November 20. Although there were 6 more heavy attacks in November and December (largely ineffective because of adverse weather), production was brought up to 15 percent of capacity in January and was maintained at that level until nearly the end of the war. From the first attack to the end, production at Leuna averaged 9 percent of capacity. There were 22 attacks on Leuna, 20 by the Eighth Air Force and 2 by the RAF. Due to the urgency of keeping this plant out of production, many of these missions mere dispatched in difficult bombing weather. Consequently, the order of bombing accuracy on Leuna was not high as compared with other targets. To win the battle with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required.

The Germans viewed the attacks as catastrophic. In a series of letters to Hitler, among documents seized by the Survey, the developing crisis is outlined month by month in detail. On June 30, Speer wrote: "The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90 percent by June 22d. Only through speedy recovery of damaged plants has it been possible to regain partly some of the terrible losses." The tone of the letters that followed was similar.

Given these documented realities there is no way that production of aviation fuel increased during june and in the month of september, the month before the underground refineries even went on line and when synthetic production is documented at its lowest levels increased by over 300% to a level close to double the highest production prior to the attacks on both synthetic oil or the 1944 attacks on Ploesti. How do you explain that in the month that you had the lowest synthetic production and after the russians had cut off all romanian production and before the underground refineries had produced a single Barrel of oil production of aviation spirits went from 292 tons (which is already ludicrous) to a figure of 836 Tons???

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Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #108 on: April 06, 2008, 03:15:49 AM »
Hah "documented realities", you haven't documented anything. What was that you said about taking "3rd party analysis as gospel"?  :lol

I can understand it is difficult to handle that the findings of an independent civilian comity that had nothing to prove or justify differs from the findings of those who did have something to prove and justify (why they sent all those men to die over Germany for instance, surely they did not die in vain? To say nothing of the cost involved and the future of the USAF). [sarcasm] Nah ... that can't be it! [/sarcasm]

Believe what you want Humble. :)


Edit Btw. the numbers I have posted (from the report) are the total production figures, not only that from the synthetic oil industry, but from all production.
« Last Edit: April 06, 2008, 03:22:25 AM by Lumpy »
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

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Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #109 on: April 06, 2008, 04:03:25 AM »
Another thing to ponder: The Luftwaffe flew more sorties in 1944 than they did in 1943. The Luftwaffe lost more planes in the air in June - October 1944 than they did in January - May 1944. The Luftwaffe shot down 24,800 Soviet aircraft in 1944, that's 2,300 more than they shot down in 1943. Even in the few war months of 1945 the Luftwaffe shot down 11,000 Soviet aircraft.

What were these Luftwaffe planes flying on if there was no fuel? Schnapps? (Pilots probably, but not their aircraft ;))
« Last Edit: April 06, 2008, 04:20:37 AM by Lumpy »
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

-Archangel Gabriel, The P

Offline bozon

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #110 on: April 06, 2008, 07:24:28 AM »
...
Consequently, the order of bombing accuracy on Leuna was not high as compared with other targets. To win the battle with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required. [/i]
...
I think many of you miss a good point that Lumpy is making. It is not a question of whether the strategic bombing campaign made a dent in the German war machine. It obviously did. The more interesting questions are: "was it worth it?" - in terms of were the required resources could be better spent elsewhere and "was this the right way to do it" - in terms of high alt heavy bomber stream and carpet bombing.

The quote above demonstrates this very well. German production was hit, but was it worth the 6,552 sorties, a year time and god knows how many dead crewmen to do it? If they used mosquito instead of B17s, could they achieve this at a lower cost?

Similar questions can be asked regarding the German decisions (regarding the original post). What if instead of bombing Britain for two years, they had put all this effort into building a navy, or other means to challenge the British navy and allow an invasion?
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Offline Iron_Cross

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #111 on: April 06, 2008, 08:13:51 AM »
Lumpy, I can put some impressive numbers on a piece of paper, if I don't want the Gestapo to come take me away and shoot me.

"look at my books, I've produced XX amount even after we were bombed!"  "I have crews working night and day to repair the damage and increase our production."

"Where is it, it never arrived."

"How should I know that.  We sent it out, if it didn't arrive it must be the trains got bombed."

ECT...ECT...

Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #112 on: April 06, 2008, 09:39:10 AM »
Lumpy, I can put some impressive numbers on a piece of paper, if I don't want the Gestapo to come take me away and shoot me.

Yes of course you could. That may have been how things were done in Soviet Russia, but not in Germany. Failing to meet production quotas may have gotten you replaced, but not shot. The Germans as a people are far too fiddly for detail and bookkeeping, and other areas of German record keeping (like awarding kills to pilots) shows an almost unequaled attention to detail and verification.

Also, just ask yourself: If the fuel production was that impaired how could the Luftwaffe continue to operate, flying hundreds of thousands of sorties in 1944, in fact more sorties than they flew the year before?

Also some people claim the German jet fighters and bombers were grounded much of the time due to lack of fuel thanks to the USAAF efforts against the synthetic plants. How do they arrive at this obviously erroneous conclusion? (I think because they have something to prove.) The Jumo 004 jet engine burned diesel oil, not aviation gas. The 262 would be the last aircraft in the Luftwaffe inventory to run out of fuel.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

-Archangel Gabriel, The P

Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #113 on: April 06, 2008, 09:42:40 AM »
The quote above demonstrates this very well. German production was hit, but was it worth the 6,552 sorties, a year time and god knows how many dead crewmen to do it? If they used mosquito instead of B17s, could they achieve this at a lower cost?

Yup, that is the crux of my argument.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

-Archangel Gabriel, The P

Offline MiloMorai

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #114 on: April 06, 2008, 09:46:06 AM »
Nice graph on German avgas.


Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #115 on: April 06, 2008, 09:50:21 AM »
What's the source of that graph Milo? Even if that graph is correct it shows that avgas stocks lasted well into 1945, like I've said.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

-Archangel Gabriel, The P

Offline MiloMorai

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #116 on: April 06, 2008, 10:03:13 AM »
Doesn't matter how much stock you have on hand if you can't get that stock to the end user. The transportation system was a mess.

Source, maybe Crumpp.

Offline humble

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #117 on: April 06, 2008, 11:54:32 AM »
So your defending the 800+ tons of avgas figure in sept of 1944 as accurate?

As for a few of the other comments...

While operational sorties were up, training became almost nonexistant and many other elements like engine breakin etc were curtailed severly.

The strategic airwar was costly and its overall effectiveness when analysed in any single aspect can certainly be called into question. I think the real measure of impact was summed up very well in the quote I posted a few pages back. The overall effect on Germany was devestating and seperate from all other factors had brought the economy/infrastucture to a point of collapse by the end of 1944.

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Offline MiloMorai

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #118 on: April 06, 2008, 12:02:10 PM »
So your defending the 800+ tons of avgas figure in sept of 1944 as accurate?

Trouble reading the graph gSholtz? At the begining of Sept 44 there was ~300t of avgas in stock and by the end of Sept 44 there was ~200t in stock.

Offline Mike Williams

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      • http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/
« Last Edit: April 06, 2008, 12:21:48 PM by Mike Williams »