Author Topic: How would the P-38 have performed... (Read 3881 times)

HoHun · « **Reply #60 on:** May 11, 2006, 04:35:28 PM »

Hi Ack-ack,

>But your implication is still wrong. It wasn't the turning with the Japanese plane that killed him, he died from a spin caused by asymetrical (sp?) power while he was in a turning engagement.

I believe Kweassa is right in identifying the attempt to turn with a Japanese plane as the true reason for McGuire's demise. It increased the risk far beyond what it would have been if he'd kept speed and altitude. (It also increased the chances of success, so McGuire really took a calculated risk.)

With regard to the asymmetrical thrust: It sounds as if McGuire wasn't intentionally running his engines asymmetrically, but the asymmetry resulted from a sudden technical problem? I might have misunderstood this initially.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Treize69 · « **Reply #61 on:** May 11, 2006, 05:47:04 PM »

I'd have to say, if you were to break down McGuires death into the simplest possible terms, the causes would be-

1) Failure to jettison his tanks
2) Attempting to turn a dangerously overloaded airplane with a much better turning enemy
3) Getting involved in a turnfight at both too low a speed and without enough altitude for a recovery in the event of a problem
4) Possible technical difficulty
5) Failure to follow his OWN written guidelines for air to air combat

all of which were coupled with-

6) Overly aggressive nature coupled with overconfidence and greed- he wanted to pass Richard Bong for the top score at any cost.

As much as I hate to downplay the outstanding heroism and unquestioned combat ability of one of the greatest pilots in the history of the USAAF, I'm sorry to say Tom McGuires death was his own fault.

Given the circumstances, the same thing probably would have happened to any pilot in any aircraft. Do you think Don Gentile would try to turn a P-51 with droptanks down low? Or Johnny Johnson in a Spit with a 45 Gallon slipper tank? Discretion is the better part of valor, but there is no cause to this incident, no matter which side you look at it from, other than pilot error.

Even Bong supposedly said, when he heard about it, "I was afraid this would happen". Tommy pushed himself too hard, and his luck finally ran out.

If this same type of death were to happen in AH, you would see him on 200 or the country channel laughing (or ranting) at his own stupidity and saying how he "should have known better".

Captain Virgil Hilts · « **Reply #62 on:** May 11, 2006, 05:48:44 PM »

McGuire had been grounded for a short period in order to allow Bong to go home the top ace and make his rounds and appearances as such.

McGuire wanted to go home. But he would not leave his beloved squad unless ordered to do so, because he felt he could not abandon his men. He felt his number was up, and that he had run out of luck. That was one reason he chose NOT to fly his own plane. He knew that if he matched or beat Bong, he would be ordered home immediately. Once the order grounding him was lifted, he decided to make a run at getting at least 2-3 kills in order to match or beat Bong, and go home.

In the fight, he CHOSE to engage and push his luck because his wingman was in a bad position and fighting for his life. He HAD to try to save Weaver, no other course of action would be acceptable, he could not leave one of his men to die in order to save himself. Did he push his luck? Sure he did. Was it to get the kill? Maybe somewhat, but mostly to save Weaver, the kill would have been icing on the cake. Did he run out of luck? Yes, just as he already felt he had.

From what is known about the fight, the best educated guess is that he applied assymetrical power in order to try to get inside the Japanese plane that was on Weaver, and as he pulled hard to turn, he plane shuddered at the edge of control. He likely pulled the outside engine back, and then tried to throttle BOTH engines up but only one responded, causing him to snap inverted and spin in.

With regards to his doctrine, published as the indoctrination to the tactics for the theatre, something must be stated. That was written as a guide for new pilots, new to the theatre. A more modern yet similar example is the "rookie indoctrination" that NASCAR commentator Benny Parsons used to give to rookie drivers at every track. He would often use the legendary "pass in the grass" by Dale Earnhardt to beat Bill Elliot as his example. He would show the pass on the monitor and then tell the rookies "I'm a NASCAR Winston Cup Champion, but I'm not Dale Earnhardt. I can't do what he did and you can't either, so don't try something like that." The same thing applied in McGuire's case. He certainly would not tell a new pilot with few hours in fighters and no combat experience to fight the Japanese the way he did. Eventually both McGuire and Earnhardt ran out of luck. It happens.

When McGuire's remains were recovered, in 1947, Charles Lindberg attended the funeral with McGuire's widow, as he had flown with McGuire during the war. He told McGuire's widow that "Tommy was the best pilot I've ever seen or flown with, and maybe even the best ever". A glowing endorsement considering who said it and who he had flown with.

Treize69 · « **Reply #63 on:** May 11, 2006, 05:53:05 PM »

I also remember reading that Lindbergh and Mrs. McGuire were pretty much the only people there other than the Air Force honor guard. Pretty sad way to send off a hero.

Captain Virgil Hilts · « **Reply #64 on:** May 11, 2006, 06:09:40 PM »

Quote

Originally posted by Guppy35
Thanks for the clarification Savage. I clearly misinterpreted what you were saying

Well, I did sort of leave that sort of vague to say the least. Better that you asked for clarification.

The rest below has nothing to do with what is above, I just saved time putting it in the same post. It is certainly NOT directed at Dan (Guppy35).

As another clarification, it may seem I was attacking or condemning Doug Thropp. Not really. Do I feel he is wrong? Yes. Do I feel his possible animosity towards Weaver, and to a lesser degree Rittmayer, colors his memory and thoughts on the flight? Yes, somewhat. Do I feel it is intentional on his part? No, not at all. He was clearly a good pilot and a good man, as McGuire felt he was good enough to be a member of the handpicked flight. I just disagree with his view.

Once again, having read reams of reports on McGuire and the incident in question, I don't think it was all greed and a desire to get the kill that was the cause.

Did McGuire choose to hold tanks? Yes. Why? Because he was not aware of the second enemy plane, and figured 4 on 1 was enough edge. And also because the mission was supposed to go much further. Was it a bad call? Sure, in view of what happened. As we all sit at our computers, knowing that there were TWO enemy planes, and any number of other things McGuire could not and did not know, it is easy to pass judgement on the decisions made in the heat of combat by a pilot with 38 confirmed kills. Hindsight is 20-20, as my elders often said. It's easy to question his motives as well. If you want to do so, fine. Just be sure you read more than a few cursory paragraphs before you do.

Was greed for the kill the reason he pulled so hard, and reached deep into his bag of tricks? Considering his love and devotion to his men, I doubt it. I'd guess that by the time Weaver was in trouble, the decision to hold tanks was forgotten, even though it was made only a few moments earlier, when the enemy plane was first spotted. McGuire's mind was surely focused solely on saving Weaver, and everything else was secondary.

It was simply a bad day in a WAR. Two veteran pilots got caught in a series of small mistakes and questionable decisions, and paid with their lives, and two other less experienced pilots barely escaped with their lives. One of the two enemy pilots was killed as well. It's called WAR. Unlike the GAME we play, WAR is a bad thing and people really die.

Captain Virgil Hilts · « **Reply #65 on:** May 11, 2006, 06:15:18 PM »

Quote

Originally posted by Treize69
I also remember reading that Lindbergh and Mrs. McGuire were pretty much the only people there other than the Air Force honor guard. Pretty sad way to send off a hero.

It was two years after the war. There were high ranking generals there as well. But two years after the war, people wanted to forget. As the great actor George C. Scott once said, "I spent nearly three years after the war burying dead soldiers, and seeing their families grieve. I spent that same time drowning in a bottle." By 1947, I'm sure the country was rather weary and somewhat jaded with regards men constantly being returned from battlefields thousands of miles away to be buried.

Remember that Bong was killed in a P-80 Shooting Star accident on 6 August 1945. The death of America's top scoring ace wasn't even front page news because of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. It barely drew any coverage at all.

Treize69 · « **Reply #66 on:** May 11, 2006, 06:42:07 PM »

Yeah, I know. It just seems kind of sad that more people remember some of these guys on the 50th or 60th anniversary of their deaths than noticed at the time.

We Americans have a nasty tendancy to only recognize the great ones after they have passed into memory.

HoHun · « **Reply #67 on:** May 12, 2006, 01:43:55 PM »

Hi Hilts,

>As we all sit at our computers, knowing that there were TWO enemy planes, and any number of other things McGuire could not and did not know, it is easy to pass judgement on the decisions made in the heat of combat by a pilot with 38 confirmed kills.

Actually, I think it's not that much what happened once the fight had begun but the way McGuire set up the fight that lead to his demise.

Once the fight breaks out, you just have to do what has to be done, and spinning out while trying to clear the wingman clearly is one of the things that can happen in the heat of combat.

Somehow, I could only find Weaver's combat report on the internet (attached below as it is from Google cache and likely to expire soon) and not the modern analysis which adds considerably more detail and accounts for Fukuda's fighter, which Weaver wasn't aware of.

However, by the WW2 report, it looks as if McGuire had already spun out by the time the Fukuda entered combat.

It also looks as if McGuire had decided to engage Sugimoto by a maximum performance turn, something at which Sugimoto's aircraft was far superior.

The really interesting question in my opinion is: Why didn't the US pilot manage to make their superior numbers tell? Why did the second section get attacked without the first section being able to help, and why wasn't the second section in a position to help the first section when Sugimoto switched targets?

Weaver's report describes a WW1 style Lufberry circle with Sugimoto outturning everyone else rapidly. Arranged like pearls on a string, the P-38s did not have any separation that would have been required for mutual support.

The four-finger formation had lost all of its capabilities by the decision to go for a hard turn immediately. That was the mistake that lead to the attacks on Thropp and Weaver, the latter in turn leading to McGuire's death.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

---cut-------------------------------------------------

431ST FIGHTER SQUADRON
475TH FIGHTER GROUP
APO 72

9 January 1945

INDIVIDUAL COMBAT REPORT OF CAPTAIN EDWARD R. WEAVER
A. Mission #1-668; 7 January 1945; 431st Ftr Sq; 4 P-38s.
B. Fighter Sweep to Negros Island
C. Time of attack: 0708/I.
Altitude: 1,400 feet

D. At 0620/I, 7 January 1945, I took off as #2 man in a flight led by Major McGuire, of 4 P-38s of the 431st Fighter Squadron. We climbed on course for Fabrica Airdrome on Negros Island leveling off at 10,000 feet. West of Leyte, cloud coverage became 10/10ths at 6,000 feet and remained so to the target area. Over Negros we descended through several layers of stratus clouds breaking out below the overcast at 1,700 feet, 10 miles NE of Fabrica Strip. We proceeded to that strip arriving at 0700/I and circled it at 1,400 feet for about five minutes. Major McGuire then set course at this attitude for the strips on the western coast of Negros. At about 10/15 miles west of Fabrica I saw a Zeke '52' coming directly towards us at 500 feet below and 1,000 yards ahead. By the time I radioed this information, the leader had seen the enemy, he was directly underneath us. Major McGuire, followed by his flight, made a diving turn to the left for an attack. The Zeke immediately dived to the left also and came around on the tail of #3 man, Lt. Thropp, who had previously been instructed by his element leader, Major Rittmayer, to change positions with him. The enemy was on the inside of this very tight turn at 300 feet and fired at Lt. Thropp. I radioed that the Zeke was directly behind us, and Major Rittmayer, in #4 position, fired a burst sufficient to make the enemy turn even more tightly and lose Lt. Thropp. That put the Zeke in range and inside of me, in #2 position. I radioed major McGuire that I was being attacked and increased my turn, diving slightly. The enemy stayed with me, but I was now inside and a little below my leader. At this time Major McGuire, attempting to get a shot at my attacker, increased his turn tremendously. His plane snap-rolled to the left and stopped in an inverted position with the nose down about 30°. Because of the attitude of my plane, I then lost sight of him momentarily. A second later I saw the explosion and fire of his crash. The Zeke broke off his attack just before Major McGuire's crash, and climbed to the North. It is my opinion that the enemy did not at any time change his attack from me to my leader. I believe his crash was caused by his violent attempt to thwart my attacker, although it is possible that the Major was hit by ground fire, which had now begun.

When the Zeke broke away to the North, I also turned in that direction and joined the remainder of the flight as #3 man. We all chased the enemy and Lt. Thropp, in #1 position, got in a burst just as the Zeke climbed into the overcast. A second later, as we turned to the South, the Zeke reappeared to the East and headed toward us. It got a burst at Lt. Thropp from 1000 o'clock high and I saw a slight amount of smoke come from Lt. Thropp's left engine. Pulling up my nose, I got a short burst from 30° below. Then I followed Major Rittmayer, the #2 man, in a 180° turn to the right to pursue the Zeke, who swung around and again attacked from 1000 o'clock high as we jettisoned our auxiliary fuel tanks. I saw hits on Major Rittmayer and again pulled up my nose turning to the right for a burst from 30° below. The Zeke, also being closed on by Lt. Thropp who was now above, behind and to the left of me, made a diving turn to the right from him and headed North. Lt. Thropp had continued his turn and started home with a bad left engine. The Zeke swung on his tail and fired just as Lt. Thropp entered the overcast. I was too far out of range to fire as the Zeke also climbed into the overcast, breaking off toward the South. I circled the bottom of the overcast for approximately three minutes waiting for the enemy to show himself again. Thinking that he might be above, I climbed through the overcast and looked for him there for a few minutes. Lt. Thropp radioed that he was all right and on his way home. I then gave up the hunt and set course for my base at 0715/I, landing at 0805/I.

EDWIN R. WEAVER
Captain, Air Corps

paladinsfo · « **Reply #68 on:** May 14, 2006, 02:53:16 PM »

Gentlemen..
I am new here....so if I make some errors...I apologize....and I am not especially literate with this machine....
a question was posed about re-engining a P-38 with the P-51 engine...it didn't need more power, it needed more reliable power. A p-38 regularly broke the sound barrier in a dive, several test pilots died before they discovered control reversal after breaking the barrier...another problem was the fabric control surfaces, because of the assymetrical wing the control surfaces would develop flutter under certain conditions and in a matter of seconds the vibration would damage or completely destroy the device.
Several P-51 B models were reworked as F6 models....I purchased a B model with the Malcolm hood that was shipped to Australia as a photo recon ship...it was never used, and when I purchased it it had logged 43.5 hours on the hobbs meter. I shipped it to the Philippines where I owned an aviation electronics establishment and started rework. At that time the Philippine air force was converting from P-51's to F-86 and F100 jets from the U.S. Air National Guard, whom was updating their equipment.
My bird was never equipped with pylons, weapons, armor etc..the only armor was in the cockpit area...The camera was behind the pilot and weighed in nearly 450 pounds, the old ARC radio units were also power hogs and added another 230 pounds as they were powered by dynamotors...all of that went...we moved a battery and extended fuel tank aft for weight and balance....From the Philippine air force I purchased 2 each crated packard engines rated at 2100 horsepower...my plane was 2200 pounds lighter than a combat version with 30% more power....for sunday afternoon fun and giggles we would dogfight with the P.A.F sabres...I won most of the time.....could turn a lot faster, shorter and outclimb them if they spooled down.....
Some additional info on the Flying Tigers P-40......When the order came in from China for the planes, Curtiss was working to capacity...but greedy for the bucks they wanted the contract....They very carefully read the contract and accepted it with no changes. In their inexperience the Chinese had not required external armament pylons on the planes.....nor additional armor....no self sealing fuel tanks etc....
Curtis-Wright contacted their warehouse manager to get some reject engine parts inventoried...parts that were out of spec for production engines...they carefull miked each part out and placed them in carefully marked bins.....they used hand fitted cranks etc, and extremely tight tolerance parts..resulting in the first "Blueprinted" engines....when the engines were installed and test flown the Curtiss test pilots never pushed the engines hard because they wanted a deliverable and didn't want a destroyed engine......When Chennault got the planes they were several hundred pounds lighter than those going to the U.S./Turkey/U.K and the tight tolerance engines resulted in horsepower that was 4-500 horsepower more than the stock engine......look at the combat record with the zero-sen fighter over china...amazing....

Capt Chuck Phillips
Former S.E.Asia pilot
Air America, Lao Air, Angola
China Post 1

Ack-Ack · « **Reply #69 on:** May 14, 2006, 04:17:24 PM »

P-38 had fabric control surfaces? Every P-38 I've ever seen has been all metal construction.

ack-ack

Furball · « **Reply #70 on:** May 14, 2006, 05:04:34 PM »

Quote

Originally posted by paladinsfo
A p-38 regularly broke the sound barrier in a dive, several test pilots died before they discovered control reversal after breaking the barrier

Ack-Ack · « **Reply #71 on:** May 14, 2006, 06:01:22 PM »

I think he's talking about the airflow over the leading edge of the wings when the P-38 is in a compressability state. Because the airflow would break the mach barrier but not the plane.

ack-ack

paladinsfo · « **Reply #72 on:** May 14, 2006, 07:26:11 PM »

The aircraft construction was all metal, but because of the flutter problem the control surfaces were metal frames covered with fabric and doped, as on a piper cub....the P-40 and the P-51 all had fabric covered control surfaces....
Several folks tried to fully metalized the aircraft by covering the surfaces with aluminum...the planes were either static displays or may have broken up in flight, but invariably the fabric stayed.

On the P-38....not leading edge conpression..in a power dive...
Initially all fighter aircraft are run through flight testing before being accepted for combat and the purchase is complete. Part of the test is a power dive from a specified altitude and a defined angle of dive. There is a cruise speed for aircraft and a never exceed speed. In the tests the P-38 was so clean aerodynamically that at 80% power the aircraft could easily exceed the design speed and actually broke the sound barrier, and cause control reversal. Initially two pilots were killed and a third barely escaped before losing the aircrft during flight tests..He ...said that when he tried to pull out of the dive the controls would not respong and the harder he pulled back, the steeper the plane dived....At a later date the same thing happened to the test pilot and for some unexplained reason he pushed forward on the controls and the aircraft climbed out of the dive. Prior to breaking the sound barrier he described the aircraft as shaking so badly that he thought he would break up in mid air then suddenly all was quiet, with virtually no sound in the cockpit....The air speed indicator was pegged full scale. When he recovered from the dive and was suddenly climbing then as he fell below the speed of sound the aircraft again reacted as though it was going to fail.....It was quite a while before they realized exactly what happened..The final write up was still top secret at the end of the war, and became public in the early 50's....

leitwolf · « **Reply #73 on:** May 14, 2006, 07:52:34 PM »

EDIT: ack-ack already said it.

paladinsfo · « **Reply #74 on:** May 14, 2006, 07:58:35 PM »

Leitwolf...I like your avatar, I had for many years a Siberian wolf pup that I raised from about 6 weeks old until he passed away....In Alaska he would wait by the plane while we loaded for a trip north, then sit in the co-pilots position like he owned it...he was around 200 plus pounds at full growth...