Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII

[Iron_Cross]

Tell me Iron Cross, did you even read this thread?

Yes, did you?

We agree that the outcome was not going to be different, but we disagree as to the "cost".

[Angus]

What a big and chunky thread. How the hell did I miss that one
Anyway, being too lazy to look for it, did anyone mention the efforts that the German reich had to undergo for AA defences? Those were absolutely stunning.
Did it get mentioned how much of the Nazi war effort was vented into weapons of revenge because of the bomber campaign? Same thing there, - stunning.
And did it get mentioned how close Nazi Germany was to the buckle after the burning raid on Hamburg?
Did anyone mention that there were already riots in British cities in the late BoB, and that many a foreign emissary uttered doubt that the nation would endure it?

My point is, that getting bombed is rather bad, and lots of efforts are taken to avoid it.
And, IMHO, bombing is more effective to populations with "higher" cultures and more urbanism.

[JScore]

Threads like this crack me up.  Very bright people with doctoral degrees have argued this topic until THEY were blue in the face, and here are a bunch of homegrown, armchair generals with all the answers.  I'm going to grab some popcorn, do continue.....

[Lumpy]

What a big and chunky thread. How the hell did I miss that one
Anyway, being too lazy to look for it, did anyone mention the efforts that the German reich had to undergo for AA defences? Those were absolutely stunning.
Did it get mentioned how much of the Nazi war effort was vented into weapons of revenge because of the bomber campaign? Same thing there, - stunning.
And did it get mentioned how close Nazi Germany was to the buckle after the burning raid on Hamburg?
Did anyone mention that there were already riots in British cities in the late BoB, and that many a foreign emissary uttered doubt that the nation would endure it?

My point is, that getting bombed is rather bad, and lots of efforts are taken to avoid it.
And, IMHO, bombing is more effective to populations with "higher" cultures and more urbanism.

Hi Angus and welcome to my thread. Yes the German efforts to defend against the bombing has been mentioned. Revenge weapons haven't come up, nor the British riots. While I do greatly respect your opinion and value your input, I would prefer that you actually read the thread before commenting... or at least my starting post. If you had you'd know that this discussion is limited to the USAAF daylight bombing campaign that started in January 1943 six days before the fall of Stalingrad and the destruction of the German 6th Army. The RAF terror-bombing that started three years earlier is not part of this debate. The AA defenses mentioned were already built and deployed to counter the RAF bombing, and the V-weapons were already under development, also in response to the RAF terror-bombing. My position is that the USAAF bombing campaign started too late in the war, and did too little damage to the German war effort to have a significant impact on the war beyond perhaps shortening the war by a few months, at best. I also contend that the USAAF's choice to create a strategic bomber force in Europe was conceptually misguided and that it would have been more useful to create a tactical air force with emphasis on fighters, fighter-bombers and attack planes like the Mosquito to counter the Luftwaffe by daylight.

[Lumpy]

Threads like this crack me up.  Very bright people with doctoral degrees have argued this topic until THEY were blue in the face, and here are a bunch of homegrown, armchair generals with all the answers.  I'm going to grab some popcorn, do continue.....

Welcome to the show. Grab some beer while you're at it.

[Stoney]

...It is annoying that I have to repeat myself:

...The 8th Army Air Force wouldn�t just have disappeared from the war if the Campaign had not taken place. Again I annoyingly have to repeat myself:

...As for the comparison, helpful or not it is still accurate.

You missed my point on the first two. 

And don't be so difficult.  I've been in this thread since the beginning and I've read every post. 

My second point was not a hypothetical.  I stated that regardless of the effects of the bombing on the ground, the 8th Campaign provided the USAAF an opportunity to destroy the Luftwaffe in the air and ground--i.e. escorts shooting down Luftwaffe planes and pilots.

Using a thread that's supposed to be about the effectiveness of strategic bombing to make a comparison between the SS, the USAAF, and the RAF (i.e. war criminals) does nothing to support your original theory and will only inflame folks reading/posting this. 

I'm out...

[Lumpy]

My second point was not a hypothetical.  I stated that regardless of the effects of the bombing on the ground, the 8th Campaign provided the USAAF an opportunity to destroy the Luftwaffe in the air and ground--i.e. escorts shooting down Luftwaffe planes and pilots.

I.e. the B-17's were reduced to being mere bait to lure the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition, as I said IN THE FIRST POST IN THIS THREAD!

"In the end the �self-defending bomber� had to be defended by fighters (much like the German Zerst�rer concept). And since the bombs they dropped on Germany did little damage to German war production the B-17 and her companion the B-24 ended up as little more than bait to lure the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition. That�s the only success of the USAAF�s strategic bombing campaign in Europe."

I'm out...

Goodbye.

[Angus]

Hello Lumpy, and nice to meet you.
I didn't read the whole thread, but thank you for getting me into the focus.
I want to comment on this text of yours:
"My position is that the USAAF bombing campaign started too late in the war, and did too little damage to the German war effort to have a significant impact on the war beyond perhaps shortening the war by a few months, at best. I also contend that the USAAF's choice to create a strategic bomber force in Europe was conceptually misguided and that it would have been more useful to create a tactical air force with emphasis on fighters, fighter-bombers and attack planes like the Mosquito to counter the Luftwaffe by daylight."

Now....loking backwards, I'd say you are mostly right. But when you go on to the Strategic force as a misguided thing, well, back then could yopu have known at all? The Douhet theory was still running, and everybody followed it. It had worked, - sometimes, and it did work...later in the war. Sometimes the horrible shock of bombing will buckle a (already bent perhaps) nation into surrender.

Now the daylight bombing campaign did one big thing. It forced the LW to come up in daylight and fight.
The campaign came with bumps though, - well we know,  - the bombers needed escorts, - their defensive armament was not enough alone. BUT, with bombers in daylight as well as escorts, the USAAF could bomb anything they could see (and daylight makes a bit), so the Germans HAD to counter them.

Now, none of those decisions or conclusions happened in a day. It is much easier for us to look backwards and try to judge. And production lines don't start in a day, - there is a long way between a theory+plan+material+production+execution etc. We must understand that. A long line.

And BTW, when you refer to RAF terror bombing, they started somewhat late, - the whole opening of their bombing was completely strategic, but with little accuracy. (Although they hit G�bbels garden already in 1940, - at night).
The openers and promoters of the whole deal were the LW, which started to execute this well before WW2 (if Guernica counts) as well as absolutely from the beginning days of the Polish campaign.

The theories were there, they sometimes worked, and entire long-lasting plans were built from them.

[splitatom]

the reason why was because the norten bombsight couldnt put a bomb into a picle barel at 10,000 unless it was perfect coditions thus we couldnt even put bombs within 1000 feet of a target most of the time especialy at night

[Lumpy]

Hello Lumpy, and nice to meet you.
I didn't read the whole thread, but thank you for getting me into the focus.

You�re welcome. And btw. I�m your old neighbor from the �old country� *wink wink, nudge nudge*

I want to comment on this text of yours:
"My position is that the USAAF bombing campaign started too late in the war, and did too little damage to the German war effort to have a significant impact on the war beyond perhaps shortening the war by a few months, at best. I also contend that the USAAF's choice to create a strategic bomber force in Europe was conceptually misguided and that it would have been more useful to create a tactical air force with emphasis on fighters, fighter-bombers and attack planes like the Mosquito to counter the Luftwaffe by daylight."

Now....loking backwards, I'd say you are mostly right. But when you go on to the Strategic force as a misguided thing, well, back then could yopu have known at all? The Douhet theory was still running, and everybody followed it. It had worked, - sometimes, and it did work...later in the war. Sometimes the horrible shock of bombing will buckle a (already bent perhaps) nation into surrender.

Now the daylight bombing campaign did one big thing. It forced the LW to come up in daylight and fight.
The campaign came with bumps though, - well we know,  - the bombers needed escorts, - their defensive armament was not enough alone. BUT, with bombers in daylight as well as escorts, the USAAF could bomb anything they could see (and daylight makes a bit), so the Germans HAD to counter them.

That is the gist of it yes. The only real success of the USAAF bombing campaign was to lure the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition that they couldn�t win. However, by that time I think you�ll agree with me that the war was already lost for the Germans. You�ve written a paper on the effect of the British on the war in the east and have started at least two threads in the O� Club on the same subject. The first USAAF raid on Germany was only six days before the German defeat at Stalingrad.

To send thousands of people into harm�s way in extremely expensive machines just as bait for Luftwaffe fighters is not an effective use of lives and resources. You�ll have to agree with that. In the summer of 1943 instead of having ~300 B-17�s and ~100 P47�s facing 400-600 German fighters, the USAAF could have had 1500-2000 P-47�s (just going by production costs). And before commenting on this you should read my next paragraph.

Now, none of those decisions or conclusions happened in a day. It is much easier for us to look backwards and try to judge. And production lines don't start in a day, - there is a long way between a theory+plan+material+production+execution etc. We must understand that. A long line.

I agree completely. That�s why I�ve said: �But let me just add that I have the benefit of hindsight and that the USAAF at the time believed they were doing the right thing. When they realized things were not going as planned they were so committed to the campaign that they had little choice but to try and make the best of it. I am in no way criticizing the 8th AAF or their men... I am criticizing the people who propagate the myth that the 8th AAF was a decisive factor in winning the war in Europe, and those who think strategic bombing with conventional munitions was effective (I do not consider firebombing conventional).�

You see Angus that this whole thread is a result of Humble arguing in another thread (hijacking it, so I started this one) that strategic air warfare in WWII was a success, and that the Germans lost the Battle of Britain because they didn�t have a strategic airforce. He even went so far as to say that if the Luftwaffe had a couple hundred B-17s instead of medium bombers they would have won the BoB. A completely ludicrous argument in my opinion.

This thread is about the people today that still think the USAAF made the right choices before the war and was right in building the USAAF the way they did.

The openers and promoters of the whole deal were the LW, which started to execute this well before WW2 (if Guernica counts) as well as absolutely from the beginning days of the Polish campaign.

Absolutely. But this is nothing more than a diversion from the purpose of this thread. Just like the comments on RAF bombing. This thread is about the daylight strategic bombing in Europe.

[Angus]

Well, Norseman, - well said.
I guess that we agree on one thing, I'll try to stitch it together somehow. Okay:
"While the aim of the USAAF daylight bombing campaign was to cripple the German industrial output, it's outcome weighted more in what it did to the German Luftwaffe"

?

And, btw, I'm digging in my bookpile. I have a couple of really good ones about airpower. Will give you the ISBN's if you like. Really interesting stuff, promise!

As for the paper, I'm still writing, - making the structure, - and you have a sharp eye noticing that I had 2 threads running on the topic. Still have sore eyes because of some work on it last night
Please feel free to comment on those, I'll ping one thread today with a little fact that I found.

Then, on this

" He even went so far as to say that if the Luftwaffe had a couple hundred B-17s instead of medium bombers they would have won the BoB. A completely ludicrous argument in my opinion."

Completely agree. It was not the bomber gear that mattered. And there were the fine Ju88's at the time, as well as the distance not being that great. Distance so small, that beam navigation could be used at night for much of the industrial part of England.
Guess his point was what the USAAF tried to promote later (with bad results), - that the armament of the bomber should be enough for self defence.

[Rich46yo]

I.e. the B-17's were reduced to being mere bait to lure the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition, as I said IN THE FIRST POST IN THIS THREAD!

"In the end the �self-defending bomber� had to be defended by fighters (much like the German Zerst�rer concept). And since the bombs they dropped on Germany did little damage to German war production the B-17 and her companion the B-24 ended up as little more than bait to lure the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition. That�s the only success of the USAAF�s strategic bombing campaign in Europe."


Goodbye.

                           So they never hit factories and war producing centers? They didn't stress an already stressed fuel production chain? If I remember my history right the Germans had to use coal to synthesize their aviation fuel into the kind of high octane product their high performance airplane had to burn in order to compete. And if I remember right we had success in attacking the few centers of industry available for the production of these chemicals. Anyway there was to much interference from the "tactical crowd" for strategic bombing to really work as planned.

                          Its been a long time since I researched this and I dont have time to get into it now.

                          North Vietnam was an agrarian society with very few strategic targets most of which were off limits to Yank air power until later in the war.

                          Fast forward to 2008 and we now live in a time where we can basically take out any target at anytime. Its interesting to think that as of today when we have the capability to cripple any Industry of an enemy we are hesitant to do so because we dont want to destroy their industrial infrastructure that would be critical to their recovery after the war. If a war like the Gulf war started now, say like with Iran, America has the military capability to deliver a strategic punch entirely made up of precision munitions that could cripple their industrial output in a matter of days.

                        But what would be the point in doing so? When one bomb hits within 3 meters of its target and cripples a control center for electric output why bother with a hundred such bombs that totally destroys the entire facility?

                       So strategic bombing now has a place only in history. With the lethality and accuracy of precision munitions there just isn't any reason to annihilate the industrial centers of a enemy nation anymore. Someone mentioned the Gulf War here earlier. Its not that we cant do it anymore its more like there is simply no point in doing so.

[Hazzer]

Dive Bombing had more effect on the outcome of wwII than Strategic bombing.In a few months Poland Belgium France Norway were subdued,by obsolescent Stukas.!The Japanese won a Great victory at Pearl harbor using Val dive Bombers with Great accuracy.The USA Won a more decisive victory months Later,using the Dauntless dive bomber,an aircraft at best only slightly better than either the stuka or the Val.

In achieving these victory's they suffered less losses and achieved much higher accuracy,and with a crew of two they were more cost effective both in money and lives,than either a b17 or Lancaster,the former having a crew of ten or 9!and costing substantially more in dollars

Losses for the 8th Air force are and were horrendous,so much so that in the Autumn of 1943 they considered halting their campaign,they suffered an almost 50% loss rate.Bombed factory's were usually up an running again within weeks,if not day's,due to the fact that high explosive bombs destroy sheds and people but not machine tools.A bit of tarpaulin an they were back in business.had both the RAF and the 8th Air force concentrated on Oil,they may well have achieved their goal,but the cost would have still been high

 In fact the War against Germany,had turned against the Nazis in February 1943 at Stalingrad,before the 8th Air forces  and Raf's campaign 's had got underway.The Red army never used Strategic Bombing.Strategic Bombing only became effective with the advent of Nuclear Weapons.  To sum up wwII,proved Douhet's theories incorrect.That is,Stategic Bombing does not win war's.Hiroshima accepted.

[Lumpy]

Well, Norseman, - well said.
I guess that we agree on one thing, I'll try to stitch it together somehow. Okay:
"While the aim of the USAAF daylight bombing campaign was to cripple the German industrial output, it's outcome weighted more in what it did to the German Luftwaffe"

?

That I can agree on completely.

And, btw, I'm digging in my bookpile. I have a couple of really good ones about airpower. Will give you the ISBN's if you like. Really interesting stuff, promise!

By all means!

As for the paper, I'm still writing, - making the structure, - and you have a sharp eye noticing that I had 2 threads running on the topic. Still have sore eyes because of some work on it last night
Please feel free to comment on those, I'll ping one thread today with a little fact that I found.

Well I did comment in one of the threads. I was the first to mention the battle of Moscow if I remember correctly. The outcome of the war in the east hinges on that battle alone, imho.

Then, on this

" He even went so far as to say that if the Luftwaffe had a couple hundred B-17s instead of medium bombers they would have won the BoB. A completely ludicrous argument in my opinion."

Completely agree. It was not the bomber gear that mattered. And there were the fine Ju88's at the time, as well as the distance not being that great. Distance so small, that beam navigation could be used at night for much of the industrial part of England.
Guess his point was what the USAAF tried to promote later (with bad results), - that the armament of the bomber should be enough for self defence.

I�m not sure exactly how he imagined the B-17 would make such a big difference. You can read his posts yourself if you want. They are in the �It's a real war, and you must pick your planes. What will they be?� thread: http://bbs.hitechcreations.com/smf/index.php/topic,232037.0.html

So strategic bombing now has a place only in history. With the lethality and accuracy of precision munitions there just isn't any reason to annihilate the industrial centers of a enemy nation anymore. Someone mentioned the Gulf War here earlier. Its not that we cant do it anymore its more like there is simply no point in doing so.

I don�t think anyone has argued that strategic warfare with conventional munitions couldn�t be done today. This is what I said in the very first post in this thread: �Strategic air warfare is today just a minor part of military thinking, with aircraft like the B-52 and B-2 originally designed for strategic use being adapted and used for tactical warfare with precision munitions.�

There never was a point in �doing so�. WWII proved that strategic bombing was not an effective method to wage war in cost of lives and resources.

As for the rest of your post: Your arguments have already been voiced in this thread� and responded to. If this debate is just going in circles with the same arguments being rehashed over and over again it is time for this thread to die.




Hazzer, I agree with almost everything you said.

[Angus]

Very nice Lumpy
Found one of my books, still digging for the second one (that one is better, although a bit smaller, and recommended to my by a retired LW wingco/colonel , hehe was at his place for information excavation and got a good lunch while at it)
Anyway, it's not flawless, but a good read:
"Air Power" by Stephen Budiansky.
ISBN is 0-670-03285-9
Goes from Kitty-Hawk to the Gulf-war II
Will find the other one. Have some really good stuff on the BoB as well, and since that is related with strategic warfare in some sense I'll have some more ISBN's floating around.
BTW, one of the best that I read from in a more WW2 general sense in John Keegan. Absolutely brilliant.