The enigma of the Bf-109

[humble]

Originally posted by Angus
From Humble
"No they shot down 13...all were accounted for. The russians were actually much better than anyone else in that regard"

I'd take their total claims with a wee salt.

You see, when the commisar comes around and demands results, sometimes they must be somehow provided

Oops, may have started a flamefest

Not at all, truthfully thats what I'd think to....till you start to realize they have serial numbers & pilot for an awful lot of their awarded kills. I'm not pro russian about much of anything. But the more you read the more impressed you become with them. I put a couple quotes up from the german side regarding the Kuban bridge head. I'll add 1 more....
Grislawski knew that the first period at the frontline after a home leave was hazardous-that he had become slightly "rusty" - and he decided not to take any risks. He was very cautious during his first combat sorties after his return from his home leave. Most missions were free hunting or Stuka escort against the Soviet bridgehead at Myshako, behind the German main line west of Novorossiysk on the Kuban Bridgehead's southern coast. Although the Germans had concentrated a powerful air corps in the Kuban Bridgehead, achieving a numerical superiority, they were unable to assume control of the air as during the previous years.
I./JG 52 was stationed at the other end of Taman Airdrome. Grislawski grabbed a bicycle and rapidly made it to the first Gruppe's command post, located in a bus. He found his old friend Kabisch waiting for him outside. They hugged, and it felt as if the past four years were gone. Grislawski felt tears in his eyes, but not tears of joy.
"Man, Kabisch!" he gasped. "Why have you come here?"
Kabisch just shrugged his shoulders. "You know-war. . . I volunteered for pilot training, just like you. . ."
"But that's different!" Grislawski exclaimed with discontent.
Kabisch looked hurt.
"What do you mean? I'm a Feldwebel now, and. . ."
"That doesn't matter!" Grislawski interrupted him. "How many sorties have you made?"
"About twenty-five."
Grislawski shook his head.
"Helmut," he almost whispered. "You stand with one foot in the grave. This is no game, and things are no longer what they used to be here in Russia."
"Oh, come on, Alfred!" Kabisch patted Grislawski's back: "I just got my seventh. . ."
Feldwebel Helmut Kabisch, the old recruit trainer who had become a fighter pilot, was immensely proud of his seven first victories. The last one had been achieved against a LaGG-3 at 1620 hours on 20 April 1943.
But his rash attitude only increased Grislawski's preoccupation. "These damned greenhorns," Grislawski thought. "And now Kabisch too!"
"Look, Helmut!" Grislawski yelled. "Forget about all that rubbish with easy victories! You have to be damned cautious!"
Then he pulled Kabisch, who looked both disappointed and surprised, aside. When he was sure that no one was listening, he said:
"I have a suggestion, and I hope you will follow it. This is no place for a beginner! But I've got some connections. I can contact Hermann Graf, and he will use his influence to have you transferred to my gang. There I will be able to watch over you! You have to get at least fifty combat sorties before you've got any chance at all!"
But Kabisch wasn't intrigued at all by his old friend's suggestion. "Come on, Alfred," he said and sighed. "I don't need any babysitter. And besides of that, I've been with the second Staffel for a couple of weeks, and they all are swell guys."
With a feeling of hopelessness, Grislawski made another try: "Helmut, those swell guys will all be gone in fourteen days, or you will be gone! You might just as well go pick a suitable coffin right now. I guarantee that only under my wings will you be able to survive fifty sorties!"
But Kabisch's pride would not allow him to accept the proposal. Grislawski felt deeply sad when he returned to his biletting.

Kabisch did not survive the Kuban campaign....

[humble]

1st I'd like to apologize again to Hohun Gsholz (sp?) and anyothers who I might have lobbed rocks at....skuzzies right it was uncalled for....

Discussing the Luftwaffe these are the elements of the equation I see as self evident....

1) they had the "best" cadre of pilots at the beginning of hostilities....

2) they had the only true "airforce" in the world.

3) they had the best operational doctrine....
    a) the rotte/Schwarm vs the ketten
    b) best pilot leads vs highest rank
    c) The Kcmarek
    d) The "finger four"

4) They had the best tactics, many aviation "experts" expected the "classic" swirling dogfights of hells angels....even though very few top aces on any side a "dogfight" unless they had to. The germans were the only airforce who trained and focused on vertical envelopement. Compared to the french, italians and japanese who were accomplished acrobatic pilots. This combined with the typical "vic" basically gauranteed a "free for all"....

So....

How and why did the luftwaffe fail so miserably in the projection of "pure" airpower. The only logical conclusion I can reach is the tools being utilized. It's obvious to see that the germans didnt have the correct "tool" for strategic bombing...less evident but I believe also true is that the Bf-109 was suprisingly ill suited to the role of air superiority fighter.....

[Seeker]

Originally posted by Oldman731
So far as I can tell, the Battle of Britain was the only time in the war when the aerial defense prevailed over a determined aerial offense.

- oldman

Malta?

[Charge]

"How and why did the luftwaffe fail so miserably in the projection of "pure" airpower. "

During BoB:

It is so easy to be wise afterwards...

Stupid choice of targets (cities, made by high command ->Hitler et al. Think of Churchill in direct lead of RAF? He would sure have been better than Hitler, I'm sure, but still...)

Stupid choice of tactics ->eg. Close escort for bombers negating the reaction speed of fighters. Even the bad tactics of Stukas flying in formations and relying on their miserable defensive weapons is a good indication of this. They (JU87s) fared much better in the eastern front when they changed tactics.

The Germans fought an offensive campaign after the great victory in France (spiced by optimistic propaganda I'm sure). Whereas the Brits surely felt that they almost fought for their existence and surely their national pride was so high that the invasion of their home island was not an option in their minds.

It was stupid of Hitler to imagine that he could force the Brits to surrender with their back against the sea (and USA being behind that sea!). Hitler did not provide the Brits with a sensible political way out of the situation but challenged one of the oldest empires of the world into war which proved to be a very bad strategy added with war against Russia and USA at the same time. (Think about the resources and manpower for example...)

Historically the WW1 was a radical change in how technology was utilized in warfare. This continued still in WW2 where airpower was utilized in massive scale for the first time so the effective use of airpower had to evolve through experience in a very short time.

The BoB was one of the first major air campaigns ever and the situation the two opposing forces were put were different, but nevertheless they had to learn, and quickly, too, to come out as victor. Using bad tactics over enemy territory IS stupid in the long run. Every minor failure in aircarft leads to loss of both a/c and pilot whereas for defender even a major failure in a/c isn't disastorous.

"The only logical conclusion I can reach is the tools being utilized."

Then your logic fails. Maybe U should read more (or grow older perhaps)? Using the outcome of BoB as a statement to back up the claim that german aircraft were inferior is rather..stupid? Or then again you are probably intentionally just trolling, aren't you?

BTW I personally do not value M. Spick very high as a source of information. Or  to define: his info may be right but the conclusions are sometimes .

-C+

[Nashwan]

During BoB:

It is so easy to be wise afterwards...

Stupid choice of targets (cities, made by high command ->Hitler et al. Think of Churchill in direct lead of RAF? He would sure have been better than Hitler, I'm sure, but still...)

The Luftwaffe had already lost the BoB by the time they switched their daylight attack to cities.

Stupid choice of tactics ->eg. Close escort for bombers negating the reaction speed of fighters.

Again, this only came about later in the BoB, after the Luftwaffe had lost. In fact, Goering ordered all Geschwader leaders to determine their own escort patterns, and emphasised frei jagds.

From Goering's orders, 19th August:

"In the actual conduct of operations, commanders of fighter units must be given as free a hand as possible. Only part of the fighters are to be employed as direct escorts to our bombers. The aim must be to employ the strongest possible fighter forces on free-lance operations, in which they can indirectly protect the bombers, and at the same time come to grips under favourable conditions with the enemy fighters"

Even the bad tactics of Stukas flying in formations and relying on their miserable defensive weapons is a good indication of this. They (JU87s) fared much better in the eastern front when they changed tactics.

Stukas fared better on the eastern front because they had a large area to operate in and usually managed to avoid interception.

They failed during the BoB because of the RAF's integrated warning network, which meant they were usually intercepted.

Stukas were provided with generous air cover during the BoB, they still got shot to pieces.

Goering's orders, 15th August:

"The fighter escort defences of our Stuka formations must be readjusted, as the enemy is concentrating his fighters against our Stuka operations. It appears necessary to allocate three fighter Gruppen to each Stuka Gruppe, one of these fighter Gruppen remains with the Stukas, and dives with them to the attack; the second flies ahead over the target at medium altitude and engages the fighter defences; the third protects the whole attack from above. It will also be necessary to escort Stukas returning from the attack over the Channel."

[Charge]

"The Luftwaffe had already lost the BoB by the time they switched their daylight attack to cities. "

Nash, what is the turning point when you consider the battle was lost for Luftwaffe?

Some would say by the time they launched their first attack..but what do you say?  

-C+

[MiloMorai]

Originally posted by Charge

"The only logical conclusion I can reach is the tools being utilized."

Then your logic fails. Maybe U should read more (or grow older perhaps)? Using the outcome of BoB as a statement to back up the claim that german aircraft were inferior is rather..stupid? Or then again you are probably intentionally just trolling, aren't you?

There is some merit to humble's statement to which I will add, 'not being utilized'.

Up til BoB, the front line of the combattants was together. During BoB, it was seperated by at least 20 mi. of water. Drop tanks, which the Germans had used in the SCW, would have made some difference. 1 'tool' not being utilized. Later when heavy bombers appeared, and the Germans knew of the Allied 'heavies',  there was only the 190 that could effectively attack them and still do combat with enemy fighters. Adding gunpods to the 109 to make it bomber attack capable degraded its performance. The 190C that could have been around in 1943 but was not developed (until to late as the D-9 and Ta 152C) and produced. Another 'tool' not being utilized. It would have been a better fighter than the 109. Only when it was too late did Germany start to develope heavy fighters that were dual purpose (fighter and bomber attack capable) and high altitude rated.

The 109 production should have been cut back after the F/early Gs and eventually stopped with it being replaced by the 190C and/or a new 'heavier' dual purpose fighter.

In the beginning, the Germans were farsighted but after BoB they could not see past their noses. Willey had too much 'influence' in Berlin while Tank did not. Hence the 110 is produced over the better Fw187. Another 'tool' not being utilized.

Did the Germans put up a hard fight? Yes, but it would have been a harder fight if the 'tools' had been utilized better.

charge, Germany and the LW might be your love but please open your mind.

[Nashwan]

Nash, what is the turning point when you consider the battle was lost for Luftwaffe?

Some would say by the time they launched their first attack..but what do you say?

I don't think there was a "turning point", as such, although it's possible to those observing at the time that a particular day might have seemed like a turning point.

I think as the battle wore on, it increasingly tilted in favour of the RAF, which managed to build up it's strength whilst the Luftwaffe were losing theirs.

Certainly by the time the Luftwaffe switched attack to London, they were very understrength, whereas the RAF was still pretty much at front line strength.

As to the turning point being the day the Luftwaffe launched the battle, clearly the Luftwaffe lost, and clearly, with the same circumstances run again, they would still lose.

That wasn't clear at the time, of course. If the Luftwaffe had inflicted higher losses on the RAF, or managed to sustain less losses themselves, things could have been different, but with the balance of forces, and the performance of both sides, the Luftwaffe couldn't win.

To get a win for the Luftwaffe, you either have to change the balance of forces, or the performance of one side or the other.

Stephen Bungay in The Most Dangerous Enemy has a couple of tables showing first the best kill/loss days for the Luftwaffe:

19 July Raf losses 10, Luftwaffe losses 4
7 August Raf losses 4, Luftwaffe losses 3
11 September Raf losses 27, Luftwaffe losses 21
14 September Raf losses 11, Luftwaffe losses 8
28 September Raf losses 16, Luftwaffe losses 4

and second the days of heaviest fighting:

11 August RAF losses 17, Luftwaffe losses 20
12 August RAF losses 20, Luftwaffe losses 27
13 August RAF losses 13, Luftwaffe losses 47
15 August RAF losses 32, Luftwaffe losses 75
18 August RAF losses 34, Luftwaffe losses 69
30 August RAF losses 23, Luftwaffe losses 23
31 August RAF losses 37, Luftwaffe losses 33
7 September RAF losses 23, Luftwaffe losses 41
15 September RAF losses 28, Luftwaffe losses 56
27 September RAF losses 29, Luftwaffe losses 57

It's clear that on quiet days, the Luftwaffe could occasionally "win", but on the days of heavy fighting, the RAF almost always won.

You can't win a battle by a few individual combats, and I think the Luftwaffe, wth the emphasis on the "experten", was barking up the wrong tree.

War isn't a game of AH, where kill/death  and "score" are what matters. It's about team performance.

[Naudet]

Angus & Nashwan,

did you ever consider to compare the LW BoB losses to the RAF losses of the circus operations in 1942?

I know that the BoB involved a larger number of planes, but in both cases you have an attacking force going up against a well prepared defender that can choose when and were he will counterattack.

Currently i am not sure if the Spit & Hurricanes involved in those air raids to france in '42 were outfitted with droptanks or if they had the same limited combat time over france as the Bf109 had over england.

[Angus]

Naudet, it was both ways I belive, some of the RAF had drop tanks.
As for the 109 drop tanks already available before the BoB, I belive they were wooden (wood pulp?) ones, considered to be somewhat of a hazard.

Now, the Circus stuff was IMHO a rather silly campaign.
It gave the LW experts a sporting chance of plonking down RAF aircraft that were mostly waiting to be attacked, while causing hardly any damage whatsoever to the LW.
So, the KD number for the RAF was very appalling.

However.......the RAF blooded many young pilots which would go on fighting to the end of the war, while the LW simply ran out of good crew. A bit of a rough school it was.
I will later type in a story of a young Spit driver who got himself into a 1 vs 2 against 109's over the channel in his first combat mission. Now, he lived to fight another day, become ace, then instructor, then fighting on again almost to the end of the war.
That itself is a victory on its own, for there were hundreds alike.
As Nash pointed out, it's not all about KD....
Anyway, if the claim presented on these boards of the LW only having 6000 pilots of single engined fighters KIA during the whole war, how the #### did they manage to be manning their aircraft with newbies in the late half of the war?

[Angus]

THen, Naudet, this here:
"I know that the BoB involved a larger number of planes, but in both cases you have an attacking force going up against a well prepared defender that can choose when and were he will counterattack. "

There is a good difference. The RAF over France and the lowlands is going against an enemy which is well stuck onto non-enemy territory. So there is not exactly bombing and stafing anything, and no territory bombing is possible. This never shows well enough in comparison IMO, but the fact remains that the LW only had to hop over the channel to hit the UK, while they had literally hundreds of miles of conquered territory as their shield before Germany would be hit. So, they could play cat and mouse forever over France, as well as hide and seek.

But, when a single engined fighter (P51) appeared over Hamburg, Göring is told to have said "Now it's all over".....

[Charge]

Milo, you did dig pretty much hidden agenda out of that "'tool' not being utilized" comment. Considering the success the 109 had in hands of capable and less capable pilots and strategic situation where that "inferior tool" was utilized until 1945 I tend to disagree with you.

"charge, Germany and the LW might be your love but please open your mind."

Now that is a bit too thick.  I don't like BS may it come LW or RAF/USAF luvers.

I love WW2 aviation and like to have it without too much cream, ty.

edit: Pretty far fetched, Angus. What is your point?
-C+

[Angus]

Tell me what is far fetched Charge and I will explain the point better

[MiloMorai]

I did not dig deep at all, charge. There was available 'tools', and better, Germany could have used but kept the 109 around too long.

Think how much better those 'capable and less capable pilots' could have done with better 'tools' than the 109.

Sorry, your are being myoptic.

[humble]

The Germans fought an offensive campaign after the great victory in France

Great victory by who? Certainly not the luftwaffe, the airwar was nowhere near as lopsided as the ground war. As more and more of france was rolled up many french aviation units lost their will to fight. However, those that did continue to fight gave the germans all they could handle. Again the germans lost 36% of their forces....thats a very high casualty rate considering the advantages they had.

I'm not trolling at all, in fact what I'm stating isnt anything other than the prevailing thought from military historians. The measure of a fighter is its ability to control its own airspace and project a foward area of operations over the opponent...the luftwaffe could do niether. A good counterstudy is the deployment of the F4 over Vietnam. The Us got locked into roughly a 1-1 trade off. They quickly determined that the problem was a combination of a poorly designed airframe and poor pilot training/tactics. The airframe wasnt changable but they did add cannon (part of the problem). They also instituted what became "top gun" to teach both ACM and ACM specific to the matchup . You'll note that the F-14 was configured as a double superior plane as a result. It had both the tremdous E fighting capability the F4 had but also was very capable as a turnfighter.