The total comes to 632 fighters (all Bf109s and Fw190s). Luftwaffe serviceability tended to run around 50%, and 8th AF intellegence reported that around 300-350 Luftwaffe fighters were seen. It seems likely that this was a fairly accurate estimate of the number of LW sorties flown that resulted in contact. In terms of fighter odds, we are looking at around 1.5:1 in the actual combat area, as opposed to over 4:1 seen in the previous battle.
Your assumption as to the numbers of LW fighters put into the air to intercept the various Allied bomber raids on 8 April '44 is very much on the high side.
The LW never sent up one large formation of all available fighters to hit one point along the bomber stream
s. Just like all allied escort fighters weren't combined at one point covering the bombers. They were spread out and on 8 April the Allies were hitting many targets over the Reich. Mostly the targets were split between airfields and industry across western Europe (255 bombers of the 3rd Bombardment Division were targeting airfields through out; the bombers of the 2nd Bombardment Division were targeting aircraft industries). The LW only had the numbers to form into 3 or 4 Gefechstverband of a max of 50 - 60 fighters each (typical numbers were much lower, sometimes as few as 20 per Gefechstverband). It only stands to reason that large portions of the Allied escort fighters never saw the enemy, the same is true of the LW dayfighters. A good number never made contact with the enemy.
Just as an example:
A Gefechstverband made up of Sturmstaffel 1 and elements of I., II., IV., flying a mix of FW 190-A6s / A-7s and 109Gs (about 60 fighters) intercepted B-24s of the 2nd Bombardment Division NW of Braunschweig. A 'massive' air battle ensued over Fallersleben in which the 'sky was filled with swirling P-51s, P-38s, Bf-109s and FW 190s'.
It should be noted that the LW at this point were ordered not to engage the allied fighters but to push through to the bombers. Schmid in summarizing operations for April '44:
The daylight air warfare over the Reich with the increased American offensive action had brought about a psychological effect on all Luftwaffe command staffs and dominated them. Nowhere, at no command headquarters, neither at OKH, nor at OKL, nor the staff of the General der Jagdflieger, nor at Luftflotte Reich, nor at the headquarters of I. Jagdkorp was an adequate plan under consideration for operations to gain air superiority by a victorious fighter battle. the attention of all responsible commanders was focused only on one danger - the Flying Fortress and their bomb loads. The persistent demand for destroying American bombers by an incessant commitment of fighters originated with the Führer.
Oberst Johannes Kogler, Kommodore of Jagdgeschwader 6 stated:
Orders were given to leave Allied fighters alone and concentrate on the bombers. This command led to a vicious spiral of disaster. The Luftwaffe concetrated on the bombers and were shot down by Allied fighters. The American fighters learned that they were safe against attack and became bolder and more effective. The Luftwaffe headed for bomber formations which supposedly were unescorted, but you ran into fighters anyway and in the end they were all over the place. The Luftwaffe developed an inferiority complex which got worse each day, but High Command woul dnot relax its order.
What Kogler is talking about is that the Allied fighters had freedom of operation, with little fear of the LW attacking them while forming up or en route to the escort / patrol area. They were able use this freedom to stay on the offensive while the Luftwaffe fighters were ordered to attack the bombers and as such were an easier target.
The LW through the use of radar, ground observation, recce etc.. were able on many occasions to establish areas of local control on certain sections of the bomber stream but these control was only temporary and within minutes Allied fighters would be vectored in. With the LW restricted to attacking the bombers they had to just accept this.
When folks talk about 'numbers' defeating the LW they aren't referring to the total numbers/ ratio of fighters in a given air battle. They refer to the the total number of fighters / sorties flown over the course of the air war over western Europe. The LW were never in the position to inflict upon the western allies losses great enough to win air superiority. The battle of attrition was always a great advantage for the Allies.
Not only was attrition a factor but the lack of the total number of day fighters available for Reichsverteidigung meant that units were 'scattered across the Reich'. As such they had to fly long distances to reach the bombers and / or to form up with other units. Many times LW fighters ran low on fuel before they made contact, or intercepted the bombers late, or missed them all together.
Willi Unger of 11./JG 3 stated:
The operational bases of our fighter units in Reichsverteidigung were spread all over Germany. Attempts to maintain strength at critical times and in critical areas were made by the rapid deployment of fighters to northern or southern Germany. Several Gruppen from various airfields would combine in the air and were then led from the ground to attack the approaching bombers. This did not always work. The bombers often cheated by flying towards one town then changing course to bomb a completely different target. As the endurance of our fighters flying with an auxiliary drop tank was a maximum of 2.5 hours, we were often forced to break off. There was no question of German fighters having the advantage, only disadvantages, since the numbers of American escort fighters were far superior to us and they also operated at higher altitude.
The allied fighter pilots were able to build up experience while growing their numbers. The direct opposite was happening with the LW. This is a direct result of the allied numerical superiority.
Christer Bergström wrote an article:
The effect of Allied numerical superiority in the air over Normandy in 1944While it focuses on the period right around D-day it goes to demonstrate the effect of Allied numerical superiority on the LW.
Finally Schmid stated in March '44:
...the striking power of the few remaining daylight fighter units assigned to Reichsverteidigung remained unbroken. Whenever weather conditions permitted the concentrated employment in close combat formation in a single area, noteworthy success was achieved in bringing down enemy aircraft and keeping our own losses to a reasonable limit. The success of our defensive operations over Berlin on 6 and 8 March gave ample evidence of the fighting morale of our fighter pilots and of their ability to execute effective combat despite the technical inferiority of their aircraft... If the Reichsverteidigung had 1000-1200 fighters available, it would doubtless have been in a position to alter the situation in the air, at least by day, in Germany's favor within a ver short period of time, assuming of course, that there was no appreciable increase in American fighters.
Allied numerical superiority in the air over western Europe was key in the battle of attrition, it was key in spreading the LW out all over Western Europe, it was key to the D-day landings and it was key in allies gaining air superiority ...
I didn't read anything past the post I quoted you from. So if others brought up the same points I did then great. Just take my contribution with this post with a grain of salt...
