.......back to the tax payers.
To my mind and most everyone else who flew the F-4E, the absolute worst Emergency Procedure was a Dual PC (Power Control) Failure. Why, requires a short systems ground school. The stabilator in the F-4 was powered by two independent hydraulic PCs, one off each engine to the stab.
If a very rare dual failure occurred, airflow would force the leading edge of the stab to the full down position and result in an uncontrollable nose pitch up of the Phantom. At this point the crew would be along for the ride and have no choice but to eject.
END O GROUND SCHOOL.
Here is a video that shows what would happen with a dual PC failure. The incident in the video was caused by a lost tool socket that rolled into the stick well on takeoff rotation and froze the the stick full aft. Different situation but, same result. Apologies for the advertisement at the beginning,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qhajoju_7Qc&feature=shareSo, here I am at Osan AB, ROK. It’s February, bone chilling cold, and nasty weather most of the winter. The bone chilling cold required wearing a poopy (anti exposure) suit because most of our flying was over the Yellow Sea in the ACMI (Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation) area. The poopy suit was to prevent freezing to death in the cold ocean water after an ejection.
On this memorable day, we were flying an air to air gunnery mission. We were going to intercept a Flight Systems International (FSI) F-86 carrying a dart tow rig. The Sabre would release the dart out on a 2,000 foot cable, enter a constant turn, and provide us a stable target to shoot with the 20mm, six barrel, 6,000 rounds per minute cannon in the nose of the Phantom. This was an incredibly fun mission. Anyhow, we got in the area early because the Sabre had a mechanical problem and was late taking off. He finally got to the area and had to air abort. So, we went into max endurance mode at 28,000 ft and 280 knots and were about 150 miles out over the ocean. The FSI guys were scrambling to get a second jet coming our way.
As we waited, my backseater (who was one of two I ever flew with that I would have rather had his body weight in extra fuel) was reading the paper. All I could see was newspaper in my mirrors. I’m busy paying attention to our position (now closer to North Vietnam and China than Osan) fuel status and engine health. It was a crystal clear day with huge whitecaps on the water from our altitude. At one point, I remember thinking it wouldn’t be fun to be down there.
Finally, we hear the second FSI jet check in with the GCI controller. As he reached his orbit point, the Sabre pilot reported the dart wouldn’t release from the tow rig. At this point we had enough fuel to stay a few minutes but, there wasn’t another tow jet available to launch. As I’m talking with the tow pilot and GCI controller, I hear snoring over the intercom. A glance in the mirrors reveals a helmet resting on his right side canopy rail. He’s dead asleep! So, I do a sweep of the fuel gages and engine instruments. There’s something amiss. The right engine oil pressure is gradually dropping. If that wasn’t bad enough, the left engine PC presssure was dropping at about the same rate. The two completely independent system gages were nearly matched in position and rate of decrease.
At first, I’m totally perplexed by what is in front of me and can’t figure out what is causing this bizarre picture. So, thinking through it one step at a time, I (not we) am going to most likely lose the left PC. That’s not so bad because there’s still the right PC. But, wait! The engine oil pressure is steadily decreasing and will most likely freeze and kill the right PC.
I’m about to have the dreaded Dual PC Failure. So it’s checklist time. I first go through the Loss of Oil Pressure checklist. Yada, yada, yada, secure the engine and perform a single engine approach and landing. I go through that checklist and don’t plan on being that lucky. I (sort of we) are now 120 miles out over the ocean with both gages getting close to the “0” position. Here’s the very succinct Dual PC Failure checklist:
We weren’t equipped with an APU.
In the process of this, I’ve declared an emergency and told the GCI controller I’m headed direct to Osan. Then, I called the SOF (Supervisor Of Flying, a senior pilot in the controller tower whose job is to track takeoff and recovery of all local flying and to assist with emergencies like this). We discuss the situation and he asks if he can read me any checklists and my plan. I advise that all checklists have been covered to include the Pre Ejection checklist. At this point the snoring from the backseat abruptly stops and a nervous WTF is going on question is blurted out. I tell the SOF we are coming straight to the field and will only get one shot at the runway based on the rate both gages are now approaching their empty sides. I tell my now fully alert backseater what’s happening and what the plan is, and to do his individual Pre Ejection checklist.
By now, we’ve been drilling straight at the field and the approach end of the runway. Oh, by the way, single runway we could make a straight in approach to has a huge tailwind. So, we have to got the other end with about 135 degree turn to final from our direction of flight. As we get a visual on the field, a check of the two gages shows an uncomfortably low indication on both. I didn’t look at them any longer. Nothing to be gained at this point.
Gear and flaps down about a mile out, turn to final and roll out about a half mile. The flight controls are still feeling normal. Across the over run, flare, and started the throttles back to idle. As I continued the flare, the stick started losing the normal pressure feel. Touched down, popped the bag (drag chute), and rolled out to the end and EOR (End of Runway) check area. After touchdown, I stop cocked (shut down) the right engine since it was showing zero oil pressure.
We parked, chocked, shut down the other engine, safetied the seats, unbuckled, and climbed down to see what the back of the jet looked like. The belly about midway down the right engine was covered with oil. The left side at about the same point had a huge stream of hydraulic oil. It was now time to go through maintenance debrief and get out of this stinking (literally) poopy suit. I wrote the jet up and put it on a red X (grounded until repaired).
A couple of hours later, I called maintenance for a report on what happened. The left side PC had a material break causing a leak. When asked how much hydraulic fluid was remaining, the answer was zero. The right engine oil system also had an unrelated material failure. It was the same answer when asked much oil was remaining in the engine. Amazed that the right engine didn’t seize, I asked why? The engine oil was and is synthetic. It doesn’t break down and cause seizure instantly like conventional oil. Apparently, the synthetic oil coating in the engine continued to lubricate just long enough to prevent a really bad day. After rotating back home, I started using synthetic oil in my cars and do to this day.
Definitely dodged a bullet this day.
