Originally posted by Guppy
It took until mid-1944 for 8th Fighter Command to re-equip its main strength with P-51s. In 1943 and early 1944, the bulk of the fighter force was made up of P-47s, and half or more of the long-range escorts were P-38s.
I agree that 8th AF would have been better off retaining its P-38s instead of handing them off to 12th AF, but I still don't think that would have allowed them to dispense with P-47s. P-38 production wasn't sufficient to meet the needs of the ETO, MTO and SWPA groups, and a lot of desperate shuffling had to take place to keep everything together (a P-38F-15 was still flying combat missions with 15th AF in mid-May, 1944!).
Also, having more P-38s would only lead to even more engine problems over Europe, further straining logistics and maintenance. On the plus side, though, an earlier introduction to combat might mean that the problems would actually be fixed in time to do some good.
There is no doubt that the P-47 was absolutely essential. Had the 8th AF just gotten their act together and equipped the P-47 with the right drop tanks range would not have been an issue. The P-47 could never have been replaced, unless there had been a few thousand more P-38s, or some other competent fighter, such as the P-51, or the F4U. The P-51 was not a world beater, there were just plenty of them and they arrived at the right time.
Regarding P-38 engines, by the time the P-51 arrived in substantial numbers, the P-38 engine problems (mostly poor pilot training and dishwater gasoline) were solved, with improved fuel, and more automatic engine controls.
When the P-51 arrived, it brought plenty of problems of its own. Cracked heads dumped coolant, and siezed engines, resulting in the loss of the plane, massive amounts of fouled plugs, nasty spins caused by the 85 gallon tank behind the pilot, and a host of other issues. The idea that the P-51 arrived with no bugs and ready to fight, with some sort of near perfect reliability, performance, and maintenance record is nothing more than an 8th AF myth to cover for previous gross incompetence of their command staff.
The problem of low P-38 production is sort of funny. There were nearly 10,000 P-38s built and deployed, more than most fighters in WWII. And that still wasn't enough. There must have been an incredible demand for a plane that was supposedly so incapable of defeating its enemies (a 4:1 or better kill ratio in combat vs. the Luftwaffe). The fault for there not being 20,000 P-38s instead of 10,000 must be laid squarely at the feet of the War Production Board and the USAAF. Being for the most part of the war the most sought after fighter plane, the P-38 was never really second sourced. Although there was a plant near here supposedly producing them, Consolidated Vultee of Nashville Tennessee never actually built more than 113 P-38s. Lockheed in Burbank was saddled with the extra production of B-17s when Boeing couldn't build enough (had Lockheed been building more P-38s instead, and the 8th AF used them for escorts the demand for B-17s might have been easier to satisfy).
Regarding the solving of P-38 problems, the USAAF and the War Production Board held up the installation of many of the "problem solvers" Lockheed came up with. Not to mention they tied up Lockheed engineers with stupid projects that the USAAF did a very poor job of managing (yes, the USAAF managed engineering projects, not the aircraft company or its engineers). The P-38 engine issues were actually solved in 1943, not mid to late 1944. The reason those upgrades weren't on P-38s in combat in mid 1943, instead of early 1944 is simply incompetence on the part of USAAF command staff and the War Production Board. Even the dive flaps were ready by spring of 1943. Had second source production been in place when it should have, in 1942, by mid 1943, you would have seen 460 MPH P-38s with automatic engine controls and dive flaps in combat. Lockheed was continually denied permission to stop production in order to upgrade the P-38 ( most often, the proposed production stoppage was for less than one week).
In all honesty, the P-51 equalled the P-38 in numbers deployed by April 20th, 1944, a couple months before mid 1944. The majority of historians say the Luftwaffe was finished as a major force by April. While they continued to do damage, to both fighters and bombers, they were no longer an insurmountable obstacle.
The biggest changes that produced measurable results were the release of fighters from close escort, and the tactic of having the P-47s escort the bombers to and from the German frontier, and having the long range escorts only flying escort while deep in Germany. It allowed the long range escorts more fuel to fight with, and less time to fly. Being able to fly directly to the point where the P-47s were released, do the deep penetration escort, and then be released to return to base as soon as the P-47s were available for the return leg, the long range squadrons had as much as 24% more fuel, and as much as two hours less flying time. It was much more a matter of the change in tactics, combined with the introduction of MORE fighters than it was any one particular fighter. Had the new fighters been P-47s with the necessary range, or P-38J-10-Los, the result would have been the same.
Remember that long range high altitude escort over the enemies homeland was a totally new concept (at least to the 8th AF) when a single unit equipped with P-38s was suddenly thrust into the job in October 1943, fresh from training in the U.S. (less than 30 days deployed), with no experienced leadership, and facing 10:1 or worse odds when the P-47s had to turn around. And still bomber losses dropped immediately. Looks to me like they did well for a bunch of green rookie kids in a supposedly incapable plane. Imagine if they'd been there in June, with three other groups, all at once, with shiny new P-38K-5-Lo fighters.
