More MAX information

[Puma44]

In a purely regulatory sense, he is correct. Prior to the major changes in July of 2013, a person could theoretically serve as FO for a Part 121 carrier with a commercial ticket and 250 hours.

However, Vraicu is also correct. There was no US major 121 carrier hiring Commercial pilots with 250 hours into the right seat of the big iron. None.

I can't find the original reg but here's a clip from Flying magazine that spells it out. I think we can consider Flying a reputable source of info:

  Busher, Vraicu, Eagl, Puma44 and the rest of the aviation professionals that have contributed. Better thread than the locked one.


<edit> Busher...thanks for that video. It does a good job of showing the problem, the solution and the short amount of time available to "do some of that pilot stuff, Mav!" </edit>

Good points, Toad.  It comes down to money and liability.  Who’s the guy holding the purse strings going to pick to fly his 40+ million dollar jet full of passengers, a pilot with 2-300 flights hours or the guy with several thousand flight hours?  With the current worldwide shortage of qualified pilots, we may see more low time pilots put in high performance positions that they are not aviation matured for, yet.  Not a comfortable scenario.

Agreed on your comment about this thread.  Much more productive discussion without the hostility and name calling.  Well done gents.

[Oldman731]

Ruh-roh.

"Federal prosecutors and Department of Transportation officials are scrutinizing the development of Boeing Co.’s 737 MAX jetliners, according to people familiar with the matter, unusual inquiries that come amid probes of regulators’ safety approvals of the new plane.

A grand jury in Washington, D.C., issued a broad subpoena dated March 11 to at least one person involved in the 737 MAX’s development, seeking related documents, including correspondence, emails and other messages, one of these people said. The subpoena, with a prosecutor from the Justice Department’s criminal division listed as a contact, sought documents to be handed over later this month."

https://www.wsj.com/articles/faas-737-max-approval-is-probed-11552868400?mod=hp_lead_pos1

- oldman

[Busher]

Ruh-roh.

"Federal prosecutors and Department of Transportation officials are scrutinizing the development of Boeing Co.’s 737 MAX jetliners, according to people familiar with the matter, unusual inquiries that come amid probes of regulators’ safety approvals of the new plane.

A grand jury in Washington, D.C., issued a broad subpoena dated March 11 to at least one person involved in the 737 MAX’s development, seeking related documents, including correspondence, emails and other messages, one of these people said. The subpoena, with a prosecutor from the Justice Department’s criminal division listed as a contact, sought documents to be handed over later this month."

https://www.wsj.com/articles/faas-737-max-approval-is-probed-11552868400?mod=hp_lead_pos1

- oldman

Can you spell Scapegoat?

Anyone else think this might be premature when considering the cause of these accidents has not yet been published? Furthermore, when did air safety become the jurisdiction of the Justice Department?

[Toad]

To me it looks more and more like the focus of the investigation and certainly the media is on AOA. They are making a big deal out of the fact that a single AOA could trigger MCAS activation.

I've thought about this and I'm coming to the conclusion that there are valid reasons for either single or both activation. It's a choice the manufacturer makes and there are plus/minus considerations no matter how you wire it.

If all sensors are working correctly, either method works fine. AOA gets high and the first sensor to "see" AOA >1.00 triggers the stickshaker/stall barrier/MCAS/whatever system the aircraft has.  This would be the FAA certified G-550 method. Or, in a two sensor method, AOA gets high and BOTH sensors "see" AOA > 1.00 and together they trigger the stickshaker/stall barrier/MCAS/whatever system the aircraft has.  This would be the JAA certified G-550 method.

Now think about a situation where just ONE AOA sensor goes bad. It can fail either way, that is it can FAIL to sense high AOA when the aircraft approaches a stall or it can FAIL by sensing high AOA when the AOA is essentially normal for that phase of flight.

In the case of a single sensor trigger (FAA G-550), if this bad single sensor FAILS to sense high AOA, the other good sensor will still trigger stall alert/protection. That's a good thing.

OTOH, if a bad single sensor FAILS and senses high AOA incorrectly, it triggers a stall alert/warning that should be handled by the flight crew using the abnormal procedure that already exists and that they should be able to perform without reference to a checklist. So, no valid reason to crash the airplane over an incorrect reading from a single bad AOA vane.

Now, in the case of a dual (BOTH AOA vanes) sensor trigger (JAA G-550), if this bad single sensor FAILS to sense high AOA, the other good sensor will NOT trigger stall alert/protection. I'm not so sure that's a good thing. If you are stalling the jet and one AOA sees the stall and the other does not...no stall alert/protection.

OTOH, in a dual trigger system if a bad single sensor FAILS and senses high AOA incorrectly, it will not trigger a stall alert/warning. This basically avoids a nuisance stall alert/protection event. That's a good thing but is it critical? There are established procedures for this situation in every jet I ever flew.

I guess each of us has to decide if a dual system is better or worse than single trigger.

I see it kind of like this. Consider a situation where one of your AOA vanes has failed or is inaccurate for whatever reason.

A single trigger system will likely warn you every time if you are approaching a stalled condition; it will also possibly give you false warnings.

A dual trigger system will likely not give you false warnings but may fail to warn you if you are approaching a stalled condition.

What do y'all think?

[Toad]

Then there's this bit of news.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-crash-boeing-aoa/optional-warning-light-could-have-aided-lion-air-engineers-before-crash-experts-idUSKCN1NZ0QL

...Lion Air did not install the AOA DISAGREE alert, which warns pilots when the “angle of attack” (AOA) readings do not match, because it is optional and not required by regulators, Managing Director Daniel Putut told Reuters....

...Several carriers, including American Airlines, Southwest Airlines, Canada’s WestJet, Singapore Airlines offshoot SilkAir and Dubai’s flydubai, said the AOA DISAGREE alert was installed on their 737 MAX jets before the Lion Air crash.

Some airlines have also installed a separate optional gauge that gives pilots a direct AOA reading in the cockpit.

American Airlines and SilkAir already have the gauge, while Southwest said it decided after the Lion Air crash to install the gauge on future 737 MAX deliveries to provide “supplemental visual feedback for identifying erroneous AOA data”....

...The alert light turns on when the AOA indications disagree by more than 10 degrees for 10 continuous seconds, according to an American Airlines 737 MAX flight manual obtained by Reuters.

Would the light have made a difference? There's going to be discussion on whether or not this should be optional. I think one of the mandated changes may well be to install this option on every one of the MAX aircraft.

I saw another article where Southwest is putting the AOA display into the PFD.  Picture in the article linked below. It's already in the HUD of every MAX apparently. (  https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/southwest-airlines-is-adding-new-angle-of-attack-indicators-to-its-737-max-fleet/  )

[Vraciu]

Well, on both the Embraer and the Falcon we have two AOA sensors.   On the EMB they work together.   On the Falcon one is a primary and the other is a backup, with the latter set to trigger at two degrees AOA higher than the former. 

We have checklists to deal with erroneous sensors.

Not sure if that adds anything of merit to the discussion other than to show there are many ways to skin a cat.

[Puma44]

In spite of all the cool technology, every sim session, every year we practiced the basics; approach to stall, steep turns, etc while hand flying the aircraft.

One sensor, two, or three.  Pilots still have to recognize when HAL is going off the reservation, disconnect it NOW, and apply Private Pilot 101 skills to the problem and hand fly.  Any delay can only go bad.  The more I read and hear, it seems that whatever the actual mechanical cause of these two MAX incidents was, they could have been prevented by pilot dummy down of the technology and just plain flying the jet - My Opinion.

[Maverick]

Just tying in with what Puma said. I am wondering if some high time pilots might have just gotten to the point where they have forgotten how to "fly" the plane rather than the instrument package and auto pilot? I am not trying to be snarkey, just mentioning that a newer pilot with fewer hours might be a tad more closer to his / her training in actual hand flying than an old head who has spent years twisting nobs on the autopilot. In short I think there can be good points to both sides. The high time pilot has the experience if they recall the basics as well. The newer pilot is less jaded / complacent perhaps and more into hands on. Just a thought.

[Vraciu]

I agree with Puma. 

As for forgetting how to fly....I think that’s a myth.   The problem, and I have seen it firsthand (as have many of my colleagues), is that a lot of these pilots do not receive adequate training.    They rely on the technology to protect them and when things go wrong they’re unable/incapable of downshifting to a manual mode.  They either brainlock under stress or lack the skill to salvage the situation. 

But if one knows how to fly they don’t magically forget just because they use automation.   When I reach my acceleration height and clean up the airplane I turn on the autopilot so I can get my head out of the cockpit and look for bad guys.   I’ve kicked a penguin off my iceberg doing that which increases my situational awareness.   That’s one of the big benefits of automation: increased SA.   

HOWEVER, I am also capable of flying the airplane with nothing but the attitude indicator and the thrust levers.   I know what fuel flow gives me a certain airspeed.   I can back that up with where my hands place the levers.   Some of this is an intuitive thing that comes with experience in the plane and some of it is just old school Pitch/Power/Performance style flying—something that isn’t really being taught any more. 

I’ve also noted that American pilots are traditionally very good at stick and rudder flying, while some of my EASA colleagues are less so.  They are technical experts to the point they can tell you the dimensions of every tire but some of the other stuff is lacking.    This is due to the cost of training and the way EASA structures the rating courses.    There’s nothing wrong with being a bookworm, but practical application is a vital aspect that is being pushed to the side in many places—including the US.

[Puma44]

Just tying in with what Puma said. I am wondering if some high time pilots might have just gotten to the point where they have forgotten how to "fly" the plane rather than the instrument package and auto pilot? I am not trying to be snarkey, just mentioning that a newer pilot with fewer hours might be a tad more closer to his / her training in actual hand flying than an old head who has spent years twisting nobs on the autopilot. In short I think there can be good points to both sides. The high time pilot has the experience if they recall the basics as well. The newer pilot is less jaded / complacent perhaps and more into hands on. Just a thought.

Good point Maverick.  In twenty years flying the 737, I’ve seen both sides of what you discussed.  Some very senior pilots ran the gamut from lazy, dependent on the technology, to hand fly the jet as much as possible.  Younger and/or new pilots to the jet tended to still have their hand flying skills intact, especially those from recent commuter jobs (Beech 1900, Embraer, Saab were the best in my experience) and were open and teachable.  Military F-teen guys were sometimes a different story and quite challenging.  Everyone, without any previous 737 experience had the same problem in the early months flying the jet:  Energy Management.  Even with good hand flying skills, low time pilots in the jet were slow reacting to this aspect, in combination with the new systems of the jet.  This experience leads me to wonder if slow pilot reaction (lack of experience) led to both of these recent tragic incidents, regardless of what mechanical issue occurred.

[Vraciu]

Good point Maverick.  In twenty years flying the 737, I’ve seen both sides of what you discussed.  Some very senior pilots ran the gamut from lazy, dependent on the technology, to hand fly the jet as much as possible.  Younger and/or new pilots to the jet tended to still have their hand flying skills intact, especially those from recent commuter jobs (Beech 1900, Embraer, Saab were the best in my experience) and were open and teachable.  Military F-teen guys were sometimes a different story and quite challenging.  Everyone, without any previous 737 experience had the same problem in the early months flying the jet:  Energy Management.  Even with good hand flying skills, low time pilots in the jet were slow reacting to this aspect, in combination with the new systems of the jet.  This experience leads me to wonder if slow pilot reaction (lack of experience) led to both of these recent tragic incidents, regardless of what mechanical issue occurred.

Makes sense with a jet as heavy as the 737.   I saw this in the ERJ with guys coming over from the SAAB 340, but it’s a relatively light jet and the FADECS spool the engines up pretty fast.   Any way, I can see how being ahead of the jet in the 737 is even more vital. 

[Vraciu]

Can you spell Scapegoat?

Anyone else think this might be premature when considering the cause of these accidents has not yet been published? Furthermore, when did air safety become the jurisdiction of the Justice Department?

Kinda’ scary. 

[morfiend]

Good point Maverick.  In twenty years flying the 737, I’ve seen both sides of what you discussed.  Some very senior pilots ran the gamut from lazy, dependent on the technology, to hand fly the jet as much as possible.  Younger and/or new pilots to the jet tended to still have their hand flying skills intact, especially those from recent commuter jobs (Beech 1900, Embraer, Saab were the best in my experience) and were open and teachable.  Military F-teen guys were sometimes a different story and quite challenging.  Everyone, without any previous 737 experience had the same problem in the early months flying the jet:  Energy Management.  Even with good hand flying skills, low time pilots in the jet were slow reacting to this aspect, in combination with the new systems of the jet.  This experience leads me to wonder if slow pilot reaction (lack of experience) led to both of these recent tragic incidents, regardless of what mechanical issue occurred.

  Ya but do you remember how to arm the genie???    




     

[Puma44]

  Ya but do you remember how to arm the genie???    




     

Yep!  Will never forget that level of responsibility.

[morfiend]

Yep!  Will never forget that level of responsibility.