Gripen,
Since you insist on pedaling half truths. Lets examine some key paragraphs keeping them in context.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ww2/batlbrit.pdfYou say the RAF could have sustained it's losses and the LW could not have kept up the pressure.
Lets examine the Order of Battle:
"On 1 August RAF Fighter Command
strength stood at 570 Hurricanes and
Spitfires (two- thirds of these were
Hurricanes), and of the total only 367 were
operational. Thus, excluding the less
capable types, Blenheims, Defiants,
Gladiators, and so forth, the German
Me109s outnumbered the British forces by
almost two to one (367 versus 702). British
defenses also included some 1,200 heavy
and 650 light antiaircraft pieces. And,
although the Germans considered these
insufficient for the defensive task, antiaircraft
fire would account for about 12 percent of the
German losses in the coming battles."
This is the Strength of RAF FIGHTER COMMAND. The entire RAF fighter force. Including the areas the LW could not overfly to the North/West of England.
"GERMAN AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY
10 AUGUST 1940
The total force available on 10 August
was 3,196 aircraft, with 2,485 operational.
Luftflotte 5:
138 He111 and Ju88 (123 operational)
37 Me110 (34)
Luftflotten 2 and 3:
406 Ju87 (316)
282 Me110 (227)
813 Me109 (702)"
This is the LW forces involved in the BoB. Now there are 2 other Luftflottes the LW is not using. They are holding down the frontiers of the Riech which is not at war any place else except England in August '40. Check out the appendix in Lund's article under Order of Battle.
Now lets look at losses, ability to replace Aircraft, and pilots.
"Between 8 August and 6
September, 657 fighters had been lost. By
using replacement aircraft (from repairs and
storage) Fighter Command managed, until 1
September, to keep frontline strength at
about the same levels as were available at
the end of July. But, those reserves had
dwindled from 518 Spitfires and Hurricanes
(in maintenance and storage) on 6 July, to
only 292 by 7 September."
The RAF's Entire fighter force reserves are down to 292 planes. Pretty low. Now lets look at the RAF's ability to replace those reserves and keep it's frontline strength up.
"British production figures were no
more encouraging. In the last week of
August, for example, only 91 Spitfire and
Hurricanes were produced while losses
reached 137 destroyed and 11 seriously
damaged. With losses at these rates,
Fighter Command estimated that reserves
would be exhausted in three weeks followed
by steady depletion of the frontline
squadrons. This, of course, would be
accelerated if the Luftwaffe could
successfully knock out critical production
facilities."
So by the end of September '40 IF the LW kept it's current strategy the RAF would be running on empty with nothing to replace it's losses OF JUST PLANES.
Let's look at the RAF's ability to replace it's pilots.
"The critical problem faced
by Fighter Command was the loss of
trained fighter pilots. In phase one of the
campaign (8 to 18 August), the RAF lost
154 pilots (killed, seriously wounded or
missing). Only 63 new fighter pilots were
available from the training schools for the
same period. During phase two, 24 August
to 1 September, the figures were even
worse as losses reached 231 pilots, or
about 20 percent of the total combat
strength of the command! Combat strength
in the month of August decreased by
almost one-third, from 1,434 to 1,023. The
squadron average fell from 26 to 16
operational pilots. Naturally, combat
experience was similarly reduced.
In July and August, roughly onefourth
of the squadron leaders and one-third of
the flight leaders had been killed or removed
from flying due to injuries. Experienced pilots
numbered no more than 500—less than onehalf
of Fighter Command's strength—with the
remainder often having less than 20 hours
flying time on fighters. Daily sortie rates were
high and it was not uncommon for pilots to fly
three and four sorties a day. Stress was also
high. "One squadron, No. 85, based at
Croydon, had fourteen of its eighteen pilots
shot down in two weeks, two of them
twice."105"
So the RAF was losing pilots it could not replace AND just as importantly was losing it's experienced pilots who could fight.
So were does this all leave the RAF on 7 September '40?
"On the ground the persistence of the
German attacks was beginning to take effect.
The RAF was faced with the real possibility of
withdrawing 11 Group to bases north of
London. "Air superiority over Kent and
Essex, at least for a week or two, was in the
Luftwaffe's grasp; the aim of Adlerangrif was
near to being realized."106"
Now lets look at the LW's Three Luftflottes that were facing down the RAF:
First we will look at the LW's ability to replace it's lost Aircraft.
"Material losses were also high; in the
two week period beginning 24 August some
545 aircraft of all types were lost—200 more
than British losses for the same period. By 7
September, Luftflotten 2 and 3 fielded 623
operational Me 109s. This was a reduction of
about one-eighth the available strength at the
beginning of phase one."
They have lost ONE EIGHTH their original Strength of ME 109's...They went from 702 (just 109's) to 623.
Now lets look at the RLM's ability to produce 109's.
"Production of the Me109 (190 per
month) was about one-half the British
production rate for the Spitfire and Hurricane.
Reserves were sufficient to keep most fighter
units at 80 percent strength and bombers at 86
percent. While losses of the bombers and
Me110s should be considered high, this too
was changing. "As the inexperience of the
R.A.F. squadrons increased, so also would
the success of the German bombers and twinengined
fighters, whose crews were, thus far at
least, more easily replaced with experienced
personnel."107 Therefore, the Luftwaffe ended
Phase two with a capability to field 623
operational Me109s against a force of only 350
RAF fighters."
So the LW was able to replace it planes and keep it's units at a combat effective level.
Now lets look at the LW's ability to replace it's pilot losses.
"The Luftwaffe, too, was experiencing
difficulties at this point in the campaign. Crew
fatigue was evident because the Luftwaffe did
not establish a system of pilot rotation as had
the RAF. Because of the requirement for
extensive escort duties most fighter pilots flew
two sorties a day for weeks at a time. Aircrew
losses were high, reaching five losses for each
British loss. This problem became so serious
Goering ordered that only one officer be allowed
to fly per aircraft, severely reducing the
experience level “airborne” within the bomber
forces. Only 97 percent of the pilot
requirement could be met for the serviceable
Me109s."
So the LW was down 3 percent of its 109 pilots and 1/8th of it's planes. Again their are two other Luftflottes the LW has not drawn any replacements from. The RAF's average fighter squadron has been reduced by 38 percent. Seems the facts show the LW was winning AND could sustain the losses. Sure the bombers were getting a nose bleed but there were 2 other Luftflottes to throw in the fray AND the RAF was fatally hemorrhaging the all important fighter pilot.
The single engine dayfighters were doing just fine in the LW. Even at the 1:2 ratio. which would have begun to dramatically increase just as the USAAF ratio increased in '44 against the average inexperienced LW pilot, the LW could sustain it's losses. Not an easy victory but a victory nonetheless.
But we all know the LW high command changed strategy and lost the fight. Thank god.
To say the LW had no chance of winning the BoB is pure fantasy. It was in fact a hard won victory for the RAF. One that they almost didn't come out on top of...
Crumpp
