Hazed,
If I lead you to think I considered the pilots of the Luftwaffe to be inferior, then you misunderstood me. Nothing could be further from the truth. I've stated for years that, especially in the case of the 20th and 55th, they were not only green, but so was their command staff. Stan and Art both complained about lack of leadership and experience at times, and confidence at other times. On the other hand, the Luftwaffe pilots were experienced, battle hardened, and talented. On the squadron level they were fairly well lead.
However, between October of 1943 and February of 1944, and especially in October and November of 1943, the deep penetration escorts were overwhelmingly outnumbered by the Luftwaffe. Most often, the best the escorts could do was 80% strength at take off, and early returns accounted for the loss of as much as 50% of that strength. On any given mission, the entire available deep penetration escort in October and November consisted of the above mentioned 80% of ONE FIGHTER GROUP. That's a fact. Entire 200 to 400 bomber groups were covered by as few as 50 fighters when they were actually IN Germany. These same 50 planes flew the ENTIRE mission. They had enough fuel for 5 minutes of combat at 100% throttle, any more than that and the best they could hope for was a swim in a cold English Channel. The P-38s most often flew from the WEST side of England, forcing them to fly longer than any other group.
Beginning in February, the numbers BEGAN to become more equal. Finally, the P-51s were arriving in strength, the P-47s gained longer legs, and more P-38s arrived. However, both the P-38s and the P-51s were still experiencing teething problems, and they were still tied to close escort. Only when the escorts were released to engage the Luftwaffe on their own terms, and when escort duty was assigned in stages, allowing the escorts to work in shifts on each mission, did the end begin to come quickly. The idea that there were suddenly overwhelming numbers of Allied fighters is false. Only in April did the number of P-51s deployed to Europe even equal that of the P-38s. There was still a serious shortage of drop tanks, especially for the P-47s.
There was a serious shortage of well trained replacement pilots, and they were often sent to the wrong units. Art said it was not at all uncommon to get replacement pilots who had never even sat in a P-38, nevermind flown one. Trained P-38 pilots were often sent to P-51 or P-47 equipped units.
There was even a lingering problem with poor fuel quality that caused extreme difficulty with both the P-38 and the P-51. Fouled plugs, rough engines, blown head gaskets and cracked heads (those last two are FATAL to a P-51, a cooling system problem meant a P-51 had a very few minutes to fly under power) blown up intercoolers, kicked rods, and burnt valves, were all COMMON problems. Only after Doolittle took over did the fuel issue get resolved, and then only because Doolittle was a Shell employee in his civilian career.
Contrary to popular belief, the 8th AF spent as much time shooting itself in the foot as it did shooting down the Luftwaffe. The list of mistakes made by the 8th AF and even higher staff is longer than anyone cares to recount.
Back to your first post that began this whole thing. The first glaring error I saw in what you quoted was the fact that the Luftwaffe pilot thought the P-51 was more manueverable and a better climber than the P-38 showed he did not know his opponent well. In fact, neither is true, and the P-38 was actually faster at higher altitudes. I'm not saying the whole book is wrong or without merit, I'm just saying that the first quote is an opinion that is in fact just that, an opinion, easily refuted by facts. I hope to be able to read the book sometime soon, I'm sure there is valuable information in it.
