Originally posted by Staga Armour in different angle:To penetrate 30mm armour in 30 degree angle ammunition needs to have better than 37,5mm penetration.30*1,25=37,5
'Ian Gooderson's 'Air Power at the Battlefront', London 1998, containsa couple of cases studies.I. Roncey Pocket.In the wake of the Allied breakout from Normandy, Operation COBRAwhich began on 25 July 1944, large German forces in the Cotentinpeninsula were forced to risk air attack by moving in daylight toavoid being encircled by American armour. Just south of Coutances,near Roncey, some six German divisions were cut off in what becameknown as the Roncey 'Pocket'. Choking the roads, the German columnsbecame ideal targets for attacks by Allied fighter-bombers whoseattacks succeeded in preventing any organised breakout [...]Some indication of the destruction caused specifically by air weaponsis provided by an RAF anti-armour operation on the same day [29 July].Rocket Typhoons of 2nd TAF were requested by US forces to attack aconcentration of some 50 German tanks observed in the Roncey area,near Gavray. Consequently Typhoons of No.121 Wing of No.83 Group flew99 sorties in the area between late afternoon and dusk, and claimedthe destruction of 17 tanks with a further 27 damaged. The pilotsreported that there was little sign of life or movement during theirattacks and the area was littered with damaged and burning tanks,making target selection difficult. There was no flak, and pilots wereable to attack at very low level. Only one Typhoon was lost, hit byflying debris and forced to crash-land.The Typhoon effort had been concentrated mainly against a Germancolumn near the village of la Baleine, and shortly after the airattacks this area was investigated by the British Army's No.2 ORS. Thecolumn had been a formidable mix of armour and transport, includingPanther tanks. The surrounding terrain was heavily wooded anddissected by deep, narrow valleys and the column had used a side roadwhich descended to la Baleine where a bridge crossed the river Sienne.On one side of this road was a steep, wooded cliff and on the other asheer drop to the river; caught by fighter-bombers at this point thevehicles had been unable to pull off the road. P-47s had attacked thearea with 500-lb bombs before Typhoons had been called for, and thebridge over the river had been sufficiently damaged by their bombs toprevent heavy vehicles from crossing. After examining the tanks andvehicles the ORS outlined the causes of destruction. This is shown inthe following table:LA BALEINE - LOSSES AND CAUSESDestroyed Possibly Unknown Unknown Aban-by Rockets Rockets Shells Causes Crew doned TotalsPanthers 1 - 1 - 3 3 8Pz Mk IV 1 - - - - - 1Armoured Cars - 1 - - - - 1Armd. troop carr. 5 - - - - - 575 mm SP Guns - - - 1 - 1 250 mm AT Guns - - - - 1 1 2Howitzers - 1 - - - 1 2Rocket launchers - - - - - 1 1Lorries - - - 8 - - 8Cars - - - 10 - - 10_____________________________ _____________________________ _________Totals 7 2 1 19 4 7 40The motor transport was so mangled that identification of the cause ofdestruction was impossible and the ORS acknowledged their 'unknowncauses' table to be unduly loaded. They suggested that a more accuratepicture would be provided by the motor transport being spread over thetable in the same proportion as the other losses. Although rocketsappear as the biggest single known cause of destruction, the amountattributed to them is small compared to the relatively high number ofPanthers destroyed by their crews or abandoned intact. How they hadbeen left suggested abandonment in haste, almost certainly as a resultof air attack or the threat of such attack, and possibly even beforethe arrival of the Typhoons. Craters of 500-lb bombs were found in anorchard within 50 yards of two Panthers; neither tank had been hit butthe crews obviously baled out and later set fire to the tanks, one ofthe guns being destroyed by a high-explosive round left in thechamber.Although lack of fuel in a retreat could be expected to result in theabandonment or destruction of tanks by their crews, this was not thecase at La Baleine; near similar bomb craters two Panthers were foundcompletely undamaged, their fighting ability unimpaired with fullcomplements of petrol and ammunition. One of the 75 mm self-propelledguns, its armour reinforced with concrete, was found abandonedundamaged 35 yards from a bomb crater. As it had not been set on fireby its crew it was considered more likely to have been abandoned inhaste rather than left as a deliberate roadblock.Possibly the tanks had been abandoned or destroyed by their crewsbecause they could not negotiate the damaged bridge. The ORS notedthat the German crews could have forced the river further downstream,as American Sherman tanks later succeeded in doing, but this ignoresthe fact that in their hurry to escape encirclement the Germansprobably had little time to reconnoitre the area. That all the troopcarriers discovered had been destroyed by rockets suggests thepossibility that other similar types may have escaped over the bridge,not needing to be abandoned like the heavier tanks. At la Baleine themost significant evidence of demoralisation was that there were noGerman graves. Only one German corpse was found and local civilians,many of whoom were interviewed, confirmed that it was of a sniperkilled after the air attacks, while no evidence could be found thatAmerican forces had removed bodies for burial. This suggests that theGerman troops may have dispersed from the column when it becameobvious air attack was imminent, which squares with the Typhoon pilotsobserving little German activity during their attacks.La Baleine was the first ORS investigation of its type, and certainlyreflects the shortcomings of air-to-ground weapons against tanks.Despite the craters none of the tanks or self-propelled guns had beenknocked out by bombs, and the number destroyed by rockets isunimpressive. Nevertheless, there was a good deal of evidencediscovered by the ORS at la Baleine to suggest that air attack wasresponsible, even if indirectly, for the disruption and abandonment ofthe column, and that the German crews preferred to abandon or destroytheir armour rather than invite further air attack by attempting tosalvage combat-worthy tanks.
II. MortainSimilar evidence of German tanks being abandoned under air attack isseen in the example of the only large-scale German armoured offensivemounted in Normandy. Early on the morning of 7 August 1944, the strikeforce of XLVII Panzer Corps, the 1st SS, 2nd SS, and 2nd Panzerdivisions, attacked positions held by the US 30th and 9th Infantrydivisions near Mortain with the ultimate objective of reaching theCotentin coast at Avranches and cutting off American armouredspearheads from their supplies. Although tank strength was depletedafter weeks of heavy fighting the Germans mustered 70 Panthers, 75 MkIVs, and 32 self-propelled guns for the attack. By noon on 7 Augustthey were within nine miles of Avranches after penetrating the frontof 30th Division to a depth of about three miles. Having arrived inMortain only the day before, 30th Division had nothing but its 57 mmtowed anti-tank guns and 3 inch gun tank-destroyers with which toengage the German tanks at close range. Despite its determineddefence, the credit for bringing the German attack to a decisive halton the afternoon of 7 August is generally regarded as belonging toAllied fighter-bombers, particularly the RAF Typhoons, which werecalled to intervene.The response of the Allied tactical air forces to the German attackwas swift. The Typhoons of No.83 Group RAF were made available, andplans co-ordinated directly between the headquarters of No.83 Groupand IX Tactical Air Command. Rocket Typhoons were to engage the Germantanks, while American fighter-bombers were to attack transport movingto and from the battle area. The Ninth Air Force was also to provide afighter screen to intercept German aircraft, a vital task as theLuftwaffe had planned to make an all-out effort to support the attackwith some 300 planes. The German command had relied upon fog,prevalent on previous days and which had been forecast for 7 August,to protect their armoured spearheads from air observation and attack,but at about 11 am that day the fog over the battle area began toclear.At about midday the first Typhoons took off for the American sectorfrom their advanced landing grounds, and went into action just before1 p.m. against a concentration of some 60 tanks and 200 vehiclesobserved along a hedge-lined road near Mortain. The tanks, someheavily camouflaged, were grouped closely together as if unpreparedfor the rapid lifting of the fog. After overflying at low level toconfirm them as German, the Typhoons commenced dive attacks upon thefront and rear of the column, which was immediately brought to a halt.The pilots observed that their attacks caused great confusion, and sawGerman tank crews bailing out and running for cover regardless ofwhether or not their tanks were left blocking the road. Also at thistime the first American fighter-bombers arrived in the area, withP-47s, including the squadron equipped with rockets, attacking Germantransport.The weather remained clear and between 2 p.m. and 8 p.m. flights offive or six Typhoons were taking off roughly every 20 minutes toattack, returning to refuel and rearm before setting off again forMortain. As the afternoon wore on the pilots found the task oflocating the German tanks increasingly difficult due to theirdispersion and to clouds of dust and smoke in the battle area, but theforward movement of the German attack had been halted. By the end ofthe day No.83 Group had flown 294 sorties and IX Tactical Air Command200 sorties in the Mortain area. Three Typhoons and pilots had beenlost. Though the level of flak had initially been light, it hadincreased during the day with box-like patterns being put up over thetanks, and many of the Typhoons were found to have suffered damagefrom this and small-arms fire.German accounts clearly attribute the failure of their attack on 7August to the fighter-bombers. The commander of 2nd Panzer Division,von Luttwitz, later recalled that his tanks had made a swift advanceof about ten miles when suddenly the fighter-bombers appeared,They came in hundreds, firing their rockets at theconcentrated tanks and vehicles. We could do nothingagainst them and we could make no further progress.Hans Speidel, then the Chief of Staff of the German Army Group B,later wrote of Mortain thatit was possible for the Allied air forces alone to wreckthis Panzer operation with the help of a well co-ordinatedground-to-air communication system.The German troops received no air support on 7 Aug. Their aircraftattempting to reach the battle area were intercepted by strongAmerican fighter patrols and none reached within 40 miles of Mortain.Although fighting continued in the area for several days, with Mortainbeing recaptured by American forces on 12 August, the Germans made nofurther attempt to reach Avranches after 7 August. Typhoons took nopart in the battle after that date, with responsibility for airsupport reverting to the IX Tactical Air Command. The claims made bythe Allied fighter-bomber pilots for the period 7 - 10 August areimpressive, and are shown below:ALLIED FIGHTER-BOMBER CLAIMS, 7 - 10 AUGUST 1944ProbablyArmour Destroyed Destroyed Damaged Total2nd TAF 8 35 21 1409th AF 69 8 35 112Motor Ttansport2nd TAF 54 19 39 1129th AF 94 1 21 116Yet these claims are misleading and cannot be substantiated. During12 - 20 August the Mortain battle area was examined by two separateBritish ORS teams; No. 2 ORS and ORS 2nd TAF. No German vehicles weremissed by the investigation as the areas was not extensive; moreoverthe area was examined from an observation aircraft at low level withno further vehicles discovered. The destruction attributed to variousweapons can be tabulated as shown in the following table, which is acompilation of both the RAF and Army reports:DESTRUCTION ATTRIBUTED TO VARIOUS WEAPONS,MORTAIN AREA, AUGUST 1944FORM OF DESTRUCTION OR NEUTRALISATIONCannon/ Aband.TYPE Rockets MG Bomb intact Crew US Army Unknown TotalPanther 5 - 1 6 4 14 3 33Mk IV 2 - 1 1 - 5 1 10SP Guns - - - - - 1 2 3Arm.Troop Carr. 7 4 - 1 - 3 8 23Arm.Cars 1 - - 1 - 5 1 8Arm Recov.Veh. - - - - - 1 - 188 mm Guns - - - - - 1 1 275 mm Guns - - - - - 1 - 150 mm Guns - - - 1 - - - 1Cars 2 2 - - - 4 3 11Lorries - 6 - 1 1 2 20 30Ambulances - 2 - 2 - - 1 5Motor Cycles - - - 1 1 1 2 4_____________________________ _____________________________ ___________Totals 17 14 2 14 5 38 42 132This shows that a total of only 46 German tanks and self-propelledguns were actually found in the battle area, and of these only ninewere considered to have been destroyed by air weapons.
It was not possible to discriminate between victims of British andAmerican aircraft as the latter had also fired some 600 rockets. Manyof the 'unknown causes' were found some distance from any sign of airattack - such as cannon and machine gun strikes on the ground androcket or bomb craters - and could not be considered as possible airvictims. An obvious question is whether the Germans had been able torecover any of their tanks. The presence of a German tank recoveryvehicle would seem to confirm they had but, while it is likely thatsome tanks were recovered, this can hardly be an adequate explanationfor the discrepancy between air claims and the destruction found.Armoured and motor vehicles destroyed by air weapons were invariablyburnt out, and for recovery purposes damaged and abandoned vehicleshad priority over such. German prisoners, many of whoom werequestioned on this subject, consistently stated that burnt out tankswere never salvaged. In effect, a tank hit by a rocket or bomb was notworth recovering and the ORS should have found what was left of it.Another question is whether German accounts of the fighting can shedmore light on the number of tanks and vehicles destroyed by airattack. The histories of the German divisions that fought at Mortain,compiled post-war, stress how decisive the intervention of thefighter-bombers had been, but are ambiguous with regard to thequestion of losses. That of the 2nd Panzer Division states of theTyphoons that they attacked with great accuracy and succeeded inknocking out even the heaviest tanks, but the number of tanks actuallylost in this way is not given. The history of the 1st SS PanzerDivision (LAH) is similarly unclear as to the actual number of tanksknocked out from the air, though it implies that the number wasconsiderable and quotes an account of the air attacks by a panzergrenadier who recalled seeing many black oil clouds indicating theposition of destroyed tanks. Also quoted is a panzer grenadier officerwho, after describing how a fighter-bomber shot down by flak crashedonto a tank and put it out of action, adds that most of the othertanks and armoured personnel carriers also fell victim to the intense,hour-long, low-level attacks. Yet such German accounts attributingheavy tank and vehicle losses to air attack are misleading. They takelittle cognizance of the losses inflicted by US ground forces which,though almost certainly overestimated at the time in the confusion ofbattle, were none the less considerable. American accounts of thefighting indicate that, on 7 August, the forward troops of the US 30thand 9th Divisions claimed the destruction of at least eighteen Germantanks, fourteen of them by the 30th Division's attached 823rd TankDestroyer Battalion alone. Moreover, the ORS confirmed that US troopsaccounted for more heavy German armour than the fighter-bombers, thedestruction of twenty of the total of forty-six tanks and SP gunsfound being attributed to US ground weapons.The principal reason why such German accounts should be regarded withcaution, however, is that they provide no explanation as to what hadbecome of the tanks and vehicles destroyed by the fighter-bombers bythe time the ORS examined the battle area. Nor do they explain the notinconsiderable number of tanks found abandoned or destroyed by theirown crews. To some extent, German attribution of tank losses to airattack may stem from the confusion of battle, but it may also suggestboth a reluctance to acknowledge the morale effect of such attack, anda desire to ascribe the halting of the armoured thrust, which was muchin the nature of a forlorn hope, to Allied air power rather than todefeat at the hands of US ground forces.Despite the toll taken of the German armour by US ground weapons, thecommanders of the US units engaged on 7 August later confirmed that itwas the fighter-bombers that brought the German thrust to a halt. Atthe time of the ground survey, a member of ORS 2nd TAF visited theheadquarters of the US 9th Division's 39th Infantry Regiment. He wastold by the Commander how the German attack had cut off part of hisregiment from its headquarters and how his anti-tank guns had beeninsufficient to halt such a large number of tanks. He also told how hehad remained 'vulnerable and anxious' until Typhoons arrived to attackthe German spearhead. A visit was also made to the Commander of the30th Division's 117th Infantry Regiment, which had been in the path ofthe 2nd Panzer and 1st SS Panzer Divisions on 7 August. He recalledthat when the mist lifted at about 12.30,Thunderbolt and Typhoon aircraft came in immediately andattacked, Typhoons attacking for what seemed to him to beabout two hours. This, added to the resistance of the groundforces, stopped the thrust.Such appreciation of the close air support on 7 August is significantin view of the tendency of Allied aircraft to attack friendlypositions inadvertently in what was a very fluid ground battle. The US30th Division recorded that the Typhoons and P-47s often attacked itspositions, the 120th Regiment alone receiving ten such attacks duringthe day.Given the lack of tank destruction by air weapons, the undoubtedeffectiveness of the sustained fighter-bomber assault on 7 August musthave been largely the result of completely disrupting the Germanattack by compelling tanks to seek cover or their crews to abandonthem. The level of destruction attributed to air weapons by the ORS istoo insignificant to have been decisive, and even if the unknowncauses for destruction of both armour and motor transport were addedto the air attack totals the number would not be a quarter of thoseclaimed. Yet no fewer than ten of the 33 Panthers found, or 30 percent, had been abandoned or destroyed by their own crews. This was animportant discovery at that time, and a contemporary RAF tacticalstudy stressing the demoralising effect of the 3-inch rocket (RP)projectile offered this explanation for the German abandonment oftanks and vehicles at Mortain:Interrogation of prisoners has shown without questionthat German tank crews are extremely frightened ofattacks by RP...Crews are very aware that if an RPdoes hit a tank, their chance of survival is small.It is admitted that the chances of a direct hit areslight; nevertheless, this would hardly be appreciatedby a crew whose first thought would be of the disastrousresults if a hit was obtained.Prisoner of war data further confirmed the demoralising effect of airattack upon tank crews. German tank crewmen questioned for the laterjoint RAF/British Army study of Typhoon effectiveness indicated anirrational compulsion among inexperienced men to leave the relativesafety of their tank and seek alternative cover during air attack:The experienced crews stated that when attacked from theair they remained in their tanks which had no more thansuperficial damage (cannon strikes or near misses frombombs). They had a great difficulty in preventing the in-experienced men from baling out when our aircraft attacked.It is certainly plausible that tank crews under a heavy scale of airattack would be induced to bale out, despite the interior of the tankbeing possibly the safest place to be, and in this way the bombs androckets did not need to strike the tanks to be effective. When askedfor an opinion by the ORS on the number of abandoned tanks in theMortain battle area, an experienced NCO of a US anti-tank unitreplied,There is nothing but air attack that wouldmake a crack Panzer crew do that.
SORTIES AND CLAIMS BY ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCESFALAISE POCKET, AUGUST 1944RAF 2nd TAF US 9th AF TotalSorties 9 896 2 891 12 787MT destroyed 3 340 2 520 5 860Armour destroyed 257 134 391_____________________________ _____________________________ __Total claims 3 597 2 654 6 251Claims per sortie 0.36 0.91 0.49Shortly after the pocket had been closed No.2 ORS conducted anextensive investigation in the area to determine the German lossescaused by air attack and the effectiveness of air-to-groundweapons.The principal roads taken by the Germans were patrolled inthree areas; the 'Pocket' itself around Falaise, the area at the mouthof the pocket near Chambois and referred to as the 'Shambles', and thearea known as the 'Chase' which led to the Seine crossings. The resultof the investigation is shown in the following tables:GERMAN ARMOURED AND MT VEHICLE LOSSES IN THE FALAISE 'POCKET'AUGUST 1944Abandonded/TYPE Rockets Bombs Cannon/MG Destr.b.crew TotalTanks, SP Guns, AFVs 11 4 18 100 133Lorries, cars, mcs 4 43 278 376 701Guns - - 1 50 51_____________________________ _____________________________ ________Totals 15 47 297 526 885Percentages 1.7 5.5 33.5 59.5Of the 133 armoured vehicles of all types located by the ORS in the'Pocket', only 33 had been the victim of any form of air attack. Theremaining hundred had been destroyed by their crews or simplyabandoned. Air attacks were far more effective against soft-skinnedvehicles. Of 701 cars, trucks and motor cycles found in the 'Pocket',325 had been the victim of attack from the air, and of these 85 percent were hit by cannon or machine-gun fire - a testament to theeffectiveness of this form of attack. The fact however remains that ofa total of 885 vehicles of all types lost by the Germans in theFalaise pocket nearly 60 per cent were destroyed or abandoned by theircrews rather than as the direct result of attack from the air. Thelarge number of armoured and motor vehicles abandoned or destroyed bytheir crews is hardly surprising in such a retreat, and it was thoughtmany of those destroyed by air weapons had already been abandoned. Airattack, though, was considered responsible for much of the abandonmentas a result of causing disorganisation; moreover, destroyed vehicleshad completely blocked roads. Cannon and machine gun attacks hadproved to be extremely effective against the densely-packed motortransport. Such vehicles hit by cannon or machine gun rounds wereinvariably burnt out, and the report noted that where pock marks ofstrikes appeared in the roads a burnt vehicle was usually found.IV. ArdennesThe influence of Allied tactical air power upon German ability tocarry out large-scale armoured operations was so great by the end of1944 that the timing of the German Ardennes offensive was dictated bythe occurence of bad weather. In the early stages of the offensive,which began on 16 Dec 1944, fog and low cloud protected the tankspearheads from aerial observation and attack. Then the weathercleared and Allied fighter-bomber pilots were presented with targetssuch as they had not seen since Normandy and, as in Normandy, theymade large claims for the destruction of armour. Between 17 December1944 and 16 January 1945 the IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands of theNinth Air Force and RAF 2nd TAF claimed a total of 413 German armouredvehicles destroyed in the Ardennes salient, 324 of which were claimedas tanks. In early January No.2 ORS began an investigation of theseclaims, in the middle of the month they were joined by ORS 2nd TAF anda joint report was produced.Although hampered by thick snow which prevented the discovery ofrocket craters and burnt patches caused by napalm bombs, the ORS wereable to examine 101 armoured vehicles - the practice being to searchan area within 2 - 3 kilometres of each claim. The claims fordestruction within the salient are shown below:ALLIED AIR CLAIMS FOR GERMAN ARMOUR DESTROYEDIN THE ARDENNES SALIENTIN AREA EXAMINED BY ORS IN WHOLE SALIENTArmor. Armor.Tanks Vehic. Total Tanks Vehic. TotalIX TAC 62 23 85 140 69 209XIX TAC 2 0 2 176 19 1952nd TAF 2 1 3 8 1 9_____________________________ _____________________Totals 66 24 90 324 89 413The air weapons used were general purpose high-explosive bombs,fragmentation bombs, napalm fire bombs, and rockets. Many of the tanksclaimed by Ninth Air Force had also been engaged by machine guns, someonly by this means. For the 101 tanks and armoured vehicles examined,damage was atrributed as in the following table:LightTiger II Panther Mk IV SP Gun Armour TotalAIRBomb 1 - - - - 1Possiblyair attack - 3 - 2* 1 6*GROUNDAP Shot 1 16 1 9* 8 36HE Shell - 3 - 1 4 8Demolition 2 10 1 - 4 17Abandoned 1 10 - 4 7 22Other Cause - - 1 1 - 2Unknown - 5 2 1 2 10_____________________________ ___________________________Total 5 47 5 18 26 101Considering that this represents the investigation of claims for thedestruction of 66 tanks and 24 armoured vehicles the effect of airattack seems unimpressive; a maximum of seven out of 101 vehiclesexamined, some six per cent. It was found that fighter-bomber attackhad also involved some wastage, with bombs dropped among tanks alreadyknocked out by American troops, and it is revealing that even whenthese bombs landed within 15 yards of the tanks no additional damagewas done. Not surprisingly, the report concluded that, while thecontribution of the air forces to stemming the German offensive hadbeen considerable, thiswas not by the direct destruction of armour, which appearsto have been insignificant; but rather by the strafing andbombing of supply routes, which prevented essential suppliesfrom reaching the front.V. The Identification of KillsAs regards the reliability of the ORS ground surveys, one may wonderif tanks attributed to destruction by ground weapons had in fact beenknocked out by aircraft and subsequently used as target practice byAllied troops. However, such mistakes were very unlikely. Bombs androckets were harly ever, if at all, used singly, and near vehiclesdestroyed by such weapons were always found the craters of nearmisses. Moreover, rocket craters were distinctive, oval in shape andusually with part of the rocket tube or fins in or near them. Parts ofthe rocket were also often found in tanks or vehicles destroyed by theweapon. In or near tanks and vehicles destroyed by their crews wereoften found the metal cases that had contained German demolitioncharges, these being placed in a specific part of the tank, such asunder engine hatches. Pock marks on roads or holes roughly six inchesin diameter in the ground indicated machine gun or cannon attacks, andtanks and vehicles that had been strafed bore holes or dents on uppersurfaces. It is possible that tanks abandoned intact were subsequentlyused for target practice, and attributed to a particular groundweapon, but this has little relevance to the effectiveness of airweapons.Reposted again due tot he number of people apparently ignoring the findings of the ORS reference the efficacy of bomb and gun/cannon kills.RE Charlie RockSo the P-47 flight commander ignores attacking the top decks because they are too heavily armoured. The rest of the flight also ignores shooting the top decks in favour of shooting suspension components. Apparently the top armour is considered too thick to enable a kill with .50cal. He states that the belly armour is considered weaker than the other armoured surfaces, which is only true in the In the PIV. The forward belly of the Panther was almost double the thickness of ?top armour? (30mm) the StuG top and belly armour were identical at 16mm and directly comparable to the 16mm top superstructure and top turret armour of late PIV J and top armour of the Panther. Gaining better angles through ricochets defeats velocity and deforms rounds thereby reducing their effectiveness at perforating armour. The pilots note themselves that they could not be sure.
