Everyone seems to have forgotten that the P-38 was a primary fighter in the MTO, escorting bombers into Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Germany (several trips to Berlin too). It proved as reliable there as the P-51, not suffering the engine failure issues seen when deployed with the 8th AF.
You cannot isolate the 8th Air Force experience and point to the aircraft as the cause. You must evaluate what was going on the 8th AF that led to the problems.
Historians have done that and concluded that the problems were related to fuel formulation, which uniquely broke down in the Allison's intake manifold, with the anti-knock additive coming out of solution. Doolittle specified a specific fuel formulation for P-38 groups, which promptly eliminated fuel related engine damage. A second problem was that the 8th Air Force did not make any effort to train pilots in high altitude flight operations. Stateside RTUs were training pilots to fly and fight at 20,000 feet and below. Compounding the training problem was that replacement pilots rarely had any experience flying twin-engine aircraft. Most pilots arriving in Britain were trained on single-engine fighters, most getting their time in P-40s.
Now all of the above doesn't account for the P-38's design flaws. Things like a totally ineffective cockpit heater, single generator, manual oil cooler, radiator and intercooler doors; they all contributed to the numerous problems. These flaws could only be overcome, or at least mitigated by training. In the 8th AF, there was no genuine training for P-38 groups. Meanwhile, the 8th AF set up an entire training program for P-51 pilots, including combat training at "Clobber College".
Down in Italy, the 15th AF had set up a P-38 Training Command to get P-38 pilots up to speed rapidly. Plus, the fuel used in the MTO was formulated differently (much of the 8th's gas was refined by the Brits).
When the P-38L began arriving in the ETO and MTO, it arrived with automatic cooler doors, different engines with revised intake manifolds (which prevented fuel break-down), a more effective heater, dive recovery flaps, hydraulic powered ailerons and a myriad of other improvements that made the Lightning a first-rate fighter in the region.
The fact remains that the improvements were too late for the 8th AF, who never cared for the P-38 anyway. However, these new P-38s were gladly received in Italy and earned their keep flying with three of the 15th's six fighter groups. These P-38 groups were in combat up until the surrender.
The problem was one of attitude. The USAAF had a deeply ingrained bias against the P-38 and to a lesser degree, the P-47. They weren't the epitome of what the Generals thought a fighter should be. Indeed, these Generals, who became known within the USAAF as the Mustang Mafia, were in charge of the USAAF Fighter Command after the war ended. As a result, the P-38s were scrapped or sold off. P-47s were stuck in reserve and Air Guard units. The net result was that the primary ground support aircraft in place at the beginning of the Korean War were tired, old P-51Ds. While they dominated the Korean Yaks and Lavochkins, they suffered huge losses to ground fire due to the frailty of their cooling systems. Meanwhile, the Marines and Navy were flying the far more durable F4U-4, F4U-4B and F4U-5 (as well as the awesome AD-1 Skyraider). In October of 1950, the Navy offered the USAF 312 mothballed F4U-1Ds. The Air Force scoffed at the notion. Another 200 P-51 pilots would die before the surviving Mustangs were retired and replaced by the F-80 and F-84. Until the Inchon landings opened airfields on the Korean peninsular, the F-80s and F-84s had to operate out of Japan. They lacked the range to loiter over combat areas in Korea. Thus, the P-51s and a few dozen F-82 (twin Mustangs) were the primary support fighters.
When one evaluates the performance of a fighter in a theater or zone of combat, one must look at the entire picture. A localized snapshot can be extremely misleading.
My regards,
Widewing
