From what I've been told by actual fighter pilots from the 1st, 20th, 55th, and 475th, the P-38 had no handling vices other than compressibility in a dive from above 25,000 feet. The closest other characteristic that might be termed a vice was that it tended to float a little on landing. The twin engine layout allowed it to have zero net torque, it had a very low stall speed with gentle stall departure (if it even departed, you had to be in an extremely tight turn to actually depart) and relatively easy recovery. It had a short take off run, was easy to land, and generally a pleasure to fly.
If you violated the takeoff procedure, you could lose an engine on takeoff, and if you were not prepared or trained, that could kill you.
The only significant changes to the airframe that modified handling characteristics made between the F model and the end of production of the L model was the addition of the dive flaps. That and a change to the fillet radius where the wing attached to the center nacelle only affected the dive characteristics.
The P-38 was a big plane, but if handled properly, could turn with most anything, had an excellent climb rate, and great acceleration. Using differential throttle application, you could turn a P-38 extremely tight.
With a 4:1 kill to loss ratio in combat against the Luftwaffe, it was more than capable as a fighter, and an escort fighter, and did a great job of ground interdiction.
The P-38 was not known for engine problems in North Africa, and had a tremendous record in both North Africa and the Mediterranian.
The proper throttle setting for range on the P-38 was 1600 RPM, 50+ inches of manifold pressure, and mixture to auto lean. The P-38 had no equal in range at any time in World War II, among Allied fighters. The P-38 was the FIRST Allied fighter over Berlin, by itself, even the bombers had turned back.
The P-38 did well in the Pacific because General Kenney loved the plane, had confidence in it, and instilled that confidence in his men. The 8th AF was lead by bomber command staff, and when it came to fighter operations, until Doolittle came along, they were totally incompetent.
The P-38 could and did operate at altitudes in excess of 28,000 feet over the Pacific regularly, and it's just as cold at 28,000 feet over New Guinea as it is at 28,000 feet over Regensburg. The cold weather thing is pure B.S. The P-38 did have cockpit heating problems, but the improper operation of the plane was the problem with regards to mechanical failure.
The problem with cold weather operation in Europe was that pilots were running the Allisons at 2000 RPM, 20 inches of manifold pressure, and mixture in auto rich. The oil and coolant were so cold they almost congealed, and sometimes did. The cylinder head temperatures dropped so low that the gauges didn't even register. Anyone with common sense knew this could not work, but it was procedure, and that was that. It not only wasted precious fuel, it caused turbochargers to overspeed because the regulators froze, it caused engines to stall and backfire when the throttles were advanced, it caused plugs to foul constantly, resulting in rough engines and premature returns.
The minute some intelligent pilot ran his manifold pressure up to 50 inches, and switched his mixture to auto lean, the problem stopped. Even after this was discovered, the 8th did a poor job of getting the information out.
Another problem was the poor quality British Petroleum fuel. It had the tel anti knock compound blended poorly, right before the fuel was loaded in the plane. The early P-38 (pre J models)had a bizarre intercooler, which was actually a corrugated metal duct that went from the carb to the wingtip and back. In these, the tel dropped out of the fuel, and cuased detonation. In the J and later models, the intercooler was a regular core type, with a door that controlled temperature. When pilots left the door open at cruise, the tel dropped out due to excessive cooling. When Doolittle arranged to have Shell (his former employer) deliver good quality fuel to Britain, these problems stopped.
The oil coolers also had doors, and when left open at cruise, they would chill the oil, which caused the same problems as low temperature brought on by using the wrong cruise settings.
Lockheed had already solved this problem in 1943, back in the early spring, but once again, they were not allowed to stop production for a few days to make the changes, until late in 1943 at a model change. They had automatic engine temperature controls ready for the G models, but they didn't appear until the J model.
It was quite common for pilots to file an early return report claiming mechanical problems, and for the maintenance crew to file a report stating the plane had no such problems.
