Interesting discussion
My take on this is that there is a fairly simple explanation for why, when there are two large sides and one much smaller side online, both large sides tend to attack the small one. We also often see that, when the two large sides eventually have to attack each other, very little defence takes place. Both concentrate on attacking undefended or weakly defended bases in a race to meet the victory conditions first, gaining territory quickly at minimum personal cost and risk.
I don't think this requires collusion or secret alliances. It can arise naturally from a combination of game theory, the incentives built into the game and normal human self interest. Different players and sides can independently make perfectly understandable choices which, taken together, produce behaviour that looks coordinated.
This does not mean that every player shares these motivations. Some players simply want to fight, test their personal skill, fly or drive particular vehicles, or enjoy the game in whatever way appeals to them. There are many different reasons why individuals play. I am not suggesting anything about the motives of any particular player. I am looking only at the overall behaviour we repeatedly see in the arena. If that behaviour occurs consistently, it suggests that these incentives are influencing enough players to shape the behaviour of the sides as a whole.
Let me start with an analogy:
Imagine three men adrift in a lifeboat with only enough food and water for two. Two are much larger and stronger than the third. Assume each acts purely in his own best interest and that any pair can overpower the third.
For either large man, the safest partnership is with the other large man. Together they can overpower the much smaller man with relatively little risk of injury. Joining the small man in a fight against someone of his own size would carry a much greater risk. So both large men independently have the same rational preference: each would rather join the other large man against the weakest. The two large men throw the smaller one overboard, after which there is enough food and water for both and neither has any reason to risk fighting the other.
Nobody needs to particularly like the other large man. Their interests simply coincide because the weakest opponent is the least costly one to confront.
Something similar seems to happen in the game.
Suppose the populations are 100, 90 and 30. The 100 side can fight the 90 side, where resistance and losses are likely to be much greater, or attack the 30 side, where territorial gains should be considerably cheaper. The 90 side independently reaches exactly the same conclusion. No agreement or cooperation between them is required. Both simply choose the easier target: the greatest gain at the lowest expected cost.
The victory conditions reinforce this. A side needs 90% of its own country and 20% of both enemy countries, so both large sides need enemy territory anyway. It therefore makes sense for both to take easy territory from the weak side first and postpone the more expensive fight between themselves.
Eventually the two large sides do have to compete directly, but even then we often see both tending to avoid direct confrontation, each continues attacking rather than defending.
I think this is partly because territory itself has little value beyond counting towards victory, whereas being killed has a direct personal cost to players in points, rank, perks and ego. Capturing weakly defended or undefended territory is therefore much more attractive to an individual player than fighting hard to defend territory elsewhere.
Defence is also often particularly expensive. The attacker chooses the time and place and can concentrate his forces beforehand. Attacking aircraft may already have an altitude advantage, tanks may already be established in strong positions and in numbers, and ships may already be shelling defensive positions before sufficient defenders can react.
The first defenders therefore tend to arrive outnumbered and at a considerable disadvantage. They may have to die repeatedly simply to slow the attack while reinforcements arrive. Even then, many of their side's players may prefer to remain on an attack elsewhere rather than abandon a successful offensive to join a costly defence, so adequate reinforcements may never arrive.
That gives players yet another reason to attack rather than defend.
So I think much of this behaviour follows from one simple incentive:
- Players tend to seek the territorial gains needed for victory wherever those gains can be obtained at the lowest personal risk and cost.
With a large population imbalance, that means both large sides are naturally drawn towards attacking the small side first. Later, when the large sides must compete with each other, the same incentive can turn the war into a race through each other's weakly defended or undefended territory, with victory going to whichever side captures the required percentages first. The fastest path being the path of least resistance.
That may be frustrating for players who prefer frequent direct combat, while other players may enjoy the teamwork, territorial progress or simply winning the war. There are many different motivations among individual players, and I am not claiming that any particular player is consciously making these calculations.
The point is simply that the overall behaviour is clearly visible in the arena. That suggests these incentives influence enough players to shape the behaviour of the sides as a whole. What looks like collusion can therefore emerge naturally from the game's incentive structure interacting with ordinary human self-interest.
At least that's how it looks to me.
Food for thought.
Badboy
