Hortland, since analogies seem to be over your head, how about this: Support of the German people: Europe’s Greatest Democracy
Nazi Mandate This is a source I’m sure you’ll have a hard time arguing with, since it is a Nazi revisionist site. 45 million is a pretty good mandate. The data is verifiable. Other support for this contention can be found in the following:
Loyalty Oath 90% Referendum Election propaganda I have yet to read or hear a serious German telling of the period that suggests otherwise, whether the subject doing the telling was apologetic or defiant. Is it really surprising given the culture was, until the end of WW1, a comfortable, authoritarian monarchy? Hortland, how do you feel the Social Democrats failed in meeting the Nazi political challenge, since they ultimately were the biggest political losers?
Known Nazi Policy Goals There is no shortage of film, audio, written or first person accounts that clearly state the ultimate goals of National Socialism. You have to hand it to the Nazis, propaganda or not, they were really up front with the people about what they were going to do and they delivered. Did the Nazi’s say -- war with Britain in 1939? No. It was more like, we have lands that need to revert to our control, and heaven help those who stand in the way. Did the Nazi’s say -- we will gas 12 million people (Jews, Gypsies, Homosexuals, etc. in factory killing machines? No, but pretty close.
A state which in this age of racial poisoning dedicates itself to the care of its best racial elements must some day become lord of the earth. Road to war The Jew or us, one of us will have to go. Exterminate the Jews/1933 style Not our fault! Really, we feel no hatred against the Czech people Poland excuse -- Were the majority of the German people pro Nazi: clearly yes.
-- Were the majority of the people hard core nazis: probably not.
-- Did they decide to go along with the program and not ask too many uncomfortable questions of their leadership as long as they had jobs, full stomachs and goods to buy? I would say yes, and the Nazi reluctance to go to a war footing domestically until well into the war would seem to support this.
-- Were they war mongers? Some actively, most at least passively as long as the war was going well.
-- Did the mass public support the SD/Gestapo against “nonconformists” or were they victimized? Plenty of good German documentation would indicate the former.
-- Were they responsible for the extreme war crimes and supporting a war of aggression? When they stopped questioning their leadership and voluntarily gave Hitler a full “power of attorney” to do as he wished, I would say they acquired some definite responsibility.
Dreseden Was terror bombing to break the will of the people a disproved theory? It had achieved success in Rotterdam (even with the mistake), so there was precedence for it. There seems to be a willingness to believe, among both the British and Germans, that while terror did not work on “us” the other side had a weaker will. The German focus on the wasteful V-program illustrates that even the Germans felt this way as late as 1944.
Terror bombing v. morale, German style 1944 Was dehousing a legitimate strategy? First off, here’s a link that provides a good history of the British area bombing campaign for background purposes.
Background In hindsight, it was a rather ineffective strategy per resources expended, but one where the actual results on German productivity, lines of communications and the economy were not fully known until the bombing surveys AFTER THE WAR. In general, IMO, winning a world war against a force as aggressive and vile as Nazi Germany, or Imperial Japan for that matter, granted a lot of leeway to take any approach that would end the war earlier and minimize allied casualties even at the expense of German civilians. The German civilians had plenty of choices in 1932, 1933, 1936…1939… and they never backed away from supporting the Nazi regime in any significant way until the end of the war.
Was Dresden beyond the pale? Yes, IMO and shameful at that point in the war. Nor was it an oversight since there were those who found it a disagreeable action even before the first bomb fell. But it was on the borderline of an accepted military strategy used by all sides (along with unrestricted submarine warfare) so I’m not sure if it is technically within the war crimes realm. I even believe, though I may be wrong, that the Nuremberg charges against Goring focused on his “supporting a war of aggression” and not on his terror bombing campaign. As Toad pointed out, without Poland there would have been no Dresden. [edit: the escalation of the terror bombing campaign was encouraged by Churchill early on to draw attention away from the airfields/no BBS room to leave orig. text in w/correction]
What about the air war against Japan? Well, for starters the first approach tried was high altitude precision bombing which failed because of jet stream wind conditions at altitude. About 1 in 50 bombs hit the intended target, for little result -- a prohibitive exercise given the extreme logistics required to run a bombing campaign from the Marianas. Indeed, attacks from Navy fighter-bombers fared much better hitting many of the same targets during carrier sweep operations. Further, casualties among bomber crews were relatively high and morale was suffering. Enter LeMay and area bombing.
Japan had an industrial infrastructure susceptible to area bombing and, unlike Germany, lacked the ability to significantly disperse industry. Further, the industrial base was located in residential areas and relied heavily on small “local shops” for both manufacturing and assembly/sub-assembly. Dehousing not only got rid of the civilian worker infrastructure, but typically the industrial facilities themselves.
Here are the bombing survey estimates:
Physical damage to plant installations by either area or precision attacks, plus decreases due to dispersal forced by the threat of further physical damage, reduced physical productive capacity by roughly the following percentages of pre-attack plant capacity: oil refineries, 83 percent; aircraft engine plants, 75 percent; air-frame plants, 60 percent; electronics and communication equipment plants, 70 percent; army ordnance plants, 30 percent; naval ordnance plants, 28 percent; merchant and naval shipyards, 15 percent; light metals, 35 percent; ingot steel, 15 percent; chemicals, 10 percent.
The goal in all cases was clearly to defeat Japan without having to endure the hundreds of thousands of allied causalities required with an invasion. As with the Germans, perhaps even more so, the Japanese leadership had the widespread support of its people. Surrender, despite terrible hardship, was not on the horizon. In fact, in the case of an invasion many of these civilians (women and children included) were ready to meet the allies on the beaches with sharpened bamboo spears. Similarly, a horde of Kamikazes awaited. The resolve of the Japanese people can be illustrated by the wife of a Kamikaze pilot who killed herself so that her husband could die in battle without any distractions.
The atomic bombs, were entirely within the scope of the goals, capabilities and general impact of the conventional bombing campaign. They did provide a “Power from Above” element that allowed for a face-saving exit from the war for the Japanese leadership. The war ended, fortunately before any Soviet occupation of the home islands (perhaps the main focus of the quick Nagasaki attack, though there was little indication that Hiroshima was going to pay off without another example that there was more then one bomb).
Perhaps Hortland, living in a country that has not had to spill blood in such a cause (at least sine 1814) provides you with a different perspective than mine. It can be more of a philosophical exercise for you. I had relatives who fought in the war, which they would have rather missed out on if given a choice. My grandfather would have been sitting on a command/communications ship off of Japan had an invasion occurred, manning a 5” gun as the kamikazes came in. In the countries where the death notices of sons and fathers arrive, protecting the lives of foreign civilians who are actively supporting THEIR war of aggression is secondary. Ending the war, restoring peace and getting the boys home is the first priority. In the end, it usually saves enemy lives.
There is no credible evident that the Japanese leadership was seriously considering surrender. Some unqualified junior functionaries had produced peace feelers, seemingly on their own initiative, but they lacked authority and an unconditional surrender was not a serious consideration in any case. The alternative to the bombing of Japan would have been blockade and starvation. Starvation was well on it’s way Japan, and ending the war when it did likely prevented a much greater catastrophe. Saburo Sakai touched on this in “Samurai.”
Charon
