Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => The O' Club => Topic started by: Anaxogoras on April 12, 2009, 11:07:48 AM
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Ok, let's talk about the Battle of France. There was a lot of great discussion here about whether the Soviet Union did more to defeat Germany than the Western allies, and so I hope to hear more educated opinion about May/June 1940.
More specifically, to what degree was the French surrender brought about by the UK's fleeing across the channel? Could the UK have maintained a foothold in France despite the disaster at Dunkirk? Could the disaster have been averted? Not all of Churchill's decisions were proved correct during the war (Italy?), as much as we admire him today. Never sending Spitfire squadrons to France has always been a question mark in my mind.
France and the UK were in the habit of making defense guarantees that they failed to back up with meaningful action, e.g. they never declared war on the Soviet Union when it invaded Poland after Germany; failure to attack Germany in 1939 when the opportunity was there. It seems that the UK was just as tepid about aiding the French as it was about aiding the Poles, or the Finns in the Winter War.
What's your opinion?
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Did Russian beat Germany? That is a tough debate. Almost every campaign the Germans had into Russia, have been a failure do to Allies advancing, Hitler not listening to him CO and Hitler pulling troops, A/C and equipment away from the Eastern front to the western front. Lets no forget the fear factor Russia's had. Sending troops 10 to 1 against Germans, the brutal killing of German troops the surrender and physiological methods Russian used on the Germans.
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Dude.
http://bbs.hitechcreations.com/smf/index.php/topic,250753.0.html (http://bbs.hitechcreations.com/smf/index.php/topic,250753.0.html)
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Yea, i see. but, Russia was just to big to defeat.
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Well, at the time...it was Chamberlan.
France's defense was the Maginot line...which the Germans simply went around.
The tactics that Germany used were developed in secret and were something completely new. Gemany split the allies when they hit the coast, leaving the BEF without a decent port to supply them.
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Well, at the time...it was Chamberlan.
Churchill became PM on May 10th, 1940.
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As for the limited supply of fighters from England, that was due to the presumption (correctly I might add) that England could not afford to deplete its fighter resources in France. Decision was made to ensure that there were enough to fight the BOB.
Whilst the RAF were being reequipped with spits and hurris, at that time, there were still in fact squadrons of hinds (biplanes) in active service - which were upgraded just before the BOB iirc (I probably dont, but hey ho)
As previously stated, the french defence plan rested heavily on the Maginot line, which whilst impressive, doesn't move, so the hook around into Belgium was, at that time, a spark of genius. That said, had the disarray in the upper echelons of the French/English armies/air force etc been resolved earlier, it would have been a harder fight. Imo, France would still have fallen - blitzkreig being a new (and awesomely effective tactic), and there was not enough space to trade for time to resolve how to beat it - unlike in Russia.
Wurzel
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Well, at the time...it was Chamberlan.
France's defense was the Maginot line...which the Germans simply went around.
The tactics that Germany used were developed in secret and were something completely new. Gemany split the allies when they hit the coast, leaving the BEF without a decent port to supply them.
Blitzkrieg was a development of the theories developed by Fuller and Liddell Heart in the 1920's. Noting secret about it, the Germans just implemented it faster and better than anyone else.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J.F.C._Fuller
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I guess I jumped the gun on Churchill:
From wikipedia:
In 1940, Dowding, nicknamed "Stuffy" by his men, proved unwilling to sacrifice aircraft and pilots in the attempt to aid Allied troops during the Battle of France. He, along with his immediate superior Sir Cyril Newall, then Chief of the Air Staff, resisted repeated requests from Winston Churchill to weaken the home defence by sending precious squadrons to France. When the Allied resistance in France collapsed, he worked closely with Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park, the commander of 11 Fighter Group, in organizing cover for the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk.
That no one corrected me on this point indicates, to me, that as a group we know comparatively little about the Battle of France versus other segments of the war.
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As previously stated, the french defence plan rested heavily on the Maginot line, which whilst impressive, doesn't move, so the hook around into Belgium was, at that time, a spark of genius.
Wurzel
The initial plan wasn't much different from the one they used in WWI. The von Schlieffen Plan. Haul bellybutton to the channel through Belgium and the Netherlends, swing south and overwhelm France.
Their second time around they learned the values of mobility and had the tools to keep a fast moving war going using their Blitzkrieg tactics. The start of WWII is what the Germans wish they had done in 1914.
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Actually I will have to dig up a bunch of books on the subject but the Germans moving through the BeNeLux area was not unexpected and actually the allies did have a plan for it. Several factors though caused problems .. first the Dutch did not allow the British and French to move into their territory at the start of the hostilities. Second the original plans for meeting the Germans in the BeNeLux area were revised and expanded to try to meet them further in than originally planned.
As I said will dig up the books I read in college on the subject (military doctrine and implementation). But overall it was a much closer thing than people thought. The Germans were as surprised as anybody else and what many authors I have read give to the Germans was their flexibility in their command and control and allowing the battlefield commanders to make decisions. The French forces were much more rigid and the command and control couldn't adapt to the flow of the battle.
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The Maginot line is usually the only thing people remember, but there's off course more to it.
Don't forget a couple of factors :
After WW1 France thought there would NEVER be an another World War, due to the horrors of the first one. As such, they didn't really bother updating their hardware, nor tactics.
To show how prepare we were for war, my grand father got given a gun and 5 bullets before being sent to the front. First time he saw a German it was a Stuka squadron that bombed/straffed them, before meeting a whole panzer division. That went quick.
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Your grandfather sounds like one of those who was called up after the core of the French army had already been encircled in the north.
Your comment about updating hardware and tactics seems like a bit of exaggeration. After all, France wasn't fighting with WWI tanks and biplanes, and the subordination of infantry to armor was something that De Gaulle had advocated since the 1920s. The machinery and tactics were there; they were not put to use efficiently and burdened with a cumbersome chain of command.
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Read a fascinating book a few years back called Strange Victory:Hitler's Conquest of France by Ernest R May. Definitely has it's dry spots, but was most revealing. What many don't realize is that the French were well on their way to creating another static front in Belgium before the German's unexpectly erupted from the "impassible" Ardennes after the main French line had moved FORWARD into Belgium.
Bottom line is that the French main body was hampered by two big disadvantages -- its command structure was outrageously, unbelievably inflexible; and the politicians took away the military's best options before the war even started. The Maginot line accomplished its stated goal, and in fact continued to resist for weeks after it had been bypassed and made militarily useless. But the politicians wouldn't allow the military to EITHER build similar defenses along the Belgian border (for fear of offending an ally) OR to advance into Belgian territory when war was declared in order to assure proper defense of France.
So when the Germans started attacking Belgium, the French Army had to wait for political clearance to advance northward and consolidate defensively stronger positions than the pure political boundary allowed. This meant that the first Franco-Nazi battles were closer to meeting engagements than they should have been. Even so, the FRENCH won the armor battles that occurred and stymied German advance. German progress was very slow...UNTIL the forces that got bogged down in the Ardennes broke out from the woods and threatened envelopment. They ALMOST got contained before breaking out, but French dispositions hadn't solidified enough in the area and only a small portion of planned forces were in place. Even after the problem became clear they still had opportunity to "slam the cork into the bottle" and shut things down, but the fossilized command and control systems couldn't cope.
Hitler was not nearly as powerful as later events made him look, and in fact the record shows that many of his generals opposed the war with france. France had more tanks, better tanks, and a larger army than Germany could field. They had the advantages of defense and were fighting on all too familiar ground. Truth be told, even with "blitzkrieg" the French probably SHOULD have been able to stop the Wehrmacht, but the combination of political interference, rigid command structures, and unfortuitous timing in the Ardennes conspired to produce what really was an Unlikely german victory.
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Ok, let's talk about the Battle of France. There was a lot of great discussion here about whether the Soviet Union did more to defeat Germany than the Western allies, and so I hope to hear more educated opinion about May/June 1940.
More specifically, to what degree was the French surrender brought about by the UK's fleeing across the channel? Could the UK have maintained a foothold in France despite the disaster at Dunkirk? Could the disaster have been averted? Not all of Churchill's decisions were proved correct during the war (Italy?), as much as we admire him today. Never sending Spitfire squadrons to France has always been a question mark in my mind.
France and the UK were in the habit of making defense guarantees that they failed to back up with meaningful action, e.g. they never declared war on the Soviet Union when it invaded Poland after Germany; failure to attack Germany in 1939 when the opportunity was there. It seems that the UK was just as tepid about aiding the French as it was about aiding the Poles, or the Finns in the Winter War.
What's your opinion?
Are you asking the cause of the French republic collapse or are you asking if it was the fault of GB that the French republic collapsed?
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I see no way that the French as well as the British forces would have held. The German plan was sound, and worked, the allied defense didn't. In fact, the only big allied plan that worked was the evacuation at Dunkirk.
The only big risk the Gerries took was their advance through the Ardennas- if they'd been tied up there, things could have started to go bad. But they were fast enough and passed through.
As a point of interest, the Axis advanced on may the 10th. That day also delivered Churchill into office. On that day, there was still fighting going on in Norway. And the British occupied Iceland, something of great enough value to ruin Hitler's day :devil
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Read a fascinating book a few years back called Strange Victory:Hitler's Conquest of France by Ernest R May. Definitely has it's dry spots, but was most revealing. What many don't realize is that the French were well on their way to creating another static front in Belgium before the German's unexpectly erupted from the "impassible" Ardennes after the main French line had moved FORWARD into Belgium.
Bottom line is that the French main body was hampered by two big disadvantages -- its command structure was outrageously, unbelievably inflexible; and the politicians took away the military's best options before the war even started. The Maginot line accomplished its stated goal, and in fact continued to resist for weeks after it had been bypassed and made militarily useless. But the politicians wouldn't allow the military to EITHER build similar defenses along the Belgian border (for fear of offending an ally) OR to advance into Belgian territory when war was declared in order to assure proper defense of France.
So when the Germans started attacking Belgium, the French Army had to wait for political clearance to advance northward and consolidate defensively stronger positions than the pure political boundary allowed. This meant that the first Franco-Nazi battles were closer to meeting engagements than they should have been. Even so, the FRENCH won the armor battles that occurred and stymied German advance. German progress was very slow...UNTIL the forces that got bogged down in the Ardennes broke out from the woods and threatened envelopment. They ALMOST got contained before breaking out, but French dispositions hadn't solidified enough in the area and only a small portion of planned forces were in place. Even after the problem became clear they still had opportunity to "slam the cork into the bottle" and shut things down, but the fossilized command and control systems couldn't cope.
Hitler was not nearly as powerful as later events made him look, and in fact the record shows that many of his generals opposed the war with france. France had more tanks, better tanks, and a larger army than Germany could field. They had the advantages of defense and were fighting on all too familiar ground. Truth be told, even with "blitzkrieg" the French probably SHOULD have been able to stop the Wehrmacht, but the combination of political interference, rigid command structures, and unfortuitous timing in the Ardennes conspired to produce what really was an Unlikely german victory.
In a nutshell, that is the best way to describe the military situation on the ground. Although this topic is not normally discused in France, in some circles the blame is placed in the 3rd Republic, Petain and Comunist Unions (that last part is actually a sore point).
The republic was politically ineffective as it required a change of administration every 6 months and could not unify to create a clear political response. Thus, commiting the army without a clear, unhindered direction. The situation became worst when Petain was named "Head of State". Instead of adapting to the situation, he used the situation to gain total political control (kind of what Hitler did in Germany) and simply forcing the republic to surrender.
There is also the issue of the geriatric high command incapable to adjust its doctrine (read Petain). This change should have happened before the battle. (at worst, it should have happened in 1938).
There is the issue of comunist support for the Nazi party as the Soviet Union and Germany were allied at the time. It has long been suspected that unions controled by the comunists hindered production to the war effort. As things turned out after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it turns out that they did hindered the production of war material under orders from Stalin.
There is the issue of popular support. The republic was not well liked. The horrors of WWI were very fresh in the mind. And the popular opinion was that the "Bosh" would simply impose its political will on the republic and go home... just like any other conflict in Europe of the previous 200 years. I don't think many people understood that the Nazi regime had intensions of establishing an empire in Europe. You almost get the feeling that most people wanted to stay out of WWII.
So, from the political point of view, I don't think the 3rd Republic had a chance, and I don't think many people at the time mourned its passing either. But, this whole episode of history is a sore point for those who lived through it. And it is difficult to get the elders to speak about it without finding a wall or having the person you ask breakdown in tears.
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Are you asking the cause of the French republic collapse or are you asking if it was the fault of GB that the French republic collapsed?
These points go together in my mind:
- The Luftwaffe attained air supremacy
- The RAF never committed its full strength to the defense of the continent
- The Wehrmacht had long supply lines, like a traffic jam in some places, that were never touched by Allied bombers.
It would be wrong and simplistic to say it was the UK's fault. However, the more I learn about what actually happened in this battle, the more it seems we are wrong to heap praise on Dowding. A more neutral stance would be appropriate. Like simaril mentioned already, such a rapid German victory was unlikely, so it stands to reason that France and the UK could have stopped the advance if only a few things had gone differently.
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How do you come to that conclusion?
After all, Dowding concluded that pumping the RAF dry over France was nothing but a waste, and he pulled what was left back to England quite late.
I cannot see him being wrong at all.
BTW, not everyone knows this, but actually the RAF had problems (from the behalf of the French) in executing their raids, due to French countermeasures, which were made in fear of German countermeasures!
(The French actually prevented RAF takeoffs by blocking runways!!!!)
Anyway, was the German Victory so unlikely? IMHO, since the got away with neglecting the Maginot line, and thereby playing the plan as they wanted, it was not at all unlikely. They had studied well to avoid trench warfare, which the French in return, had planned. Mobility vs non-mobility.
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Are you asking the cause of the French republic collapse or are you asking if it was the fault of GB that the French republic collapsed?
Britain's force was an expeditionary force and as such had a dependence on the host country. I suppose it could be argued the Brits got stingy with their airplanes when the writing was on the wall but can you blame them? They had a vast empire to protect, one that was totally Dependant on sea lanes. And they knew the Germans would be coming after them next so they had to keep air superiority over the channel and home Islands.
I know the French took it bad. When the Brits pulled into the ports for evac. But what else could they have done? The Germans had the upper hand.
I'd vote that it was French leadership/political will that was to blame. Overall many French units fought hard an well but they had a far to cumbersome command structure. Their failure to attack the flanks of the German advance , in a meaningful way, was unforgivable. The French made their own bed.
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Bear in mind, when the BEF withdrew via Dunkirk and the other channel evacuations, it left all its heavy equipment behind leaving next to nothing in the UK other than men and light arms. With the exception of aircraft, the Battle of France left the UK perilously exposed.
Had the Germans found a feasible way of getting across the channel (and despite the myths, that meant more than just gaining air superiority), they would have found there was little there to stop them.
Good book on the RAF involvement in the Battle of France is 'Blue Man Falling'. It is fiction, but mainly historically accurate.
Being in a Fairey Battle squadron must have sucked.
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What was the population of russia from 1939 to 1945? (How many died, vanished or got captured?)
Kinda wonder how military leaders 5 years before 45 would have reacted to the now known history of the cold war and communism's grip on the planet. Think we would have assisted china in 41, provided russia with thousands of lend lease planes and ammo if we knew how things had turned out?
I am willing to bet, no.
:Edit: The P.82 Defiant, worst "fighter" ever made.
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:Edit: The P.82 Defiant, worst "fighter" ever made.
Ah yes- the Boulton Paul Defiant - a fighter with no forward firing guns... :huh
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These points go together in my mind:
- The Luftwaffe attained air supremacy
- The RAF never committed its full strength to the defense of the continent
- The Wehrmacht had long supply lines, like a traffic jam in some places, that were never touched by Allied bombers.
It would be wrong and simplistic to say it was the UK's fault. However, the more I learn about what actually happened in this battle, the more it seems we are wrong to heap praise on Dowding. A more neutral stance would be appropriate. Like simaril mentioned already, such a rapid German victory was unlikely, so it stands to reason that France and the UK could have stopped the advance if only a few things had gone differently.
- I don't know if the Germans achieved air supremacy. I think they achieved air superiority
- I would not blame the RAF. It was not ready for wide front operations and in ballance, Dowding took the right decision. I don't know what he was thinking, but I am a believer in fighting only the battles that can be won. And the political leadership of the 3rd Republic was not a position to pull together and win the BoF.
- As to the supply lines of the Germans, again, blame the geriatric leadership of the French army. The French Air Force was not independent, and the individual units were subordined to the ground commander of the area. No way that they would have been allowed to attack units behind the lines at the time, even if it is obious to us that it was the weak point. The whole concept of attacking the weak points is the essence of modern warfare. At the time, both British and French doctrine was based on strong defences spread over a wide area. In that frame of mind, the ground commanders would have wanted the air support to help beligered units on the ground
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The French air force actually sported impressive numbers, but their "system" was no good. Dowding illustrated the value of a good system in the BoB, where the LW suddenly started loosing some proper numbers to a smaller force. And not a moment to early did he pull back the fighters from France.
BTW, the RAF's performance immediately improved once they were back at home bases, yet fighting over Dunkirk.
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There are those out there that lay the blame for the defeat on the Brits.
Supplied by an American of French heritage at http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/fall-france-1940-a-10428.html
The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 - Julian Jackson
Of all the works concerning 1940 that i've read, I think this one is the most fair. Very well written, not only examines the military but also the political and societal consequences of 1940. Not solely a 20/20 hindsight lesson, but I feel Jackson really tries to understand the "boot on the ground", so to speak, of why people acted/reacted the way they did. Definately the most studious and serious work I've seen on the subject yet. I highly recommend it. J. Jackson is critical of all where it is deserved and gives praises where it is due.
Sixty Days that Shook the West - Jacques Benoist-Mechin
A day by day account of the battle, both military and political on a per day basis, thus making it simple to understand. Overall it is good, with some generalization here and there, as well as some specifics. I like it because there is a good bunch of early accounts of the High-Commands inter-squabbling as well as national leaders. A sense of panic sets in as you go along.
Basically he (Arsenal VG-33) is saying the Brits turned tail and ran leaving the French 'high and dry'.
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After a lot of reading, I think they did the sensible thing.
And the EVAC was about the only thing ever successful from the allied side in the BoF.
The French, being sore about the deal claimed that if France fell, the British would have their heads twisted off by the neck just like chicken.
After the BoB, the British response was "Some neck. Some Chicken".....
By the way, AFAIK the defence plan put much of the BEF under French command. And there was basically no plan for anything happening except the Germans attacking the Maginot line head-on. Which (silly them!) they didn't :D
As a sidenote, French forces actually moved into Germany as soon as 1939 (Saarland), and left again. IMHO, an allied offensive while Germany was at war in Poland could perhaps have tipped the scale and put the trench war into German soil. But there was not the will for such a plan.
I have been on these grounds. There were great battles there before, when German forces crushed the French late in the 19th century. And there are still some fine pillboxes there from Hitler's time. Slowly sinking into the forests...
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:Edit: The P.82 Defiant, worst "fighter" ever made.
Ah yes- the Boulton Paul Defiant - a fighter with no forward firing guns... :huh
It met Air Ministry Specification F.9/35. Which had specified a "turret fighter with a powered turret as the sole armament."
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As to the supply lines of the Germans, again, blame the geriatric leadership of the French army. The French Air Force was not independent, and the individual units were subordined to the ground commander of the area. No way that they would have been allowed to attack units behind the lines at the time, even if it is obious to us that it was the weak point. The whole concept of attacking the weak points is the essence of modern warfare. At the time, both British and French doctrine was based on strong defences spread over a wide area. In that frame of mind, the ground commanders would have wanted the air support to help beligered units on the ground
It was not a matter of whether the air force was independent or a branch of the army, and to offer that as an explanation for why they didn't attack jammed supply lines implies the most ridiculous stupidity. They didn't attack them because they couldn't; the Luftwaffe had command of the air almost as soon as the battle begun. Hence, my question as to whether the Luftwaffe's air superiority over France could have been prevented, maybe even mitigated to air parity, had the RAF deployed in full strength in France before May 1940.
Again, to me, that the RAF wasn't deployed in full strength in France is symptomatic of more general lukewarm effort to defend allied nations, with France being equally culpable. The Poles were abandoned to their fate, the Finns fought the Russians alone, they made a desultory attempt to help the Norwegians, and then, when it came down to the two strongest powers that hadn't really bothered to defend their weakest allies, they displayed the same flaccidity toward each other.
Lastly, the US was ready to watch the UK surrender to Germany. This is a fact. It's a disheartening chapter in the history of the west.
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Not all know this, but the LEND-LEASE deal only passed through congress with marginal majority. And that was...in 1941.
Anyway, I don't quite go with the BEF being half-hearted in France, nor the RAF. They were simply beaten, and as Dowding coldly put it, the RAF would have stopped existing as a fighting force in a couple of weeks or so for the loss rates they were suffering. The whole defence of France was a disaster once the Germans had managed to flank the French and British and their speedy armour and close ground support owned the fields.
BTW, if I recall right, the French airforce actually sported impressive numbers ...
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It was not a matter of whether the air force was independent or a branch of the army, and to offer that as an explanation for why they didn't attack jammed supply lines implies the most ridiculous stupidity. They didn't attack them because they couldn't; the Luftwaffe had command of the air almost as soon as the battle begun. Hence, my question as to whether the Luftwaffe's air superiority over France could have been prevented, maybe even mitigated to air parity, had the RAF deployed in full strength in France before May 1940.
Again, to me, that the RAF wasn't deployed in full strength in France is symptomatic of more general lukewarm effort to defend allied nations, with France being equally culpable. The Poles were abandoned to their fate, the Finns fought the Russians alone, they made a desultory attempt to help the Norwegians, and then, when it came down to the two strongest powers that hadn't really bothered to defend their weakest allies, they displayed the same flaccidity toward each other.
Lastly, the US was ready to watch the UK surrender to Germany. This is a fact. It's a disheartening chapter in the history of the west.
Again, I disagree. The RAF was not fully equipped to match the Luftwaffe in the Battle of France, nor was it in the Battle of Britain.
The fact of the matter is that the Luftwaffe was fully modernised with over 5,600 +/- planes against a combined force (that is French, British, Belgians and Dutch) of mostly outdated or outclassed totalling 2,900 +/- planes. Overall, I think the pilots of the allies air forces accounted well for themselves if you consider that they still accounted for 1,600 +/- of the Luftwaffe planes with loosing themselves of 2,000 +/- planes. That is pretty even outcome considering the disparity of quality of planes and numbers. So, to say that the Luftwaffe achieved air superiority... again, if they would have concentrated the forces to hit particular areas instead of spreading them throughout the front line, I can see them decimating the supply lines. But, they weren't, they were spread under the command of the ground forces... who didn't care about hitting targets beyond its tactical area.
As to the issue of the RAF, my point is that had the Armee de L'air been independent, better equipped, and better organized, it could have have held the Luftwaffe at bay. But, it wasn't, and a few antiquated British planes would not have made much of a difference when the bulk of the air forces would have still been French.
Just looking at the disposition of the RAF in the Battle of Britain, the numbers again show an unprepared air force. 1,900 +/- British planes versus 4,000 +/- Luftwaffe planes. The difference of numbers in the Luftwaffe shows its losses in the Battle of France. Although the Luftwaffe lost 1,800 +/- planes, the RAF lost 1,500 +/- planes. It was fighting over a smaller area, over its own territory, without a worry about ground support, and it still nearly collapsed, and with better planes than while in France. It just was not going to make much of a difference in France.
I do agree that it was a sad episode, made even sadder by the lack of better leader prior to the war when it could have made all the difference in preparing and reorganizing both the RAF and the Armee de l'Air, and for that matter, the ground forces too.
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Not all know this, but the LEND-LEASE deal only passed through congress with marginal majority. And that was...in 1941.
Anyway, I don't quite go with the BEF being half-hearted in France, nor the RAF. They were simply beaten, and as Dowding coldly put it, the RAF would have stopped existing as a fighting force in a couple of weeks or so for the loss rates they were suffering. The whole defence of France was a disaster once the Germans had managed to flank the French and British and their speedy armour and close ground support owned the fields.
BTW, if I recall right, the French airforce actually sported impressive numbers ...
Well, they were certainly impressive at the end :aok
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Something to consider.
About half of the RAF squadrons committed to France were strike / light bomber squadrons. On May 10th 1940 (the first day of the battle), there were 8 or 9 squadrons of Fairey Battles and 5 squadrons of Bristol Blenheims. The Blenheim ultimately proved reasonably successful as a night fighter, but in 1940 was obsolescent a daytime light bomber. Casualties were high. The Fairey Battle was an unmitigated disaster with casualties on some raids, notably the attacks on the bridges over the Meuse at Sedan resulting in almost 100% losses for some squadrons.
A further 6 squadrons were army co-operation units flying Lysanders.
That left only 7 squadrons of Hurricanes and 2 mixed Hurricane / Gloster Gladiator squadrons (the Gladiator being a fixed undercarriage biplane). That's about 96 modern fighters. The only real surprise then is that they made as much of a dent in the Luftwaffe as they did.
Anaxogoras has questioned Britain and France's commitment to defending Poland. I'm curious as to how - in 1939 or early 1940, either country could have done much to intervene?
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Anaxogoras has questioned Britain and France's commitment to defending Poland. I'm curious as to how - in 1939 or early 1940, either country could have done much to intervene?
Invade Germany.
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Invade Germany.
In 1936, sure! Afterward, the best bet would have been to bring the full resources of the French Empire, which would have taken time... time the Germans didn't give the French.
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In 1939- Early 1940 Conan not 1936
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As I mentioned, the French did indeed occupy a slice of Saarland in 1939. The Germans, AFAIK actually had evacuated the area. However there was no further plan of pushing in, so the French just left again.
The French plan was basically defensive, trusting on their Maginot line. There was no particular plan for flanks, supporting the Netherlands, nor a proper air defence system as the British were building. So, once the Germans came with their Blitz, it was all shambles....
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French air force order of battle on the 10th of may, 1940:
http://france1940.free.fr/adla/ada_may.html
Quite a few....
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French air force order of battle on the 10th of may, 1940:
http://france1940.free.fr/adla/ada_may.html
Quite a few....
Yeah, I have seen that. Shame it's not in a spreadsheet format, so that we can filter through some data... No way I am gonna spend time sorting through all that.
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Was hoping you would save be the trouble :devil
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To break it down:
The Dewoitine 520 (with which one squadron was equipped) was just about match for the 109E. The rest were outclassed although the Moraine gave a reasonable account of itself.
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Invade Germany.
How?
- France and Britain wore woefully ill-prepared to fight a war with Germany in 1939 after 20 years of military cutbacks.
- The Siegfried line was far more formidable than the opposing Maginot Line
- France and Britain didn't (or chose not to) have the option of advancing through the Benelux countries.
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To break it down:
The Dewoitine 520 (with which one squadron was equipped) was just about match for the 109E. The rest were outclassed although the Moraine gave a reasonable account of itself.
CC, the D520, then the MS, but don't forget the Curtiss Hawk ;)
AFAIK, in the BoF (As well as the blitzkrieg across the Netherlands), not all of the 109's were even the E model, as well as the air being thick with 110's, Ju87's, possibly Henchel bipes and Ju52's (of whom many were lost in Holland). So in short, fighting the LW didn't just mean jostling with the 109....
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Was hoping you would save be the trouble :devil
Nice try :aok but, it ain't gonna happen.
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How?
- France and Britain wore woefully ill-prepared to fight a war with Germany in 1939 after 20 years of military cutbacks.
- The Siegfried line was far more formidable than the opposing Maginot Line
- France and Britain didn't (or chose not to) have the option of advancing through the Benelux countries.
Those points are ussually over looked. I agree, no way it would accomplish much other than get a lot of soldiers killed assaulting the front door of fortifications.
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Because of hindsight, we have to say that attacking nonetheless was the better choice; excluding the mentioned fortifications Germany's west was lightly defended during their attack on Poland.
Or, if I take the opposing position, then France and the UK had no business telling Poland "we'll protect you."
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They were slow in thinking and neither expected Poland to fall so fast, nor France. After all, the German advance tactics were Blitzy-Genious.
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Or, if I take the opposing position, then France and the UK had no business telling Poland "we'll protect you."
Yeah, the whole thing was prepostruous. The French knew that it would take a while to rebuild their arms industry in order to match the German's industries... but in the other hand, give Germany a free hand in Eastern Europe and it would be difficult to match them in the long run. Tough call.
But, for the British, it was different, if they waited until 1942, the German navy would have presented a serious treath to the Royal Navy, so, the quicker, the better.
At the end, all they (France, GB and Germany) acomplished was to self-destruct.
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Not so sure of all that. I'd rather say that the western powers were hoping that the Germans would bog-down in Poland, and were stunned by the swift victory. There wasn't much they could have done about it anyway, except engaging in an offensive into Germany, - something never planned at all. And the horrors of WWI were still alive in everybody's mind.
Actually, the British were DISARMING almost to the outbreak of WW2, and Churchill, predicting the agressions and evilness of the Nazis (as well as claiming it being worse than communism) was frequently named a "warmonger" or somthing of that sort.
As for the German Navy, it "could" have made a little threat if it would have kept hidden until the capital ships were ready. One TG is yet little compared to what the RN was sporting. And before 1942 there were far bigger events at work...
And where did GB self-destruct???? Not getting you M8....
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Well, you can argue that WW2 caused GB to diminish from global empire to side-kick of the US.
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Not so sure of all that. I'd rather say that the western powers were hoping that the Germans would bog-down in Poland, and were stunned by the swift victory. There wasn't much they could have done about it anyway, except engaging in an offensive into Germany, - something never planned at all. And the horrors of WWI were still alive in everybody's mind.
Actually, the British were DISARMING almost to the outbreak of WW2, and Churchill, predicting the agressions and evilness of the Nazis (as well as claiming it being worse than communism) was frequently named a "warmonger" or somthing of that sort.
As for the German Navy, it "could" have made a little threat if it would have kept hidden until the capital ships were ready. One TG is yet little compared to what the RN was sporting. And before 1942 there were far bigger events at work...
And where did GB self-destruct???? Not getting you M8....
1.-Yes, the quick collapse of Polland was surprising. But France was not where near as industrialised as Germany in 1939. Keep in Mind that Germany was the most advanced, industrialised mobilised country in Europe. France needed time to "modernised" their factories in order to produce at the same level as the Germans... and the Germans factories weren't even at full capacity yet. When they occupied Chzecoslovakia, Germany gained great industrial capacities. Occupying Poland would have increase it even more. That's why France needed time to bring their investment into their own factories and American factories into fruition.
France needed time to mobilise the full human resources of its empire... Germany was already mobilised. And when it comes to technology, well, under-investment placed the French army at a disadvantace.
2.-The Kriegsmarine was engaged in a program of ship-building. It was fortcasted that by 1942 it could match the Royal Navy. But, because the war started in 1939, all they could hope was to conduct bucaneer operations. Remember, at the time, you can defeate the British only if you could stop the Royal Navy from controlling the sea, even if you never set foot in Britain.
3.-Both France and GB ended up bankrupt after WWII. So heavily in debt to the US and unable to mantain their empires that they went from World leaders, to tennant of empires that ended up tearing themsleves to pieces which could not impose its will over its own territory. As for Germany, well, it went from the most advance country in Europe to a country occupied for over 50 years by 4 foreign countries.... least we say about the rubble in the Germans cities (1945), the better off we are.
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I will give some time on this later, but there are many points where I completely disagree with you bud....
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2.-The Kriegsmarine was engaged in a program of ship-building. It was fortcasted that by 1942 it could match the Royal Navy. But, because the war started in 1939, all they could hope was to conduct bucaneer operations. Remember, at the time, you can defeate the British only if you could stop the Royal Navy from controlling the sea, even if you never set foot in Britain.
Even as it was, the Kriegsmarine was the branch of the German military that came closest to taking Britain out of the war.
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Even as it was, the Kriegsmarine was the branch of the German military that came closest to taking Britain out of the war.
Do you mean the U-boat component of the KM?
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Do you mean the U-boat component of the KM?
Has to be.
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Even as it was, the Kriegsmarine was the branch of the German military that came closest to taking Britain out of the war.
True. But they could not face the British on the surface, nor did they manage to lift the RN's embargo on German ships. Basically, Germany could have bought goods from the USA until 1941, - there was nothing American to prevent that (!), however, they could not get their stuff past the RN.
For the Axis to threaten the RN on the surface, they would have needed the combined forces of the Kriegsmarine, the Italan navy and the Vichy fleet. That would be a force far stronger than what the kriegsmarine "could have" sported in 1940, and this would have been at the time of the BoB. In the fall of 1940.
One key there would have been getting Gibraltar out of British hands, or win a naval superiority in the med before, which could have happened with the combined Vichy forces and the Italian navy vs the RN. This was the Axis thought, and this was exactly what Churchill also concluded. Clever guy who made some tough decisions...
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How?
- France and Britain wore woefully ill-prepared to fight a war with Germany in 1939 after 20 years of military cutbacks.
- The Siegfried line was far more formidable than the opposing Maginot Line
- France and Britain didn't (or chose not to) have the option of advancing through the Benelux countries.
The Westwall was an empty shell in 1939 and 40, barely more than a string of pillboxes. It was not even close to the Maginot Line.
The vast majority of Germany's forces were in Poland in September 39. If the point of declaring war against Germany was to come to Poland's aid, to say France and Britain did a poor job is a monumental understatement. They provided not one iota of pressure against Germany in the west.
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It sucks not to have an offensive plan :D
Britain belived in their Navy, the French in their wall. And neither belived that the Polish would buckle so fast.
There is one factor here that seems to be ignored. Germany and the USSR were allies.
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It sucks not to have an offensive plan :D
Britain belived in their Navy, the French in their wall. And neither belived that the Polish would buckle so fast.
There is one factor here that seems to be ignored. Germany and the USSR were allies.
Which is why France and the UK were also obliged to declare war on the USSR, but they didn't.
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If they did, wouldnt that be interesting
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Which is why France and the UK were also obliged to declare war on the USSR, but they didn't.
They were not obliged to. However, the fact alone made a land campaign against the Germans quite hopeless, as well as the only success being more territory lost to the USSR. Bear in mind that the USSR took their pre-planned slice of Poland (Molotov-Ribbentropf pact) as well as the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania).
Between the western nations there was also a disagreement about Nationalism and communism. Which was the worse one? Both France and Britain had quite som on-going communism at the time. The USA was however very suspicious towards communism. Churchill however was clear about Nazism clearly being the worse of two. Then there was the chance of the two baddies going against each other, -which did happen....