"Ya know, Seeker, from my reading of it, I gather this:
Air attacks killed anywhere from one-third to one-half as many tanks as did armor-piercing shot from anti-tank artillery and other tanks. "
I didn't know that, to be honest, but you make a good point.
My point was that despite what appears to surprisingly low amounts of actual destroyed hardware on the field, all those involved at the time, from the highest Axis commanders to the lowest Allied grunt hunkered down and watching; all agree on the absolutly paralyzing effect of unopposed airpower on armour movement.
After all, it seems both sides had to re-invent the wheel numerous times. Just as the Allieds failed to learn the buff lesson from the Battle of Brittain, and had to learn it all for them selves, so the Axis seemed to forget the effectiveness of the Blitzkrieg they themselves invented, and seemed to have no plans, doctrines or tactics to combat Blitzkrieg turned against them. Funk once posted a late war Spit pilot's log book, and I was very surprised to see that over 90 % of sorties were Jabo, not a role one immeaditaly associates with the Spit.
Again, I'd love to see some Eastern Front analysis for balance, as most of the discussions on this board are post D-day, but there's valuble comparisons to be made in both the Italian and North African campaigns too. I'm afraid to say I know absolutly nothing of the Pacific theatre's use of armour either.
What was the Finnish experience against Soviet armour?
