First of Crumpp, pour that cup for yourself.
Anyone with a passing knowledge of the circumstances of McGuire's crash knows the plane he was flying (NOT his plane) had drop tanks, and he specifically ordered the other three pilots to hold their tanks as he did.
As far as any "new" information on McGuire's crash, the latest research was done by Captain David Mason, USAF ret., with some help from myself, a half dozen World War II veteran P-38 pilots, and Warren Bodie. Some excerpts from Mason's research were published over two years ago. Mason contacted me in late 1999, and asked me to work with the P-38 pilots I knew on the actual flying characteristics and combat flying to see if we could gain a better understanding of what lead up to the crash, and why it happened. What resulted was a six month email discussion with Stan Richardson, Art Heiden, Don Rheimer, Ken Lloyd, Bill Capron, Bill Safarik, and half a dozen other pilots each with at least one full tour of combat flying in the P-38 and with an average of at least 1000 hours of P-38 seat time. Warren Bodie was brought in because of his expertise as a Lockheed engineer, and his knowledge of the structural limits of the P-38.
By the way, ONLY the 8th AF withdrew the P-38 from frontline fighter service, and even then there were still units of the 8th AF flying the P-38 in multi role missions as late as June 1944. The p-38 outnumbered the P-51 in numbers deployed with the 8th AF until around April of 1944.
The 8th AF was the ONLY AF in the entire European theatre to have any real difficulties with the P-38 that were not solved quickly. The 8th AF was for all intents and purposes a bomber AF with fighters only as an afterthought for escort duty. The entire upper eschelon of 8th AF staff was comprised of heavy bomber officers. According to the USAAF records I've seen, the WORST P-38 group in the 8th AF had a kill to loss ratio of 1.2 German planes destroyed in the air for every 1 P-38 lost for ANY reason, including combat, navigation, mechanical failure, and accidents. Remove the accidents, navigation, and mechanical losses, and it becomes 2.5:1 in favor of the P-38, combat loss to combat loss.
At least one or two groups of the 9th AF kept their P-38's all the way to VE day, and they were not assigned nor restricted to attack or ground interdiction. The 9th AF P-38's had a ratio of about 6:1 in favor of the P-38.
You might do a little research on Larry Blumer. He managed to wax about 5 or 6 Luftwaffe pilots in less than 15 minutes (likely including Luftwaffe experten Rudy Dassau), and his squadron mauled that particular JG badly enough that they were withdrawn from service. I'd say it was the Luftwaffe that got roughed up by the P-38's there.
I believe it was Steinhoff, who later went on to be the NATO commander in Europe, who said in several interviews, and in one book, that he and his pilots felt the P-38 was possibly the most dangerous fighter they faced, because it was fast, and extremely maneuverable for a plane of its size. He said that in his experience, and that of his pilots, the P-38 was the fighter they found was most likely to be able to get on your six without warning, and was difficult to evade.