Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => The O' Club => Topic started by: BlueJ1 on February 12, 2009, 11:11:35 PM
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About 1030 tonight a continental airliner crashed into a home here just outside Buffalo. 1st major airline crash in Buffalo airport history. Unknown on any details on number of passengers or individuals in the home. Just made CNN news.
We're praying for the passengers, the people in the home, and their families.
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They'll be in my thoughts in prayers, I hope everyone comes out of it okay.
:salute
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48 souls on the plane. There are deaths. Unknown as of a number yet.
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fox list 49
:(
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fox list 49
:(
The major news also said 49 killed and then soon after the news casters said only a few were killed. They are giving mixed reports. All the local channels and the media brief that was just on our channels said they were unknown on the number of deaths yet but there were 48 individuals on the aircraft and 1 inside the home that took the brunt of the aircraft's crash.
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NYS Police just stated at 0129 local that there were no survivors of the aircraft. So the total is at least 49 as of now.
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It was a Dash8 400 series.
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CLARENCE, New York - A commuter plane crashed into a suburban Buffalo home and erupted in flames late Thursday, killing all 48 people aboard and one person on the ground, authorities said. Witnesses heard the twin turboprop aircraft sputtering before it went down in light snow and fog.
Flames silhouetted the shattered home after Continental Connection Flight 3407 plummeted into it around 10:20 p.m.
It was the first fatal crash of a commercial airliner in the United States since Aug. 27, 2006, when 49 people were killed after a Comair jetliner took off from a Lexington, Ky., runway that was too short.
"The whole sky was lit up orange," Bob Dworak, who lives less than a mile from the crash site, told The Associated Press. He said that residents of the neighborhood, about 10 miles from the Buffalo airport, were used to planes rumbling overhead, but he took note Thursday night when one sounded louder than usual and made some odd noises.
The 74-seat Q400 Bombardier aircraft was carrying 5,000 pounds of fuel and apparently exploded on impact, Erie County Executive Chris Collins said.
Firefighters got as close to the plane as they could, he said.
"They were shouting out to see if there were any survivors on the plane. Truly a very heroic effort, but there were no survivors," Collins said.
The aircraft, operated by Colgan Air, was flying from Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey to Buffalo Niagara International Airport in light snow, fog and 17 mph winds.
'There was a big bang'
"We were thinking it was just another plane," he said. "It kind of made some sputtering noises but they lower the landing gear over our house a lot so the noise from the planes a lot of time will change kind of drastically as they go over."
"All the sudden, there was a big bang, and the house shook," he said.
He drove over to take a look, and "all we were seeing was 50-to-100-foot flames and a pile of rubble on the ground. It looked like the house just got destroyed the instant it got hit," he said.
Amy Kudwa, a spokeswoman for the Department of Homeland Security in Washington said there was no indication terrorism was involved.
"All indications are that this was an air-safety event," she said.
Kudwa referred all other questions to the FAA.
ouston-based Continental Airlines issued a statement saying that preliminary information showed the plane carried 44 passengers and a crew of four.
"At this time, the full resources of Colgan Air's accident response team are being mobilized and will be devoted to cooperating with all authorities responding to the accident and to contacting family members and providing assistance to them," the statement said.
Continental extends its deepest sympathy to the family members and loved ones of those involved in this accident," said Larry Kellner, chairman and CEO of Continental Airlines, in a later statement. "Our thoughts and prayers are with all of the family members and loved ones of those involved in the flight 3407 tragedy."
Continental representatives were traveling to Buffalo to provide assistance to Colgan in its response to the accident. A family assistance center is being established in the area.
Clarence emergency control director Dave Bissonette said the crash also killed one person on the ground.
A mother and daughter who live on the street where the plane crashed were being treated at Millard Fillmore Suburban Hospital for what were described as non-life-threatening injuries, hospital spokesman Michael Hughes said. Two volunteer firefighters also were being treated for smoke inhalation and minor injuries.
www.msn.com
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Euronews is saying 50 people. May they rest in peace.
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What a shame.
RIP
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Plane has known issue with landing gear strut failures, crash occurred right over the marker just after handoff. Seems a bit early to drop the gear but witness in article said that was common over his house. Delta MD88 was on approach and reporting light ice down to 3500. listening to ATC tape didnt sound like any stress in the cockpit. I'm wondering if the gear went on deployment...
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Why would a gear failure ever cause any plane to dive in though?
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drag and loss of speed under regular landing power, not noticed till too late...possibly.
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I suppose, but the landing Gear will not slow you to stall speed very rapidly. They would have to be reeeeeeallly slow first, and you'd hear this loud voice saying "Stall" "Stall" "Stall"...
I feel terrible for the family's of the people on board. I just heard on the local news that one of the passengers' husband, had died in the Towers. :(
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Why would a gear failure ever cause any plane to dive in though?
Only way would be if a piece hit tail surface...I'd actually be wondering if pilot was carrying just a bit extra speed figuring on an instrument approach in light ice better a few mph extra then trying to catch up on final...
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Plane has known issue with landing gear strut failures, crash occurred right over the marker just after handoff. Seems a bit early to drop the gear ...
Which marker? Outer Middle Inner? If she was coming for landing, don't you drop the gear at the outer marker, usually close to the glide slope intersection? I don't think any ldg extention malfunction would bring a Q400 down. Now snow/ice and fog combine with something else :frown: ...
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I'm guessing right over the outer marker, plane had just been handed off to tower for final. I dont have a clue either how a landing gear problem would bring it down. I just am speculating due to timing...something had to get it far out of whack for that type of crash.
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Landing gear is in the nacelle with the engine, so a catastrophic failure would possibly take out engine/wing junction. Whatever happened happened quickly. Sounds like the captain was flying the approach and the first officer was handling the comms.
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SAS sent back all their Dash'es after repeated landing gear failures. Maybe the gear droped off and killed the hydraulics with it.
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I've been reading about this all morning, since I grew up an hour from the crash and have a friend 10 minutes away. Two different witnesses heard a similar "chainsaw into wood" type noise before the explosion. I can't think of anything but engine trouble (esp on a turbo-prop) that would cause this type of sputtering noise.
Surely is a tragedy. Now of course all the news agencies are covering all of the commercial crashes in the past decade...and I'm flying in 9 hours. :noid
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I've been reading about this all morning, since I grew up an hour from the crash and have a friend 10 minutes away. Two different witnesses heard a similar "chainsaw into wood" type noise before the explosion. I can't think of anything but engine trouble (esp on a turbo-prop) that would cause this type of sputtering noise.
Surely is a tragedy. Now of course all the news agencies are covering all of the commercial crashes in the past decade...and I'm flying in 9 hours. :noid
Statistically speaking now is the safest time to fly, odds are against crashing again soon.
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Statistically speaking now is the safest time to fly, odds are against crashing again soon.
Well statistically odds of crashing are the same as they always are...which are indeed minuscule.
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I'll be flying out of Buffalo on monday on the same type of aircraft heading back to Afghanistan. For how screwed up our county is their is a high praise for the actions taken by our leaders here and the fire department and police for dealing so well with a situation none of us expected.
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My brother flew for Air Wisconsin flying Dash 8's until they upgraded for the CRJ 200's. He really enjoyed flying them from what I recall. Now he flies for South West.
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Plane has known issue with landing gear strut failures, crash occurred right over the marker just after handoff. Seems a bit early to drop the gear but witness in article said that was common over his house. Delta MD88 was on approach and reporting light ice down to 3500. listening to ATC tape didn't sound like any stress in the cockpit. I'm wondering if the gear went on deployment...
The plane was less than a year old. Certified 4/08. Built well after the landing gear issues that occurred in September of 07.
The problems in 07 weren't from the gear "falling off" during extension. The incidents were uneventful no nose wheel landings due to the nose gear not extending due to O-ring blockage that prevented the landing gear actuator from fully extending.
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Multiple SAS flights experienced collapse of the main gear on landing. An Austrian based (not sure which airline) experienced a wheel detaching on deployment prior to touchdown.
An AP report from Sweden says that Scandinavian Airlines has decided to permanently stop flying Bombardier Q400 turboprops after a string of crash landings blamed on landing gear malfunctions, the airline's chief executive said Sunday.
The company took the decision the day after an SAS turboprop made by the Canadian company crash-landed with 44 people on board in Denmark when part of its landing gear collapsed.
The accident followed two similar crash landings last month with the same type of plane, also known as the Dash 8-400, after which SAS temporarily grounded its fleet of turboprops. No one was seriously injured in any of the accidents....
The plane slid down the runway on its belly after the landing gear collapsed, with one wing scraping the ground in a shower of sparks. All passengers and crew were evacuated safely.
*****
Soerensen´s declaration was made as a result of the recent incident involving a Dash 8 / 400 belonging to the Austrian Airlines Group carrier Tyrolean Airways, in which a wheel detached from the starboard side of the aircraft´s dual undercarriage at Frankfurt Airport.
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This one is interesting...
This time, it involves prop overspeed on descent and approach; the Swedish air accident investigation branch (SHK) found that in a number of occasions in which this occurred (4 times in one acft!), on none of these occasions was the checklist correctly followed. The report criticised SK and Bombardier training, saying that the checklist itself was difficult to follow.
In one particularly serious incident, the aircraft was approaching Kalmar and became seriously destabilised, to the extent that the ATC officer alerted fire crews; a safe landing was made, but the approach was heavily criticised by the SHK.
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/11/08/219260/inquiry-into-destabilised-sas-q400-approach-finds-checklists-not-followed.html
While the Q400 managed to land, with no injuries to its 73 occupants, SHK says “at no stage” did the aircraft meet the requirements for a stabilised approach.
“[We] cannot judge how close the aircraft was to a crash in respect to height, speed and controllability, but can conclude that both pilots on separate occasions during the approach were convinced that they would not reach the runway,” it says, highlighting the “balanced” crew resource management which ultimately kept the Q400 under control.
SHK says the overspeed checklist procedure was “not completely clear”, notably regarding the crucial issue of retarding the throttles.
“There is no information in the checklist to say that a power lever should not be placed at flight-idle,” says SHK. “Nor was the company informed of the potentially dangerous situation that can arise by having an engine power-lever in flight-idle if the propeller is not feathered.”
Sounds remarkably similar to the accounts of the planes engines over speeding....
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Here's another tidbit...
See the story about Q-400 gear problems. Posted in the spring 2007 by a pilot with 3000 hrs on the Q400 for Scandinavian Airlines.
We have had an endless number of problems with the gear; I myself have had two occasions of the gear cycling itself multiple times, with the handle in the up and lock positions - Aparently caused by proximity sensors, as has been the case for many of my colleagues.
Looks kind of exiting with all the red, green and amber lights coming and going all the time, not to mention the actual feeling of doors and gear moving.
Fortunately, in my case, it never happend at 280 KIAS....I doubt the doors would remain attached.
In one case there was a problem with the actual uphook, very nearly causing one maingear to not extend....Crew extended it after trying alternate extension for about one hour and on a hot phoneline to Bombardier.
A few cases of trouble in the company too with nosegear extension - Don't remember the cause.
We still hear of problems on a regular basis with the prox sensors.
There has been, and contiue to be, problems with just about any system on this A/C....More interesting, we have had more than a few prop overspeeds in the last year - This results in shutting the engine down (in the case where you are able to regain some control with the propspeed) which is obviously not always a desirable thing to do in the Scandinavian winthers !
Very, very interesting aircraft indeed, and we are way beyond the "infant illness" period ....
This from PPRuNe...
Amazed at the number of ATC pilots who refuse to fly the Dash 8...
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Thoughts & prayers for the family and friends of those lost.
ROX
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initial NTSB reports significant conversation specific to icing, gear and flaps (15) selected and plane goes unstable. Gear flaps retracted but recovery unsuccessful. Somehow this is much unsettling to me, plane has excellent deicing capabilities and indicators.
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The company took the decision the day after an SAS turboprop made by the Canadian company crash-landed with 44 people on board in Denmark when part of its landing gear collapsed.
The plane slid down the runway on its belly after the landing gear collapsed, with one wing scraping the ground in a shower of sparks. All passengers and crew were evacuated safely.
the images...
(http://i231.photobucket.com/albums/ee35/lengro/dash1.jpg)
(http://i231.photobucket.com/albums/ee35/lengro/dash2.jpg)
(http://i231.photobucket.com/albums/ee35/lengro/dash3.jpg)
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The pilot of the plane is the Brother of our I.T. guy. Sad day at work...
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This is most likely icing that could not be controlled with the anti-ice and de-ice systems installed on the aircraft.
When the horizontal stabilizer stalls the nose pitches down. This can be aggravated depending on particular design features. There is evidence of accumulations of ice on the CVR. Ice can cause a tailplane stall especially during flap extension.
Several aircraft have crashed because of tailplane icing. Most notably an Embraer 120 in Detroit.
The ATR-72 crash in Roselawn, Indiana was attributed to icing. Specifically icing aft of the ice protection on the leading edge the wing.
Icing is tricky. If you get into severe icing you only have a few minutes or seconds before it makes the airplane un-flyable. But icing that severe is very rare. And modern airplanes are well equipped to deal with it, especially if the ice protection is heat from bleed air instead of inflatable boots.
I'm not familiar with the Q400 but I doubt it had hot wings and tail. Probably pneumatic boots.
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Roselawn was pilot error, he had engaged flaps during hold and then when he got clearance he forgot about them and got an overspeed warning...things went fubar when he retracted them...
I'm curious if the approach was manual or AP....
Great video
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2238323060735779946
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Roselawn was not a pilot error. If it was, why would they force the wing leading edge modification on all ATRs?
As far as the Q400, my personal guess is that they had the autopilot on, picked up so much ice that the autopilot reached it's limit and disconected ... or they disconected it themselves to manually shoot the ILS. The autopilot gave back the plane to the creew with flight controls in extreme and awckward positions, throw the plane out of balance before the unsuspecting/unprepared creew could spell "mama". :frown::salute
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My theory...
After staying up all night watching MSNBC and talking to a couple of investigators on this sorta thing, I've devised my own theory...
After seeing pictures of the percipitation in the area, I don't believe that to have caused too much of an issue, it wouldn't be anything that the planes boots (Inflatable rubber tubes on the front end of the wing that break off ice on a smaller planes that can't produce the extra air a jet engine can to feed it through heated tubes to act as a de-icer) couldn't handle. What's more interesting to me is that SEVERAL eye witnesses saw an engine on fire prior to "touch down", which, historically is EXTREMELY rare... I believe that on approach (they were ~4-5 mi out) a large gust of wind (also reported, a couple witnesses saying roughly 25 - 30 mph gusts on the ground) was able to alter the airflow over the wings causing a stall, and at ~1500 - 2000 feet, you don't have much time to recover. The pilot then was forced to take the extreme angle of attack he was at (estimated to be > 45 degrees) and increase engine power to regain airflow and airspeed. The pilot could have instinctually added full power to an engine (although a no-no, with little room to recover, I'd be wanting all the help I could get) causing one of the engines to overheat and catch fire (backed up by a couple eye witnesses saying they heard a high-pitched noise, one describing it as a "high pitched squeal, similar to an earthquake" which, sounds like a weird way to describe it, but if you've ever heard a turbo runnin on decent power, you know something of what he's talking about.). Before you reply going "Overheating an engine takes a while!!" think also that this plane was a dual engine turbo prop, and was almost through with its flight, who knows what the engine temperature was before the incident, and how quickly an engine of this particular model heats at full power... Although that would be a result of the initial stall. I'm forseeing this crash to be labled as a weather related incident...
Another possibility though...
Pilot went through a dense pack of cold air causing near instantanious icing which the boots couldn't break through (that's ALOT of ice in case you don't know... although possible, unlikely) causing an airflow disturbance over the top of the wings, again, resulting in an annoying voice saying "Stall Stall Stall" And maybe later... "Sink rate... Pull Up."
I'm making speculations here, but I believe that both cases that I bring up (although having the same result...stall) are supported by eye-witness accounts and the little evidence we have so far.
My thoughts and prayers go out to the families, and to the heroic men and women who responded to this tragedy...
Another interesting tidbit here though...
Looking through different things, it seems that plane crashes seem to come in threes...Right now we're at two, one heroic story of amazing piloting, and one mystery tragedy...
This is most likely icing that could not be controlled with the anti-ice and de-ice systems installed on the aircraft.
I'm not familiar with the Q400 but I doubt it had hot wings and tail. Probably pneumatic boots.
I'm quite familier with the Q400, it has, as I mentions, pneumatic boots.
It also has the best service record, with the only blot on it being the slight landing gear issue in Europe which was promptly fixed.
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Trigger, turbine overheat theory? :confused: I'll be very surprised if the Q400 turbines don't have a fuel bypass valve to prevent ITT redlining. Don't those have the 5000HP PW with FADEC anyway?
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Roselawn was not a pilot error. If it was, why would they force the wing leading edge modification on all ATRs?
As far as the Q400, my personal guess is that they had the autopilot on, picked up so much ice that the autopilot reached it's limit and disconected ... or they disconected it themselves to manually shoot the ILS. The autopilot gave back the plane to the creew with flight controls in extreme and awckward positions, throw the plane out of balance before the unsuspecting/unprepared creew could spell "mama". :frown::salute
NTSB finding was that misconfiguration was a key component of the crash. Doesnt mean that the icing wasnt a major factor and that corrections werent called for. However the full deployment of the flaps and subsequent overspeeding/retraction directly caused the crash. I thought recommended procedures anytime ice was observed was to disengage AP and fly the approach manually. Even GA pilots are taught you never engage flaps with visible ice on the leading wing edges? I know U've got thousands of hours in all kinds of stuff...from the comparatively little I know it sure seems like some fundamental errors...assuming AP was engaged up till final.
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Trigger, turbine overheat theory? :confused: I'll be very surprised if the Q400 turbines don't have a fuel bypass valve to prevent ITT redlining. Don't those have the 5000HP PW with FADEC anyway?
The aircraft is powered by two turboprop engines type PW1 50A supplied by Pratt & Whitney Canada. Each engine develops 5,071shp or 3,800kW. The turboprop engines, mounted in Shorts engine nacelles, have full authority digital engine control (FADEC).
The engines drive six-bladed reversible-pitch composite propellers, type R408, supplied by Dowty. The propeller blades are fitted with an electrical de-icing system.
The total fuel capacity is 6,526l giving a maximum range of 2,519km carrying 74 passengers. The maximum cruise speed is just under 403mph.
Although, yes, it does have blocks, I do believe that at full power, a number of things could have gone wrong. A plane isn't made to be run full power unless ABSOLUTLY need be. I'm not strong with this theory, this is just me trying to explain as why an engine would be on fire AGL...
Although at full power, a number of mechanical issues could have also caused an engine to ignite...
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Dash 8 has had significant issues with runaway props, if levers were in flight idle and pilot initiated checklist it would cause the severe dip/rotation/occillation as well (from account above) however I think NTSB would have commented on engine power settings or voice comments in that regard. Given the planes extensive use in Europe/Canada I cant see how the icing would bring it down unless they screwed the pooch by the numbers. Would require AP till final then flap deployment in known icing etc...
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Read an article talking about the woman & her daughter who made it out of the house, and the husband who was killed. It stated that the woman still hadn't been told about the fate of her husband. If that's accurate, it was pretty insensitive to report his death in the article for the whole world to read about first.
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Very sad day in aviation, RIP to all onboard.
Here's the tapes from Buffalo ATC - callsign Colgan 3407
Abbreviated version
Download Crash - MP3 Crash by Colgan Free Music Hosting (http://www.supload.com/listen?s=8QeAxT)
Full version - 15 mins in they're cleared for the ILS 23
http://event.liveatc.net/kbuf/KBUF-Feb-13-2009-0300Z.mp3 (http://event.liveatc.net/kbuf/KBUF-Feb-13-2009-0300Z.mp3)
Hearing the cheer in the FO's voice just minutes before they went down, then hearing ATC not being able to contact them again is gut-wrenching :(
There was another Colgan crew cleared for the approach a few minutes after, and they asked the tower if they knew what was going on down there, I imagine they saw the fire, that had to be tough to stomach.
Many pilots reporting icing conditions while in the approach area. Not the time to speculate, but the NTSB said that after 15 degrees of flaps was selected, there was severe pitch down and roll. Very likely that it was a tail stall, as a result of the ice it had accumulated. In an icing situation like this it's usually always encountered when adding flaps.
When the horizontal stabilizer stalls the nose pitches down. This can be aggravated depending on particular design features. There is evidence of accumulations of ice on the CVR. Ice can cause a tailplane stall especially during flap extension.
That's what I'm thinking. To recover from a tail stall the recovery actions are almost completely opposite of a wing stall, you want to pull the stick back to re-attatch the flow on the horizontal stab and maintain power or reduce power. Basically to recover from a tail stall you want to "undo what you just did".
Since the thrust line on the Dash 8 is above the center of gravity - any sudden increase in power will cause a nose down pitching moment, that will be aggravated by the already compromised lifting surface of the horizontal stab as a result of the ice accumulation. Like you said it's most likely to happen during flap extension, especially if you're close to the max speed for flap extension - as I'm guessing he may have been, trying to fly the approach a little faster because of the icing.
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Hearing the cheer in the FO's voice just minutes before they went down, then hearing ATC not being able to contact them again is gut-wrenching :(
Yeah... there's a reason I guess they don't play THAT particular part on the news... god that was painful to hear...
Sorry, but this stands out to me as being just... bizarre: "Um... uh... what do you mean they went down?"
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Having several thousand hours flying in icing country in pneumatic boot protected airplane I can tell you that they only protect a small part of the airfoil.
While the ATR-42 and ATR-72 aircraft are now compliant with all icing condition requirements imposed by those 18 ADs, the de-icing boots still only reach back to 12.5% of the chord. Prior to the accident, they had extended only to 5% and 7%, respectively. They still fail to deal with the findings of the Boscombe-Down tests, conducted by the British, which demonstrated ice could form as far back on the wing as 23% of the chord, and on the tail at 30% of chord. Both percentages remain well beyond the limits of the extended deicing boots, installed in compliance with those FAA ADs.
Ice accumulation on an airplane is an emergency yet many pilots have a false sense of security because the airplane has ice protection features. At best they only keep the airplanes flying until it can get out of icing conditions. Some are better at it than others.
I am currently flying a modern jet with bleed heat but that doesn't mean I would hang around in icing. When we know there is icing on an approach we do our best to stay high and descend continuously through it. It doesn't take much to take down an airplane.
Here is how little it takes......
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1997/a97h0011/a97h0011_index.asp
The flight was unremarkable until the aircraft was on final approach to the Fredericton airport. The autopilot was controlling the aircraft based on commands from the crew, the flight management system, and signals from the ground-based instrument landing system (ILS) for runway 15 at Fredericton. The aircraft's landing lights were on for the approach and landing. The captain saw the glow from the runway approach lights through the fog at about 300 feet above ground level (agl), 100 feet above decision height for the approach. At decision height, 200 feet above the runway, the captain, the pilot-not-flying (PNF), called the lights in sight and the first officer responded that he was landing. The first officer disconnected the autopilot, at about 165 feet above ground, to hand fly the rest of the approach and landing.
After the autopilot was disconnected, the aircraft drifted above the glide path, and twice the captain coached the first officer to get the aircraft down to the glide path. The first officer reduced thrust in response to the captain's first mention to get the aircraft down, and he reduced thrust to idle at about 80 feet agl. Moments later, the captain, aware that the aircraft was left of the centre line but not knowing the distance travelled down the runway, and not sure that a safe landing could be made, ordered a go-around, which the first officer acknowledged. The thrust levers were advanced, the first officer selected the go-around mode for the flight director, and he started to increase the pitch of the aircraft to the command bar indications, 10 degrees nose up. About one second after the first officer acknowledged the go-around, the stick shaker (stall warning) activated. As the aircraft reached 10 degrees nose up, about one and one-half seconds after the stick shaker activated, the captain called flaps and selected them to the go-around setting, the warbler tone associated with the stall protection system (SPS) sounded, and the aircraft stalled aerodynamically.
The area forecast for the New Brunswick area behind the warm front indicated that, for the time of the occurrence, there would be light, occasionally moderate icing in cloud. The freezing level would be at the surface, with above-freezing layers between 3000 and 6000 feet asl. The Caribou, Maine, tephigram9 for 16/2000 indicated a sharp temperature inversion aloft. The upper-level winds forecast for the Fredericton area, valid for use between 16/1700 and 17/0200, indicated above-freezing temperatures up to and including 9000 feet asl. The Surface Weather record for Fredericton indicates that at 16/2300 the dry-bulb/dew-point temperatures were -7.7ºC/-8.3ºC, and at 16/2357, -7.6ºC/-8.1ºC.
The crew reported that the flight was not in cloud until the final stages of the approach into Fredericton, where they entered cloud at between 500 and 1000 feet agl, and that there were no indications of icing throughout the flight. In the two hours before the occurrence, two flights had landed at Fredericton in similar weather conditions. During the investigation, the crew of one flight indicated that on final approach, after entering cloud, there was some light icing, and after landing there was some light rime icing on the leading edge of the wing. The crew of the other flight did not see ice during the approach or on the wings after landing. A person driving from Edmundston to Fredericton on the evening of the accident reported encountering freezing fog north of Fredericton.
The ice accretion studies concluded that the aircraft was in an icing environment for at least 60 seconds prior to the stall, and that during this period a thin layer of mixed ice with some degree of roughness likely accumulated on the leading edges of the wings. The engineering simulator comparison indicated that aerodynamic "events" occurred at 400 and 150 feet agl that reduced the aircraft lift, and that the lift losses were a result of local flow separation in the area of the leading edge cap, located between WS 247 and WS 253.
The drag coefficient calculated for the accident flight (while the aircraft was on approach below 1000 feet) was significantly higher than the drag coefficients calculated for the previous flights. This difference in coefficients indicates increased drag while the aircraft was on approach, and, therefore, reduced performance.
The ice accretion study by Bombardier Inc. also stated that for the ice roughness, height, and density predicted, a reduction in lift of as much as 0.43±0.04 in CLmax with a corresponding change in maximum AOA of 5±1.25 degrees could be expected. The contributions of sealant and ground effect to the performance degradation have been estimated in previous sections, and, when combined, amount to between 2 and 3.3 degrees reduction in maximum AOA. The aircraft stalled at an AOA which was approximately 4.5 degrees lower than expected for the natural stall. The estimated effects of ice accretion, therefore, would be a reduction in maximum AOA of 2.5 degrees (4.5 - 2) to 1.2 degrees (4.5 - 3.3); a thin layer of ice could account for this degradation.
Notwithstanding that no ice was found on the aircraft following the accident, there is no phenomenon other than ice accretion that could account for performance deficits of this magnitude, particularly when progressive performance reductions occurred while the aircraft was on final approach in weather conditions conducive to icing. The most likely scenario is that in addition to ice accretion along the leading edge, ice also accumulated on the extruded sealant at WS 247 and WS 253.
An estimated .020 inches of ice would cause a five degree reduction in critical angle of attack in the CRJ. Admittedly the wing on a CRJ is swept.
The accident this week shows evidence that the crew saw ice accumulating and then extended flaps. That is the danger point in any airplane, the point most likely to cause tailplane stall. The flap extension causes the angle of attack of the tail to increase, pushing it closer to stall. Changing airflow over the wing changes airflow over the tail, possibly exacerbating the angle of attack increase. Finally, flow separation on the bottom of the horizontal stabilizer could create a low pressure bubble far aft and actually pull the elevator down. Airplanes with a flying tail instead of a hinged elevator are less susceptible to this. I don't know if the Q400 flight controls include a fully movable horizontal stabilizer or a hinged elevator.
NASA Icing video with good explanations of tail stall.
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2238323060735779946
A summary of the Roselawn accident.
http://www.airlinesafety.com/letters/atr.htm
Another Summary with a link in it to the full report
http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19941031-1
An AOPA PDF with wise words for GA airplanes.
http://www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa11.pdf
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Another interesting tidbit here though...
Looking through different things, it seems that plane crashes seem to come in threes...Right now we're at two, one heroic story of amazing piloting, and one mystery tragedy...
no......we're at one.
the one in the hudson wasn't a crash. that was a perfect landing, considering the circumstances.
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Very sad day in aviation, RIP to all onboard.
Here's the tapes from Buffalo ATC - callsign Colgan 3407
Abbreviated version
Download Crash - MP3 Crash by Colgan Free Music Hosting (http://www.supload.com/listen?s=8QeAxT)
Full version - 15 mins in they're cleared for the ILS 23
http://event.liveatc.net/kbuf/KBUF-Feb-13-2009-0300Z.mp3 (http://event.liveatc.net/kbuf/KBUF-Feb-13-2009-0300Z.mp3)
Hearing the cheer in the FO's voice just minutes before they went down, then hearing ATC not being able to contact them again is gut-wrenching :(
There was another Colgan crew cleared for the approach a few minutes after, and they asked the tower if they knew what was going on down there, I imagine they saw the fire, that had to be tough to stomach.
Many pilots reporting icing conditions while in the approach area. Not the time to speculate, but the NTSB said that after 15 degrees of flaps was selected, there was severe pitch down and roll. Very likely that it was a tail stall, as a result of the ice it had accumulated. In an icing situation like this it's usually always encountered when adding flaps.
That's what I'm thinking. To recover from a tail stall the recovery actions are almost completely opposite of a wing stall, you want to pull the stick back to re-attatch the flow on the horizontal stab and maintain power or reduce power. Basically to recover from a tail stall you want to "undo what you just did".
Since the thrust line on the Dash 8 is above the center of gravity - any sudden increase in power will cause a nose down pitching moment, that will be aggravated by the already compromised lifting surface of the horizontal stab as a result of the ice accumulation. Like you said it's most likely to happen during flap extension, especially if you're close to the max speed for flap extension - as I'm guessing he may have been, trying to fly the approach a little faster because of the icing.
dam.......
she had that"thank god this flight is almost done tonight" tone to her voice.
it seemed that it happened so fast that they weren't even able to make a mayday, or any other emergency calls.
Godspeed to them all. :salute
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NTSB finding was that misconfiguration was a key component of the crash. Doesnt mean that the icing wasnt a major factor and that corrections werent called for. However the full deployment of the flaps and subsequent overspeeding/retraction directly caused the crash. I thought recommended procedures anytime ice was observed was to disengage AP and fly the approach manually. Even GA pilots are taught you never engage flaps with visible ice on the leading wing edges? I know U've got thousands of hours in all kinds of stuff...from the comparatively little I know it sure seems like some fundamental errors...assuming AP was engaged up till final.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
the loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots while the airplane was in a holding pattern during which it intermittently encountered supercooled cloud and drizzle/rain drops, the size and water content of which exceeded those described in the icing certification envelope. The airplane was susceptible to this loss of control, and the crew was unable to recover. Contributing to the accident were: 1) the French Directorate General for Civil Aviation's (DGAC's) inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72, and its failure to take the necessary corrective action to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions; and 2) the DGAC's failure to provide the FAA with timely airworthiness information developed from previous ATR incidents and accidents in icing conditions,3) the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's) failure to ensure that aircraft icing certification requirements, operational requirements for flight into icing conditions, and FAA published aircraft icing information adequately accounted for the hazards that can result from flight in freezing rain, 4) the FAA's inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72 to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions; and 5) ATR's inadequate response to the continued occurrence of ATR 42 icing/roll upsets which, in conjunction with information learned about aileron control difficulties during the certification and development of the ATR 42 and 72, should have prompted additional research, and the creation of updated airplane flight manuals, flightcrew operating manuals and training programs related to operation of the ATR 42 and 72 in such icing conditions.
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NTSB finding was that misconfiguration was a key component of the crash. Doesnt mean that the icing wasnt a major factor and that corrections werent called for. However the full deployment of the flaps and subsequent overspeeding/retraction directly caused the crash. I thought recommended procedures anytime ice was observed was to disengage AP and fly the approach manually. Even GA pilots are taught you never engage flaps with visible ice on the leading wing edges? I know U've got thousands of hours in all kinds of stuff...from the comparatively little I know it sure seems like some fundamental errors...assuming AP was engaged up till final.
I'm sorry Humble, I don't want to come accross as "I have xxxx hours, u don't I know shut up". I love reading what others have to offer even if it's the intercontinental missile theory. I just like to see people here get their ideas/fact straight about aviation.
Here's the NTSB report you are talking about : http://www.bluecoat.org/reports/NTSB_96_Roselawn_ATR.pdf (http://www.bluecoat.org/reports/NTSB_96_Roselawn_ATR.pdf) ... There's no mention of "full flpas, nor misconfiguration was key". The flaps 15 did cause ice to accumulate beyond the boots, but nothing wrong having them there anyway.
3.2 Probable Cause
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were
the loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal that occurred
after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots because: 1) ATR failed to completely disclose to
operators, and incorporate in the ATR 72 airplane flight manual, flightcrew operating manual and
flightcrew training programs, adequate information concerning previously known effects of freezing
precipitation on the stability and control characteristics, autopilot and related operational procedures
when the ATR 72 was operated in such conditions; 2) the French Directorate General for Civil
Aviation’s (DGAC’s) inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72, and its failure to take the necessary
corrective action to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions; and 3) the DGAC’s failure to
provide the FAA with timely airworthiness information developed from previous ATR incidents and
accidents in icing conditions, as specified under the Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement and Annex 8
of the International Civil Aviation Organization.
Contributing to the accident were: 1) the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA’s) failure to ensure
that aircraft icing certification requirements, operational requirements for flight into icing conditions,
and FAA published aircraft icing information adequately accounted for the hazards that can result
from flight in freezing rain and other icing conditions not specified in 14 Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) Part 25, Appendix C; and 2) the FAA’s inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72 to ensure
continued airworthiness in icing conditions.
3.1 Findings
1. The flightcrew was properly certified and qualified in accordance with applicable regulations
to conduct the flight.
8. The flightcrew’s actions would not have been significantly different even if they had received
the available AIRMETs.
9. The flightcrew’s actions were consistent with their training and knowledge.
37. The flightcrew’s failure to increase the propeller RPM to 86 percent and activate the Level III
ice protection system in response to the 1533:56 caution alert chime was not a factor in the
accident.
Even GA pilots are taught you never engage flaps with visible ice on the leading wing edges? I never flew anything big, nor a jet, so I have limited knwoledge. All I know with boots is the planes I currently fly for my cargo airline, being the lil C402B that has boots, and a 16,000 lb turboprop with boots. Nor the FAA directives to us, our company SOP nor the flight manual prohibit from using flaps in icing.
There is an excellent NASA video about flaps in icing. You have two types of icing, the "regular icing" that accumulates on the plane, kills your airflow & add weight. In this type, the plane will stall the "regular way", due to those factors, u are advised not to land full flaps in case of you not having enought power available to maintain flight.
The other type is the tricky one, kind of called "tail icing" by some. This one is caused by changing the angle of attack/ airflow due to flaps extention. This type of icing will cause the nose to go down like a regular stall, BUT any attempt of typical remedy by the pilot by reducing the angle of attack by putting the nose down will INCREASE the stall. To correct that NASA states to "undo what you have done".
On a side note about icing, I did encounter severe icing in both the Turbo prop and the 402. In the Metro, at 17000ft the IAS went down from 180 to 130, but I could maintain flight there. In the 402, a couple of times each winter we can't maintain altitude. Once this year I droped from 13,000 to 9,500, ice accumulated from clear wings to not flying in less than 2 min. The other time, I was 10000, diped down to 9000. Sucks when the MEA is 10K :uhoh Those 402B have the tiptanks, those are the killers. I noticed the 402C without the tiptanks have significant improvement in the ice.
About those boots, on my planes they are powered by vaccum pressure like my instruments but at 18 PSI, they are ususally rendered ineffective by multiple tiny cuts/holes in the boots.
Dawger already covered all that ... rock on dude ... I'm going back to honoring Vday I guess :D
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I have no issues at all with anything, ....all my comments are based on what I've read specific to this. Obviously its a big topic amongst the guys who fly turboprops. Almost invariably every senior pilot (5,000+ hours PIC in turboprop) specifically comments to misconfiguration as the primary cause separate from all other findings. All these guys are hitting on everything said here but with a lot of speculation on crew decisions. Unequivocally feeling that 1) flaps should never have been deployed with known icing. 2) AP should have been off (no mention yet from NTSB) to avoid a sudden release to manual flight in a unstable configuration and also to provide sensory feedback to the pilot. From everything I can find its pretty clear that any icing condition on a turboprop will maximize issues with faulty decision making. Obviously more will come from NTSB but if it was a tail stall due to ice then the real cause is 100% pilot error for deploying flaps at low alt in those conditions.
Going back to the earlier crash, its specifically mentioned (on various pilot BBS's) that the actual cause of the uncommanded roll excursion was the retraction of flaps due to an over speed warning on decent. The crash itself was due to failure to recover from unusual attitude (busted the wingtips over stressing the AF). ....this is typical from a bunch of pilot BBS's...
No! On the Roslawn accident the F/O 'deselected' flaps! He had selected flaps in the holding to stay under max holding speed (Mistake!). When he got the clearence to descend, he forgot flaps and got a flaps overspeed warning. He then reduced flaps, and the roll upset begun.
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I listend to the 30+ min ATC recording and right after the plane quit responding there was a lot of chatter from other aircraft saying they were building ice, also they brought them in at only 2300, so slow shallow approach + building ice perhaps could have caused a rather abrupt "fall out of the sky" kinda stall, and at low altitude like that it would have been almost instant.. which makes more sense than an engine failure.. If an engine had failed they would have at lease had time to get a distress call out.
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Obviously more will come from NTSB but if it was a tail stall due to ice then the real cause is 100% pilot error for deploying flaps at low alt in those conditions.
Humble, I don't have any beef with you but you keep heading down this "pilot error" road pretty doggedly. You applied it to Roselawn, in error, and you seem to be anticipating it in the current case.
The phrase "pilot error" is virtually meaningless if we consider anything more than the vaugest outlines of an accident or incident. There is no element of correctability in "pilot error". It can't be fixed. Now if one says pilot errror, because the pilot had insufficient training; or pilot error because the pilot was drunk; you have something that can be addressed. So when you prospectively assess "100% pilot error" in this case permit me to disagree with both your phraseology and methodology.
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Humble,
It is a common error to assume the last event in the accident chain is the one that should have been avoided and therefore caused the accident.
I'm not going to argue the point that extending the flaps in an airplane covered in ice is a risky proposition. Doing it with the autopilot on is much riskier still.
However, the true cause of the accident reaches much farther back in the accident chain.
I'll describe what I mean.
A pilot I know ran out of gas in a light twin flying cargo. I'll describe the event backwards so everyone can see how an accident chain is built.
He ran out of gas and crashed 1 mile short of the runway on his second ILS approach.
He allowed ATC to vector him many miles and put him at the back of the line. (Last chance to avoid running out of gas)
He missed his first ILS in 800 overcast. I suspect the low fuel situation was making him nervous.
He flew from an airport 70 away from his final destination where he had a chance to fuel but he was running late.
He flew from an airport 30 miles away to land at the airport 70 miles from his final destination. He could have fueled there too but he was running late.
He started the trip at the airport that was his final destination. He could have fueled there but he was late for work.
He had 3 airports where he could have fueled but instead, because he was late, he took a chance. In the end his reluctance to declare an emergency and let ATC vector him on his second approach put him in the weeds short of the runway but if he left his house 30 minutes earlier that day none of the rest of the chain of events occurs.
There is a similar chain in the Roselawn accident. In fact, there are some pretty off the wall accusations about that particular flight but I won't speculate about those affecting the outcome.
I flew across Lake Michigan a few hours after the accident at Roselawn in Beech 18 from Kenosha to Wilmington, Ohio. I went over Detroit to stay out of the weather that downed the ATR. I did not find out about the accident until the next day. I remember the weather system. It was evil, evil enough for me to avoid completely back when I would fly through anything.
Now, an ATR has a lot better ice protection equipment than a Beech 18 but that leads to complacency. And I suspect in that accident and in the one this week that complacency is deadly. Many pilots believe modern aircraft can survive any icing encounter and have no qualms about remaining in icing conditions.
It just isn't true. While lowering flaps on an ice covered airplane is a bad idea, it is an even worse idea to let the ice build in the first place, trusting the anti-ice and de-ice systems to save your bacon. It will build everywhere not protected by a system and sometimes where it is protected.
The number one priority is to avoid letting the ice build. Does that mean we can't operate in winter? Of course not. But pilots need to be aware that checklists and procedures are to fix problems that could not be avoided.
The dictum to not lower flaps when iced up assumes you did your level best to avoid the ice in the first place. It is not a free pass to fly in circles in icing nor is a guarantee that airframe icing won't make your airplane unflyable.
Fly through the icing layers, not in them. Icing rarely extends more than a couple thousand feet thick in any particular layer. Most of the time it is only a few hundred feet thick, usually near the top of a particular cloud layer. When I expect icing on approach I tell ATC exactly what I want to do and why I want to do it.
A combination of weather reports, pilot reports and experience make it fairly easy to figure out where an ice free layer is where we can start the approach and then plan a continuous descent from that non-icy level to the approach minimum.
And I do all that and I fly an airplane with excellent ice protection. I would never consider flying a holding pattern at an altitude where I was building ice. I won't fly at an altitude where I'm picking up ice for more than a couple minutes before I'm on the radio explaining why I need higher or lower immediately.
Ice is like wind shear used to be. Flying through conditions that had microburst/windshear potential close to the ground used to be routine but a series of accidents changed all that.
I suspect we are about to see icing get much the same treatment.
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no......we're at one.
the one in the hudson wasn't a crash. that was a perfect landing, considering the circumstances.
Perfect landing considering circumstances, yes. A downed aircraft making an emergency landing after taking damage and/or losing control of the aircraft due to outside forces, yes. Downed aircraft (crashes, this was a crash, a well controled one, very much so, perfectly executed) seem to come in threes, we're at 2...
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Perfect landing considering circumstances, yes. A downed aircraft making an emergency landing after taking damage and/or losing control of the aircraft due to outside forces, yes. Downed aircraft (crashes, this was a crash, a well controled one, very much so, perfectly executed) seem to come in threes, we're at 2...
i agree it was a downed aircraft, but it was by no means a crashed aircraft. the pilot had total control of his aircraft right up to the water landing.
misinterpretations like this is what makes people that don't know/understand aviation think that flying is dangerous.
not trying to be argumentative, just saying my view........
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Here's an excellent video about tail icing from NASA with some in-flight tests at various flap configurations with simulated tail-ice.
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2238323060735779946
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i agree it was a downed aircraft, but it was by no means a crashed aircraft. the pilot had total control of his aircraft right up to the water landing.
misinterpretations like this is what makes people that don't know/understand aviation think that flying is dangerous.
not trying to be argumentative, just saying my view........
The point being made though isn't that flying is dangerous, it is that it seems that "incidents" with aircraft appear to come in threes, (Which is a thought that has struck me before) and we are currently on our second incident. That means historically, the evidence says we are likely to experience one more "incident". Whether that is a CRJ landing without a nose-wheel, or a 747 nosing into the ground from 30,000ft, we are likely (Based solely on the pattern these incidents have followed in the past) to see one more "incident" soon.
And I must say, with all this talk of icing, I am mighty glad to be flying in Hawaii... all we have to worry about are commercial pilots asleep at the stick.
http://kgmb9.com/main/content/view/4199/40/
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The point being made though isn't that flying is dangerous, it is that it seems that "incidents" with aircraft appear to come in threes, (Which is a thought that has struck me before) and we are currently on our second incident. That means historically, the evidence says we are likely to experience one more "incident". Whether that is a CRJ landing without a nose-wheel, or a 747 nosing into the ground from 30,000ft, we are likely (Based solely on the pattern these incidents have followed in the past) to see one more "incident" soon.
And I must say, with all this talk of icing, I am mighty glad to be flying in Hawaii... all we have to worry about are commercial pilots asleep at the stick.
http://kgmb9.com/main/content/view/4199/40/
i understand that......that was just a comment i made, 'cause the media has been pissin me off lately, with their "sensationalizing everything bad.
i get what ya mean about these things being in threes too. it seems to happen with everything bad.
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There was a British Airways jet that collapsed the nose gear on landing
http://forums.jetcareers.com/general-topics/82479-british-airways-crash-landing.html
Also a Southwest airline 737 had a fire in the right engine shortly after takeoff from McCaren Intl. near Las Vegas
http://www.ktnv.com/global/story.asp?s=9837292
and a Baron crash in North Houston.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29171370/#storyContinued
Bad week for aviation. :(
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i understand that......that was just a comment i made, 'cause the media has been pissin me off lately, with their "sensationalizing everything bad.
Agreed there 100%. Anything that will scare the public is a newscaster's wet dream. Its despicable.
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one of the passengers on that flight was a 9/11 widow, i cant remember her name but she was one of the most prominent members of that group.
Also all i can say no matter what .. I hope and pray that the famlies the best and just how sorry i feel for them. RIP
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In that UK incident another Bombardier front undercarriage collapsed. Just last week I traveled in the same type of aircraft and my flight was delayed because the plane had to return due to nose wheel not going up on takeoff.
http://iltalehti.goodmood.net/iltalehti?player_video_id=28046906
I'm starting to think flying a Bombardier might not be a very smart choice.
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There was Empire in TX on Jan 27th, but cargo doesn't count does it?
(http://www.jetphotos.net/news/media/userfiles/3114414331.jpg.400.jpg)
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Wow, that looks bad. The freight dogs don't get any love from the media when things go bad.
What's the story behind that?
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Landed in freezing fog, ran off the runway and caught on fire. Creew escaped safely. Dono what the cause was, but here's the "ice" & ATR in the same sentence again :uhoh
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Really all this stuff goes to show how skilled the average day-job pilot is. The fact that millions of aircraft leave the Earth and return safe every week is testement to our level of arrogance as a spieces and also our ability. We didnt throw it all in and evolve wings, we laughed at nature and said 'We can have it all'. We cant, but we come damn close. wtg us.
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Latest report says the Dash crew went against regulations and kept the autopilot on despite ice buildup.
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Now they are saying flying with AP on in icing conditions was not against regs. It was only an NTSB "recommendation".
More details on aircraft attitudes just before impact.
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/02/15/buffalo.plane.crash/index.html
Regards,
Sun
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there was an article in my local paper saying they were headed opposite of runway heading.
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Humble, I don't have any beef with you but you keep heading down this "pilot error" road pretty doggedly. You applied it to Roselawn, in error, and you seem to be anticipating it in the current case.
The phrase "pilot error" is virtually meaningless if we consider anything more than the vaugest outlines of an accident or incident. There is no element of correctability in "pilot error". It can't be fixed. Now if one says pilot errror, because the pilot had insufficient training; or pilot error because the pilot was drunk; you have something that can be addressed. So when you prospectively assess "100% pilot error" in this case permit me to disagree with both your phraseology and methodology.
I'm not "applying it in error", I'm relaying comments from pilots with 5000+ hrs PIC in Dash-8 400's as well as other TP's. Standard OP for a Dash-8 400 in severe ice is minimum speed of 190 knts. Recognizing that no severe ice condition was formally recognized the airplane speed of 134 knots is still way to low for the conditions. No question that a lot of elements are still unknown but it is pretty obvious that something unusual occurred. Most of these guys discounted a tail stall before the feb 15 brief...
The guys who fly these things for a living are the ones speculating the most right now. Icing provides a safe and easy answer for them, but it also doesnt fit anything available from the NTSB so far. The more information that comes out the more confused they seem to be. The 31 degree pitch up appears to totally eliminate a tail stall. Asymetirical icing (pardon spelling) is current speculation but again its a known possibility and SOP would be higher speed and no flaps in moderate icing.
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Dawger,
I agree completely, whats funny to me as SLF is that the guys like you and Frenchy who fly for a living are a lot harsher then the NTSB on pilots. The guys flying the TP's are the ones putting the focus on the crew (both here and prior). In this one the guys flying jets are being told they are clueless and to butt out. The TP drivers are commenting along the lines of your post. The posts from the dash-8 drivers are both looking for more from NTSB but also commenting on what appear to me significant variations from correct procedure....
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I'm not "applying it in error", I'm relaying comments from pilots with 5000+ hrs PIC in Dash-8 400's as well as other TP's. Standard OP for a Dash-8 400 in severe ice is minimum speed of 190 knts. Recognizing that no severe ice condition was formally recognized the airplane speed of 134 knots is still way to low for the conditions. No question that a lot of elements are still unknown but it is pretty obvious that something unusual occurred. Most of these guys discounted a tail stall before the feb 15 brief...
The guys who fly these things for a living are the ones speculating the most right now. Icing provides a safe and easy answer for them, but it also doesnt fit anything available from the NTSB so far. The more information that comes out the more confused they seem to be. The 31 degree pitch up appears to totally eliminate a tail stall. Asymetirical icing (pardon spelling) is current speculation but again its a known possibility and SOP would be higher speed and no flaps in moderate icing.
I pointed out that you applied the term "in error" with respect to Roselawn. You seem to be conflating the accidents above. Regarding Roselawn I can believe an anonymous poster on a BBS or the NTSB Blue Cover. Hmmm...lemme think...
Regarding the current accident I'm not sure why you are so gung ho to hang the (convienently dead) crew? Human factors might well come into play ultimately but I guess that's what makes S P E C L U A T I O N interesting.
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I am speculating that the AP was still on when the icing problem made itself known and the pilot mistakenly tried to right the plane without first turning off the AP. If that is in fact the case it could very well make the plane unrecoverable without considerable time to effect trim changes.
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Nice to see the experts are hashing this one out... :rolleyes:
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Regarding the current accident I'm not sure why you are so gung ho to hang the (convienently dead) crew? Human factors might well come into play ultimately but I guess that's what makes S P E C L U A T I O N interesting.
I've got to agree with Humble. Something was obviously VERY not right. There was nothing unimaginable here, no freak storm. These were relatively normal conditions. As was indicated, the flaps should NOT have been deployed. I understand the statement that the last mistake may not have been the root cause of the accident, but it's obviously a MAJOR speed-bump and the deciding factor in whether you end up on a runway or in the ground.
I'll admit, I've never flown through icing (We just don't have it here in the tropics) but there are other major concerns we have. We have an active volcano I have flown near which has it's own complications. We have nasty winds. Not ice, no, but the point is, we have dangers here, and we have procedures to remain safe while flying in that environment. And if a plane crashes as a result of failing to follow procedure, then it IS pilot error. Now, if all we are looking for is something to point the finger at, we have it. But if we want to avoid this happening again, then we do need to dig deeper and find other things that could have complicated the situation, things that CAN be rectified. But as far as the ultimate cause, it sounds like pilot error.
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Nice to see the experts are hashing this one out... :rolleyes:
People all over the country in dentists offices barber shops and other waiting rooms are giving their opinions yet you expect people from flight simulator games to remain silent? :rolleyes:
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People all over the country in dentists offices barber shops and other waiting rooms are giving their opinions yet you expect people from flight simulator games to remain silent? :rolleyes:
This old adage comes to mind:
"if all your friends jumped off a cliff, would you?"
I wonder what they are saying in the CIA break room...?
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Nice to see the experts are hashing this one out... :rolleyes:
Actually to the people that fly the Dash-8 400 it is a pretty big deal. A lot of the people posting to various blogs are flying the thing every day, often in similar conditions...here is another one from today...
As a q4 Captain, I am very surprised that the aircraft is reported to have been flying at 137kts clean with increased ref on. By coincidence (or maybe not) I flew a sector today with 52 pax - landing weight 24.5 tonnes, and the flap 15 vref non icing was 117kts. Bug up the inc ref and that gives 137 kts. Fly at that speed without the flap it relates to and the speed tape would be in the red and the sps wouldn't have been far from activating. Add a bit of turbulence too....
Stick push activation in this scenario would have added to the increased aoa of the tail associated with coincident flap selection and put a tail stall much more to the fore in the way of eventualities.
Our manual states that in icing conditions the minimum clean speed is 190kts.
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I wonder what they are saying in the CIA break room...?
Are you trying to accuse the CIA of causing this? Now thats a leap! :huh
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(http://img101.imageshack.us/img101/6449/phcockpitlrgex8.jpg) (http://img101.imageshack.us/my.php?image=phcockpitlrgex8.jpg)
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S69trak6zrQ
Listen to the first few minutes of this breifing.
Think about it. Especially the next time you want to speculate. The lives were real and the NTSB will do their jobs.
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Speculation is not a criminal act and there is nothing wrong with considering possibilities. :rolleyes:
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Bad stuff happens.
Most of the time the bad stuff is preventable.
There are two types of people, those who realize that the bad stuff could have been prevented if they had engaged in better head work and those who think other people should prevent them from getting hurt from their own bad head work.
As a young pilot I engaged in lots of examples of bad head work. Some of it makes me laugh. Some of it wakes me up in the middle of the night in a cold sweat.
Its amazing how your brain digs up ancient mistakes and reminds you how close you came to pushing daisies.
The NTSB wants to mandate technological fixes for what is really a failure of human beings to accept responsibility for their own actions.
There is weather that will kill you if you let it. I suspect that, in the end, this will be the case. It is quite likely that this flight will turn out to be a series of decisions that led to disaster. The public focus will be on the last decision. The one closest to the tragedy.
The accident is truly prevented long before that. It starts with inculcating pilots with a certain attitude.
Pilots have begun to believe the marketing slogan. Flying is safe
That is pure marketing. Flying is incredibly dangerous. Just think about it. In the hands of amateurs aircraft would crash willy-nilly.
But the public needs the marketing slogans or they would never fly.
Pilots on the other hand need to be aware that every minute of every flight that flying is extremely hazardous. Only their good decisions make the difference.
It seems to me that Roselawn and most probably this accident were the result of pilots believing the marketing. I know for SURE the crew in Roselawn was less than concentrated on safety of flight. Don't ask me how, I'm not going to tell you. You will just have to trust that as fact.
Maybe I'm doing a disservice to my recently dead brethren but I'd be where they are now except for my own good luck. I've done my share of very stupid things in airplanes. I just happen to be lucky.
If the end result is new regulations for fancier ice protection and new procedures for when and where to configure flaps, gear, trim etc etc etc then we will know another band-aid is being put on the problem.
Not that I'm against better equipment and safer procedures but until the airlines focus on pilot's putting the responsibility for safety on themselves it really isn't going to change things.
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S69trak6zrQ
Listen to the first few minutes of this breifing.
Think about it. Especially the next time you want to speculate. The lives were real and the NTSB will do their jobs.
The comments were specific to the photos of the crash site. As for the accident itself speculation is normal, especially since it appears that the plane was flying at roughly 40 knts under recognized minimum speed for the conditions at hand (60 if they felt icing was severe). SOP in moderate ice is a manual approach and a "hot" landing. While other factors may contribute this has to be a factor...
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SOP in moderate ice is a manual approach and a "hot" landing. While other factors may contribute this has to be a factor...
The words "Manual Approach" and "'Hot' Landing" do not appear in any FOM, GOM or SOP volume I've ever used.
Now speaking in general directed at not one individual:
Be mindful of the things you say because while you might think it's a good idea to repeat what you read or heard in a media report, the newsmedia gets so very few things right that it's almost criminal to watch these talking heads butcher their reports. Watching an NTSB briefing where the investigative body says one thing and then the reporters draw the 180º conclusion and report the opposite of what was said makes me wonder how wrong they get other subjects. Uneducated speculation not only displays very little tact it goes past that for those who operate in a professional capacity to the point where it seems disrespectful.
Not long ago someone posted here something to the effect of they almost died in an airline crash when all that happened was a failure of a fairly simple item which warranted a return to the airport. The newsmedia oversensationalizing what they don't know can be downright dangerous when they get their hands on a few key words. That's all they have now are a few key words and they're using them to scare the public and sell adspace & airtime. The NTSB will do their jobs, the folks who need to will learn from the accident and people will continue to try to find the cheapest airline ticket available.
All that said I'd ride on a DHC-8-100/200/300/400 tomorrow and not think anything of it. But what do I know...
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Actually to the people that fly the Dash-8 400 it is a pretty big deal. A lot of the people posting to various blogs are flying the thing every day, often in similar conditions...here is another one from today...
As a q4 Captain, I am very surprised that the aircraft is reported to have been flying at 137kts clean with increased ref on. By coincidence (or maybe not) I flew a sector today with 52 pax - landing weight 24.5 tonnes, and the flap 15 vref non icing was 117kts. Bug up the inc ref and that gives 137 kts. Fly at that speed without the flap it relates to and the speed tape would be in the red and the sps wouldn't have been far from activating. Add a bit of turbulence too....
Stick push activation in this scenario would have added to the increased aoa of the tail associated with coincident flap selection and put a tail stall much more to the fore in the way of eventualities.
Our manual states that in icing conditions the minimum clean speed is 190kts.
Humble, as Golfer said, I'll hop on one tomorrow, and not worry a lick. You are a captain, that's great. Are you a trained accident investigator? Were you there? Did you review, in detail, the flight review tapes?
I am betting a no on any of that last sentence. That said, stop speculating. If there is a true flight issue, the FAA will make a ruling and advise accordingly.
Anyways, back to the speculation game... whose next?
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Are you trying to accuse the CIA of causing this? Now thats a leap! :huh
Ohh, I am sorry, I meant the top secret clandestine ops F-16 flight ops lounge.
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(http://img101.imageshack.us/img101/6449/phcockpitlrgex8.jpg) (http://img101.imageshack.us/my.php?image=phcockpitlrgex8.jpg)
And the point of this picture is...?
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And the point of this picture is...?
That the technology of this plane is far out-dated. Heads up displays and glass cockpit, what a piece of crap.
Seriously, think it would help for people to see what the inside of the cockpit looked like. When most people not in the aviation world hear a the word 'turbo-prop' they assume that its a piece of crap.
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No way in gods green earth or satans hot hell is Humble a Q400 captain. That's a copy/paste from PPrune from a European Q400 pilot.
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That the technology of this plane is far out-dated. Heads up displays and glass cockpit, what a piece of crap.
Seriously, think it would help for people to see what the inside of the cockpit looked like. When most people not in the aviation world hear a the word 'turbo-prop' they assume that its a piece of crap.
Um... okay... not sure how that ever entered into the conversation but okay...
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Wow, that looks bad. The freight dogs don't get any love from the media when things go bad.
It'd be a different story if it was a load of iphones that got toasted.
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Bad stuff happens.
Most of the time the bad stuff is preventable.
Roger that.
There are two types of people, those who realize that the bad stuff could have been prevented if they had engaged in better head work and those who think other people should prevent them from getting hurt from their own bad head work.
I don't know how they are getting though the cracks. I always taught that the Pilot In Command was the final authority, just like uncle FAA told me.
As a young pilot I engaged in lots of examples of bad head work. Some of it makes me laugh. Some of it wakes me up in the middle of the night in a cold sweat.
Its amazing how your brain digs up ancient mistakes and reminds you how close you came to pushing daisies.
Yeah, memory lane. I've been an agricultural pilot for 21 years, I dream of wires. No cold sweat though.
The NTSB wants to mandate technological fixes for what is really a failure of human beings to accept responsibility for their own actions.
But of course, as you know, the NTSB can mandate nothing. They can only recommend and serve in, essentially, a staff safety capacity for DOT.
There is weather that will kill you if you let it. I suspect that, in the end, this will be the case. It is quite likely that this flight will turn out to be a series of decisions that led to disaster. The public focus will be on the last decision. The one closest to the tragedy.
I agree with this. The BBS focus is on that very thing as well. That's why I'm saying why don't we let them get the body parts picked up before we start hammering the crew.
The accident is truly prevented long before that. It starts with inculcating pilots with a certain attitude.
Agree.
Pilots have begun to believe the marketing slogan. Flying is safe
That is pure marketing. Flying is incredibly dangerous. Just think about it. In the hands of amateurs aircraft would crash willingly.
But the public needs the marketing slogans or they would never fly.
Pilots on the other hand need to be aware that every minute of every flight that flying is extremely hazardous. Only their good decisions make the difference.
I think most pilots realize that. The ones I deal with certainly do.
It seems to me that Roselawn and most probably this accident were the result of pilots believing the marketing. I know for SURE the crew in Roselawn was less than concentrated on safety of flight. Don't ask me how, I'm not going to tell you. You will just have to trust that as fact.
It's not like a state secret. The trip to the restroom, the flight attendant interuption, the violation of the sterile cockpit rule are all covered in the NTSB Blue Cover...and dismissed as not germane to the accident. You have something else?
Maybe I'm doing a disservice to my recently dead brethren but I'd be where they are now except for my own good luck. I've done my share of very stupid things in airplanes. I just happen to be lucky.
My mama always told me "lucky is as lucky does"...well she didn't really, I just made that up...but that leads in to the safety concept of "The Randomness of Damage or Injury." The same exact problem can result in radically different outcomes. Running out of gas over the Bonneville salt flats at noon on a CAVU day, or at night in IMC in the mountains. In the first case we fuel the plane and fly out, in the second we have bodies and conclude "pilot error". That way it never happens again, right? That's why in a safety program we punish the behaviour; not the outcome.
If the end result is new regulations for fancier ice protection and new procedures for when and where to configure flaps, gear, trim etc etc etc then we will know another band-aid is being put on the problem.
Not that I'm against better equipment and safer procedures but until the airlines focus on pilot's putting the responsibility for safety on themselves it really isn't going to change things.
I'm with you on the folly of "feel good fixes". If we have a problem, though, with pilot performance we (with our safety hat on) have to question the management conditions that allow that problem to exist. A primary tenet of ORM.
If anyone operating an airplane (with our pilot hat on now) hasn't figured out that their warm pink body is going to be the first at the accident scene, I'm not sure what the airlines are going to do. It can be a real issue though.
Remember when you were in high school and took driver's ed.? Poor old coach used to have to show us a movie called "Blood on the Highway" or something. There were heads sticking through windshields and legs coming out from under cars; a cornucopia of automotive mayhem. The purpose, of course, was to induce us to drive safely. Well, how did it work? Great, right? No, of course not we were terrible drivers. That's because we were not afraid of automobiles. The coach was appealing to our safety needs but we didn't buy in because we felt no threat. Same with pilots. They are not afraid of the airplane so appeals to safety are similarly problematic. There is a better approach to this but this is already getting wall of texty so I'll skip it here.
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The words "Manual Approach" and "'Hot' Landing" do not appear in any FOM, GOM or SOP volume I've ever used.
the newsmedia gets so very few things right that it's almost criminal to watch these talking heads butcher their reports.
The newsmedia oversensationalizing what they don't know can be downright dangerous
and yet, concerning other subjects,(such as the economy) everyone seem to take their words as gospel.
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And the point of this picture is...?
dude......you just fell for his bait.......
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No way in gods green earth or satans hot hell is Humble a Q400 captain. That's a copy/paste from PPrune from a European Q400 pilot.
Never said I'm a Dash 8 pilot, thought the context of the post was pretty clear...
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Never said I'm a Dash 8 pilot, thought the context of the post was pretty clear...
You didn't cite or format your post clearly but it apparantly was not as clear as you hoped if it was misread by someone.
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You didn't cite or format your post clearly but it apparantly was not as clear as you hoped if it was misread by someone.
I'd disagree, if you read my posts here its pretty clear i'm referencing PPRuNe and other similar sites. How someone else chooses to misinterpret it is beyond my control. Whats important here is that the referenced comment is from a Dash-8 400 pilot and that sadly this is shaping up as a pilot induced event. From everything released by the NTSB so far the plane was way to slow for the conditions before deployment of gear and flaps.
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I'd disagree, if you read my posts here its pretty clear i'm referencing PPRuNe and other similar sites.
Cite them. Use italics. Use the quote feature. The post in question has a "...here is one from today..." lead in and that's it. I can at least empathize with someone who would read over it because I did a doubletake myself.
That said I'm well aware of what you're not I was clarifying it for another poster.
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Ohh, I am sorry, I meant the top secret clandestine ops F-16 flight ops lounge.
Roger! Do you consult with Rosie Odonnel on your conspiracy theories? Get some help. :rofl
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Like most pilots, I learned the hard way. I used the autopilot in icing 3 years ago, noticed my airspeed drop 30 kts, disengaged the autopilot and ... oh boy ... was I up for a ride, I was lucky I was at 10K. Now I'm a training captain for my airline, and I always stress to the new guys "carefull with AP/Ice". We hire those CFIs, 1500ish Hours that were god's gift to aviation in theior previous job. But when they find themselves shooting a 2400ft RVR approach, all iced up they loose confidence, and turn the autopilot on. :cry Makes for interesting reports, but that's how they learn.
The medias, or guys like Humble lack the practice and make up their mind with informations they piece up together from various sources. They have a guenine interest and a whill to do good, but the "sources" are often missunderstood, sensationalised, or plane out wrong. This is how a "Proceed with caution" on a flight manual, will become "and it's a big NO-NO".
Keep in mind that Airplanes manuals are not written by engeneers anymore, but by lawyers. For legal reasons, AFMs are now filled with "proceed with caution" ... you would never get to fly the dam thing if u always try to stick with the segments that didn't use the word "caution".
Don't be a fool and fall for the drama "that my friend is a big NO-NO". On my C402 I can see the ice on the wing/wing tanks/intakes, even the tail, judge the thickness and determine how severe my icing is. On the Metroliner, I can see part of the leading edge, can't really judge the thickness. As silly as it sounds, my "ice guage" is the Windshield wiper, which by experience, I'm now able to corelate ice accumulation on the wipers to how my plane flies.
On the Q400, I'm guessing they can't see the wings, they probably have a little light that tells "ice", and that's it. The autopilot will do an excellent job at flying the plane in icing condition ... but it's the pilot responsability to monitor. Pilot flying/pilot monitoring, autopilot flying/autopilot monitoring. As dawger mentioned it's easy to become complaisant. The AFM, the company SOP have advisory sections ... and it's all they are ADVISORY. Doesn't prevent you to use 15 deg of flaps in icing, doesn't prevent you to use autopilot in icing ... but if you do, you better be dam sure you are watching your plane like a hawk in a state of readiness. On the plane I fly it's gradual change in pitch and airspeed.
I recently eard a lot about "How pilots don't know they fly into icing?". It's not as easy as the medias make it look. So you have your levels of icing basicly: trace, light, moderate ( deice kicks it off), severe (deice cannot remove the ice). In your brief, u have the freezing level, other pilot reports. AIRMETs are cute but they are so wide in areas who cares.
Like this morning, I had to fly the 402B from Salt Lake to Pocatello. Airmet says icing, no Pirep, Freezing level 4,000ft. I'm filed for the MEA at 10,000ft that will bring me in the clouds. I go, 8,000ft in the climb I'm picking ice, 10,000ft I'm picking up a lot of ice, ain't going to work. I ask for 12,000ft, granteed, but I only reach 11K before riding the stall. Pireps come in, Espur at 12K reports moderate icing, Amflight at 14K reports moderate, Lifeflight at 17K reports clear of clouds, ice till 16K. I'm struggeling at 11K, riding the buffet, The boots kind of work but I'm still all packed up. I report severe @ 11K.
What does that mean for the other pilots? The guy taking off in his 737, knows that he will be picking up ice from 8K to 16K on the climb, which in winter season is like "duh!". Does he care about my severe icing report at 11K. No ... severe for my lil 402 is at best moderate for him. Aeroflgith that also flies a 402B, my severe icing report will get his attention, and it did (we fly the same route), but when he flew it 40 minutes behind me
all he encountered was moderate for a lil bit.
If you cared reading that far, my point is information is available but it's far from being in black and white. You have to gather from various sources, interpret and narrow it to what might be usefull for your flight, and it's probably going to change by the time you get there anyway. The best you can do as a pilot, is to pay attention to details especially in adverse conditions ... it surely is not like the medias and self proclaimed aviation douchbags big red flashing letters that print on your windshield. :lol
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Like this morning, I had to fly the 402B from Salt Lake to Pocatello. Airmet says icing, no Pirep, Freezing level 4,000ft. I'm filed for the MEA at 10,000ft that will bring me in the clouds. I go, 8,000ft in the climb I'm picking ice, 10,000ft I'm picking up a lot of ice, ain't going to work. I ask for 12,000ft, granteed, but I only reach 11K before riding the stall. Pireps come in, Espur at 12K reports moderate icing, Amflight at 14K reports moderate, Lifeflight at 17K reports clear of clouds, ice till 16K. I'm struggeling at 11K, riding the buffet, The boots kind of work but I'm still all packed up. I report severe @ 11K.
Sounds like zero fun there. <S>
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Fun is fair weather flying! :aok (http://i447.photobucket.com/albums/qq197/Chalenge08/costumed-smiley-011.gif)
(http://i447.photobucket.com/albums/qq197/Chalenge08/FairWeatherFlying.jpg)
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Roger! Do you consult with Rosie Odonnel on your conspiracy theories? Get some help. :rofl
No, I consult the scorpion venom hand book's recommended treatments that I found on the table at a meeting of former CIA F-16 pilot's that were visiting a friend in the hospital with brain cancer.
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No, I consult the scorpion venom hand book's recommended treatments that I found on the table at a meeting of former CIA F-16 pilot's that were visiting a friend in the hospital with brain cancer.
Your babbling better check your cold medicine or whatever your on. :rolleyes:
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Your babbling better check your cold medicine or whatever your on. :rolleyes:
*grin* He wasn't babbling; he was referencing a whole bunch of past stuff from the boards regarding conspiracy theories. :)
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It sounds more like rubber room material to me. :rofl
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Like most pilots, I learned the hard way. I used the autopilot in icing 3 years ago, noticed my airspeed drop 30 kts, disengaged the autopilot and ... oh boy ... was I up for a ride, I was lucky I was at 10K. Now I'm a training captain for my airline, and I always stress to the new guys "carefull with AP/Ice". We hire those CFIs, 1500ish Hours that were god's gift to aviation in theior previous job. But when they find themselves shooting a 2400ft RVR approach, all iced up they loose confidence, and turn the autopilot on. :cry Makes for interesting reports, but that's how they learn.
The medias, or guys like Humble lack the practice and make up their mind with informations they piece up together from various sources. They have a guenine interest and a whill to do good, but the "sources" are often missunderstood, sensationalised, or plane out wrong. This is how a "Proceed with caution" on a flight manual, will become "and it's a big NO-NO".
Keep in mind that Airplanes manuals are not written by engeneers anymore, but by lawyers. For legal reasons, AFMs are now filled with "proceed with caution" ... you would never get to fly the dam thing if u always try to stick with the segments that didn't use the word "caution".
Don't be a fool and fall for the drama "that my friend is a big NO-NO". On my C402 I can see the ice on the wing/wing tanks/intakes, even the tail, judge the thickness and determine how severe my icing is. On the Metroliner, I can see part of the leading edge, can't really judge the thickness. As silly as it sounds, my "ice guage" is the Windshield wiper, which by experience, I'm now able to corelate ice accumulation on the wipers to how my plane flies.
On the Q400, I'm guessing they can't see the wings, they probably have a little light that tells "ice", and that's it. The autopilot will do an excellent job at flying the plane in icing condition ... but it's the pilot responsability to monitor. Pilot flying/pilot monitoring, autopilot flying/autopilot monitoring. As dawger mentioned it's easy to become complaisant. The AFM, the company SOP have advisory sections ... and it's all they are ADVISORY. Doesn't prevent you to use 15 deg of flaps in icing, doesn't prevent you to use autopilot in icing ... but if you do, you better be dam sure you are watching your plane like a hawk in a state of readiness. On the plane I fly it's gradual change in pitch and airspeed.
I recently eard a lot about "How pilots don't know they fly into icing?". It's not as easy as the medias make it look. So you have your levels of icing basicly: trace, light, moderate ( deice kicks it off), severe (deice cannot remove the ice). In your brief, u have the freezing level, other pilot reports. AIRMETs are cute but they are so wide in areas who cares.
Like this morning, I had to fly the 402B from Salt Lake to Pocatello. Airmet says icing, no Pirep, Freezing level 4,000ft. I'm filed for the MEA at 10,000ft that will bring me in the clouds. I go, 8,000ft in the climb I'm picking ice, 10,000ft I'm picking up a lot of ice, ain't going to work. I ask for 12,000ft, granteed, but I only reach 11K before riding the stall. Pireps come in, Espur at 12K reports moderate icing, Amflight at 14K reports moderate, Lifeflight at 17K reports clear of clouds, ice till 16K. I'm struggeling at 11K, riding the buffet, The boots kind of work but I'm still all packed up. I report severe @ 11K.
What does that mean for the other pilots? The guy taking off in his 737, knows that he will be picking up ice from 8K to 16K on the climb, which in winter season is like "duh!". Does he care about my severe icing report at 11K. No ... severe for my lil 402 is at best moderate for him. Aeroflgith that also flies a 402B, my severe icing report will get his attention, and it did (we fly the same route), but when he flew it 40 minutes behind me
all he encountered was moderate for a lil bit.
If you cared reading that far, my point is information is available but it's far from being in black and white. You have to gather from various sources, interpret and narrow it to what might be usefull for your flight, and it's probably going to change by the time you get there anyway. The best you can do as a pilot, is to pay attention to details especially in adverse conditions ... it surely is not like the medias and self proclaimed aviation douchbags big red flashing letters that print on your windshield. :lol
Question: (This isn't an attack) I've never flown through icing, and neither have any of my instructors (we just don't get icing in Hawaii!) but we're taught NOT to deploy flaps in icing conditions to avoid the tail stall. So, in your proffesional oppinion, was it a mistake to deploy flaps in this case? And what of the lack of airspeed over the markers?
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Question: (This isn't an attack) I've never flown through icing, and neither have any of my instructors (we just don't get icing in Hawaii!) but we're taught NOT to deploy flaps in icing conditions to avoid the tail stall. So, in your proffesional oppinion, was it a mistake to deploy flaps in this case? And what of the lack of airspeed over the markers?
i'm in nj, and we're taught the same thing dude.
in CAP, i flew a couple of missions,(as mission scanner) where we didn't even start the engine, 'till the frost was removed from the wings. it was only frost, but we won;t launch with it there.
i've never flown in icing conditions, and god willing, combined with my being anal about when i'm willing to fly, i never will. i seriously admire those that have to handle those conditions.
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*grin* He wasn't babbling; he was referencing a whole bunch of past stuff from the boards regarding conspiracy theories. :)
Conspiracy theories is one description. Outright lies would be more accurate Txmom. ;)
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Question: (This isn't an attack) I've never flown through icing, and neither have any of my instructors (we just don't get icing in Hawaii!) but we're taught NOT to deploy flaps in icing conditions to avoid the tail stall. So, in your proffesional oppinion, was it a mistake to deploy flaps in this case? And what of the lack of airspeed over the markers?
That depends on the airplane you're flying and the phase of flight you're in. There will be either an approved AFM procedure from the manufacturer or an approved SOP for the company you're operating for if on a for-hire basis. In the kind of airplanes that you and CAP have ever flown then a no-flap landing is no big deal and if you were to inadvertantly encounter ice in an airplane not equipped to either prevent the formation or bust the ice from the airframe it's a good idea. A big issue with ice accretion isn't so much that ice will stick to the flaps but something else which goes to you mentioning the tail stall. Ice accumulating on the horizontal stab changes the shape of the stab (which is a wing, providing a downforce) and it's possible that the introduction of flaps can cause the airflow to change enough to create a tail stall condition. The DHC-8 has hundreds of thousands of hours being flown in icing conditions by Air Canada, Horizon, Piedmont and many others all over the globe with great success as a cold weather operations platform.
I can't honestly remember the procedures we used specifically in the Encore and other 500 series Citations but in an ERJ-170 if ice was detected by the specifically designed probes the bleed air system would automatically turn on until you were clear of the icing. If the icing conditions lasted longer than a perscribed amount of time (120 seconds? I don't remember without looking it up) you'd be stuck with a CAS message informing you that you would need to use Ice Speeds. You'd flip your landing reference speed cards over for the ice speeds which for the layman simply adds 10 knots to the normal approach speeds. The 170 family has bleed air protecting the wing leading edges and engine inlets with no tail de-ice or anti-ice capabilities. The Citation Encore has hot wings and boots on the horizontal tail. The Lear 45 has hot everything. That's also something worth pointing out the difference between deicing and anti-icing. The de-ice boots used on the DHC-8 as well as thousands of other airplanes out there including numerous jet airplanes (Many Citation 500 models, Gulfstream 200, King Air, Saab 340, etc.) are used to physically remove accreted ice from the protected surfaces whereas bleed air or "hot wing" airplanes heat the protected areas to prevent the formation of ice in the first place.
What's that have to do with using flaps to land? A lot. You will configure on schedule as you slow the airplane for the approach and some folks might choose to delay landing gear extension if the ice in the area is in fact in the moderate range. The airplane if not equipped with tail anti ice (ERJ170, Boeing 747, Challenger 300 and many more for instance) it was test flown and approved in the certification process to show that the worst case scenario ice formations did not adversely affect the flying qualities beyond perscribed limits. That just means they flew the airplane around with ice shapes glued to the leading edges and found that it could do everything it needed to without requiring the ice systems on the tail. Aircraft type plays more of a factor in it because the design is specific so simply generally applying a "don't use flaps" might and is not appropriate for many airplane types especially if outfitted with approved deicing/anti-icing equipment.
For those that do fly the NASA inflight icing video is available from Sportys for 10 bucks. It's a worthwhile investment and will show you in practice what you've read about in theory. If you're too cheap to spring for $10 then it's also floating around the internet for your viewing pleasure. There are separate modules which address GA airplanes and transport/airline airplanes and the information might just save your life. Flying in ice is no big deal in and of itself provided that both you and your airplane are up to the challenge. It's an all or nothing proposition in that case because regardless if you are willing your airplane might not be capable. The both of you need to be up to the challenge to not only fly through but escape from inflight icing encounters should you experience them inadvertently.
To answer your question:
No. There was nothing wrong with properly configuring their airplane because the DHC-8-400 in addition to Colgan's SOPs would permit them to do so I.A.W. the Manufacturers specifications for the airplane. The airplane is equipped with deice boots on both the wings and tail with an alert function to inform the pilots if the system should fail to operate.
I will defer to the NTSB to provide more facts and make an analysis before I learn from mistakes that only exist in speculative writings of uninformed reporters and posters.
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Yea. I have other stuff.
And I have personally trained pilots who believed flying was safe. You being an ag pilot I doubt complacency is really as much of a problem as it is in airline style flying.
I planned to crash every takeoff when I flew Twin Beeches. Now, not so much.
Cycling the De-ice boots and not lowering the flaps or using the autopilot isn't going to save you if you believe your airplane can fly through any icing situation and make no effort to get out of it.
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I planned to crash every takeoff when I flew Twin Beeches.
How'd you manage to screw that up?
That's not being overly dramatic or anything...
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i'm in nj, and we're taught the same thing dude.
in CAP, i flew a couple of missions,(as mission scanner) where we didn't even start the engine, 'till the frost was removed from the wings. it was only frost, but we won;t launch with it there.
i've never flown in icing conditions, and god willing, combined with my being anal about when i'm willing to fly, i never will. i seriously admire those that have to handle those conditions.
Frost is deadly as is any contamination on the wings from accumulation of ice on the ground. Inflight icing has a different dynamic and can kill you in new and exciting ways that is different from ground accumulation which occurs generally on the tops of the wings. This is why you see airliners applying one of several kinds of fluid to the tops of their wings with the most frequent being Type I (a de-icing fluid) and Type IV (an anti-icing fluid, usually green) fluids. The Type I is a mixture of either glycol and water or simply glycol and usually heated which when applied will remove exisiting ice from the surfaces of the airplane. Type IV is a thicker almost always 100% concentration of glycol which actually absorbs and suspends the falling contaminants. Type IV is designed to break away from the top of the wing as the airplane accelerates down the runway on the takeoff roll eventually blowing off before (in theory) the airplane rotates. This protects the top of the wing during ground operations and allows you to transition to the airborne segment of your flight using the onboard ice protection measures be they deicing or anti-icing. Lighter/smaller/slower airplanes don't use Type IV fluid because the speed required to have the fluid blow away is higher than some of them can even fly. You can use Type II or III to find a median which allows longer holdover times which means the time of usefulness the fluid on your wings has to absorb and suspend the contaminants before you need to remove & reapply the fluid. They're identified by color with Type I being either Pink or Orange, Type II is a straw color which looks like jet fuel and Type IV is always Green. I've never actually seen/used Type III fluid but I believe it's a lime green color according to one manufacturer of the stuff.
At any rate you mentioned frost and I'm very troubled with your statment "it's only frost." Frost used to be permitted on your airplane if polished smooth but that was changed no long ago. Now if your aircraft has frost it must be removed (heated hangar, fluid or sublimation) before you are allowed to depart. It's good that you didn't start the engine because the damage that frost does to the airflow over your wing would be evident when you attempted to rotate and the airplane refused to fly.
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Question: (This isn't an attack) I've never flown through icing, and neither have any of my instructors (we just don't get icing in Hawaii!) but we're taught NOT to deploy flaps in icing conditions to avoid the tail stall. So, in your proffesional oppinion, was it a mistake to deploy flaps in this case? And what of the lack of airspeed over the markers?
The idea of NOT deploying flaps in icing condition is to me a "failsafe" concept, same as "Don't drink, for sure don't get a DUI, compared to ... will this one glass of vodka put me over the legal limit?". As I mentioned earlier, awarness and close monitoring should be the key, monitor closely for anything odd and get ready to undo what u did.
I don't know Q400s, but I'll bet she's more than able to handle flaps and ice. The lack of airspeed is what gets me, and it comes back to the lack of monitoring I was talking about. Now I don't mean to imply that the creew was sipping coffee looking at flight attendants boobies. Maybe the creew was busy doing a before landing checklist at the Final Approach Fix and failed to notice the airspeed decreasing, AOA increasing till the autopilot "gave up".
I fly 4 to 8 legs a day, 5 days a week, It's really easy to become complaisant. Hair raising stuff becomes routine, and it's a true struggle to treat every leg like "a private pilot flying once a month would do". I'm the first to admit that I sometimes catch myself doing a single engine turn, and the last thing I remember was talking to departure. :o
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The medias, or guys like Humble lack the practice and make up their mind with informations they piece up together from various sources. They have a guenine interest and a whill to do good, but the "sources" are often missunderstood, sensationalised, or plane out wrong. This is how a "Proceed with caution" on a flight manual, will become "and it's a big NO-NO".
As I've clearly stated none of what I've posted is "my opinion". I'm smart enough to recognize the limitations of my personal knowledge in this particular area. What I have posted is thoughts and comments by current Dash-8 400 drivers who are dealing with this while currently flying the plane. From everything your posting your in agreement with what I've relayed...no way that plane should have been on auto pilot at that speed over the outer marker....regardless of what the FAA allows. Further if in fact the crew conversation of "significant icing" is correct then the low speed is exceptionally disturbing. Minimum maneuvering speed as per a post on PPRuNe is 135 kts in clean configuration in good weather and that is far below what this Captain felt was safe. With the potential icing this is right at where the stick shaker should (and did kick in).
The simple reality is that a low time (both total time and certainly in type (110 total hours) made a simple but major mistake and killed himself and 48 other people. There is no justification for allowing that plane to get that slow in those conditions or to allow things to deteriorate to the point that the AP kicked the plane back on the edge of a stall. How do you in conditions of known icing not only allow speed to drop that low but then drop gear and flaps?
The problem isn't my perception, its the obvious complacency of the PIC (not just here but Roselawn and others) that ignores "proceed with caution". This appears to have been not only an avoidable accident but in fact one that would not have happened if the pilot had followed his own companies SOP for plane type and conditions.
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Humble, I salute your last post, it makes a lot of sense. My comments were about your posts from the first couple of pages, you might want to re-read them. Your comments/conclusions/even source quoting were "out there", especially about the ATR crash.
It's like blaming me for loosing a wheel that flew into your window while driving my Viper at 40MPH in reverse. Granteed I should not have been driving that fast in reverse, and the car was probably not design for it, but you better believe the Viper could handle it. It was a design flaw from Dodge, not the fact I did it. Same with the ATR, that's why the NTSB "cleared the creew", and NTSb tells it like it is, they don't care.
I feel better now :pray
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Frost is deadly as is any contamination on the wings from accumulation of ice on the ground. Inflight icing has a different dynamic and can kill you in new and exciting ways that is different from ground accumulation which occurs generally on the tops of the wings. This is why you see airliners applying one of several kinds of fluid to the tops of their wings with the most frequent being Type I (a de-icing fluid) and Type IV (an anti-icing fluid, usually green) fluids. The Type I is a mixture of either glycol and water or simply glycol and usually heated which when applied will remove exisiting ice from the surfaces of the airplane. Type IV is a thicker almost always 100% concentration of glycol which actually absorbs and suspends the falling contaminants. Type IV is designed to break away from the top of the wing as the airplane accelerates down the runway on the takeoff roll eventually blowing off before (in theory) the airplane rotates. This protects the top of the wing during ground operations and allows you to transition to the airborne segment of your flight using the onboard ice protection measures be they deicing or anti-icing. Lighter/smaller/slower airplanes don't use Type IV fluid because the speed required to have the fluid blow away is higher than some of them can even fly. You can use Type II or III to find a median which allows longer holdover times which means the time of usefulness the fluid on your wings has to absorb and suspend the contaminants before you need to remove & reapply the fluid. They're identified by color with Type I being either Pink or Orange, Type II is a straw color which looks like jet fuel and Type IV is always Green. I've never actually seen/used Type III fluid but I believe it's a lime green color according to one manufacturer of the stuff.
At any rate you mentioned frost and I'm very troubled with your statment "it's only frost." Frost used to be permitted on your airplane if polished smooth but that was changed no long ago. Now if your aircraft has frost it must be removed (heated hangar, fluid or sublimation) before you are allowed to depart. It's good that you didn't start the engine because the damage that frost does to the airflow over your wing would be evident when you attempted to rotate and the airplane refused to fly.
this is the kind of replies that are good to read.
the pilot had explained to us how severly that the frost would've disrupted the airflow. until then, i had no clue how serious frost could be. it was something my first CFI's had never talked about. they only hit briefly on anything IMC related. hell, one of them(who i later found out took all of his training in florida) was with me for a lesson in the winter. it had snowed fairly heavy a couple days before, but there were icy spots on the taxiway(small and easily avoided). so i asked him the stupid question. "do i taxi differently in these conditions?" his answer? "i dunno. i just moved up here" :rolleyes: :(
the CFI i fly with now(who'll be checking me out in the clubs pipers) is in his 50's, doesn't need the money, and does this because he enjoys it). he is the reason that a couple of small incidents i had never became big problems. flying with this guy is never boring, and he teaches as if he was teaching someone in his own family, not like he's being paid to teach.
hell, he needed a safety pilot last fall, and asked me if i wanted to go with him.....i did. we took his cherokee, and he did what he wanted. then he STILL taught me a few things. all CFI's should be like that, not like the ones just buildoing time.
anyway, thank you sir, for another very informative post. (i mean that)<<S>>
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The idea of NOT deploying flaps in icing condition is to me a "failsafe" concept, same as "Don't drink, for sure don't get a DUI, compared to ... will this one glass of vodka put me over the legal limit?". As I mentioned earlier, awarness and close monitoring should be the key, monitor closely for anything odd and get ready to undo what u did.
I don't know Q400s, but I'll bet she's more than able to handle flaps and ice. The lack of airspeed is what gets me, and it comes back to the lack of monitoring I was talking about. Now I don't mean to imply that the creew was sipping coffee looking at flight attendants boobies. Maybe the creew was busy doing a before landing checklist at the Final Approach Fix and failed to notice the airspeed decreasing, AOA increasing till the autopilot "gave up".
this will make me ask a couple of questions...only because i don;t know.
i had seen "stick shaker" and "stick pusher" mentioned in earlier posts. does that mean that these aircraft are fly-bywire? if so, does something transmit that "mushy" feel if you get slow? i only ask, as you mentioned lack of airspeed. also, if they were picking up ice, would there be a possibility of the pitot icing up?/ even if it is heated?
not asking to question what was done, but rather to learn more about this, is all.
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this will make me ask a couple of questions...only because i don;t know.
i had seen "stick shaker" and "stick pusher" mentioned in earlier posts. does that mean that these aircraft are fly-bywire? if so, does something transmit that "mushy" feel if you get slow? i only ask, as you mentioned lack of airspeed. also, if they were picking up ice, would there be a possibility of the pitot icing up?/ even if it is heated?
not asking to question what was done, but rather to learn more about this, is all.
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I'm with you, lol. Your story about the Florida guy is very similar to our tropic CFIs. They dont really bother learning about it themselves since they never expect to see it.
The Dash-8 is NOT IIRC fly-by-wire, nor is any other commercial aircraft. Fly-by-wire (Assuming we're thinking of the same thing) is reserved for the relaxed-stability fighter jets.
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The Metro that I fly has a stick pusher yet it's all cable flight controls. The stick pusher works with a system called SAS (Stall Avoidance System). The SAS is a computer that will compute your V/Vs (kind of ur AOA), and activate when u reach the 1.1 V/Vs range. A servo will push the control collum foward, u can overide the pusher if u apply over 60 lbs of force with your arms. The SAS uses various elements as inputs, such as your AOA via a vane on the nose, your flap position, and ram air measured at the co-pilot's pitot.
The SAS triggers a horn +10 to +5 kts from stall, and the pusher from stall +4 to -1. It deactivates itself at 140+ kts.
As far as the heated pitot system, I have never seen one with ice on it while heated. On my plane, I have 2 independants pitots, one for the co-pilot, one for the pilot.
If one of the input of the SAS gets wacked, the SAS will provide false information, maybe activate the pusher. We do have the option of shutting the SAS off, with the inflight limitation of "Do not stall aircraft with SAS inop".
That's my lil turboprop, others probably have different systems.
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The Dash-8 is NOT IIRC fly-by-wire, nor is any other commercial aircraft. Fly-by-wire (Assuming we're thinking of the same thing) is reserved for the relaxed-stability fighter jets.
That's incorrect. The E-170/190 has a Fly-by-Wire Tail (rudder and elevator) and I was told originally indended to be a full FBW system. The ailerons while intended to be FBW for ease of certification became hydro-mechanical with no physical linkage between the yoke and ailerons. Movement of the yoke left or right actually controlled hydraulic actuators powered by 4 PCUs which were L/R Inboard/Outboard. I don't remember which PCUs controlled which actuators or the system failure logic. The Airbus 320 family is Fly-By-Wire as is the Dassault Falcon 7X and as will be the Gulfstream G650. If you take a closer look at Airbus models (320, 330, 340 and I don't see why not the 380) you'll see that when the airplanes are powered down at the gate that both ailerons will actually droop. This is because not only is hydraulic power not in the system due to one of several hydraulic pumps but also the flight control computers aren't commanding an input because of the system logic and lack of hydraulic pressure. When the hydraulic and electrical systems in the E170 for instance are powered up in the morning you have to wait several minutes before turning on the APU to run several PBIT's (Power-up Built In Tests) for both the Electrical and Hydraulic systems. If you bring up the flight control synoptic page on either MFD you'll actually see the flight controls being "commanded" by the computer swinging all over the place but no actual movement occurs due to the fact it's the computers checking themselves out on command. The electrical one took a good long time (2-3 minutes) and the hydraulic took 60 seconds each time you switched the pumps on prior to pushback. I'm sure there are several other fly-by-wire platforms gracing the civil skies but I'm not educated on which ones they are exactly. Suffice to say that FBW technology is no longer the sole domain of military fighter aircraft.
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Humble, I salute your last post, it makes a lot of sense. My comments were about your posts from the first couple of pages, you might want to re-read them. Your comments/conclusions/even source quoting were "out there", especially about the ATR crash.
It's like blaming me for loosing a wheel that flew into your window while driving my Viper at 40MPH in reverse. Granteed I should not have been driving that fast in reverse, and the car was probably not design for it, but you better believe the Viper could handle it. It was a design flaw from Dodge, not the fact I did it. Same with the ATR, that's why the NTSB "cleared the creew", and NTSb tells it like it is, they don't care.
I feel better now :pray
No question that my original thoughts mirror a simple question, What could so surprise a qualified flight crew that they would lose the plane so quickly and completely. Hence the 1st thought (gear malfunction) in part speculating that deploying gear that had a hidden structural flaw at the higher then normal speed was possible. 2nd that a prop overspeed on final is a bad thing in the 400. As for the ATR crew, while the NTSB might have cleared them not many TP pilots did then or now...its constantly referenced as a pilot caused event and a big point specific to the much more limited margin for error flying a TP vs a regional jet. One other interesting point is that the Captains prior ride (Saab 340) has a history of stalling in ice prior to stick shaker....
From PPRuNe...
he investigation found that despite being certified to all required certification standards at the time, the Saab 340 aircraft can suffer from an aerodynamic stall whilst operating in icing conditions without the required warnings being provided to flight crew. This problem had been highlighted when the aircraft was introduced to operations in Canada and as a result a modified stall warning system was mandated for aircraft operated in Canada. This modification was not fitted to other Saab 340 aircraft worldwide.
So based on those incidents, we may suspect the captain of 3407 might well have been inclined to interpret the stick shake and push as signs of a tailplane stall instead of an impending wing stall. In the tailplane stall scenario pulling the yoke would be the correct response.... but this time it wasn't.
Makes you think how easily things can go wrong
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I think that those TP pilots might have forgotten that ice horns formed behind the boots, allowing the boots not to do their work, which was a design flaw independant to the pilot's action. But that's just me, I understand ur opinion now :salute
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Frenchy, as we've discussed I fully recognize that I'm not qualified to have an opinion here. Having a bit of 152/172 time I realize that certain complexities of even GA flight are not modeled in a sim like AH at all...however it does give a lot of generic insight (IMO) to both unusual attitude and recovery procedures for "missing parts". From what i'm reading the Dash 8 is not susceptible to a tail stall but the Saab 340 is, given the conditions it seems possible that the PF didn't advance the throttle when the plane leveled out and took the resulting stall as a tail stall vs a wing stall and over rode the pusher thinking the tail had stopped flying...
Again from PPRuNe....
Flying the Q400 myself, Otto's story makes very interesting reading. There but for the grace of God . . .
SOP at my operator is that once the 'one to go' call is made, PF's hand goes to the power levers and stays there until altitude capture - for two very good reasons. Firstly to stop him fiddling with the pitch wheel (a well known 'gotcha') and secondly as a reminder to do something with the power once we level off.
A two axis autopilot and manual throttles can make for an interesting combination.
Me again...
Obviously a sad sad situation regardless, I'm praying they find something else (mainly for mom of FO) but I honestly had no clue how complex and unforgiving some of these TP's are. I've never been SLF in the 400 but flew in the earlier Dash-8's a dozen times or more. Never had an issue but when I think of all the "boy/girl scout" age crews it makes me shudder...
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one more from PPRuNe
This is referencing technical issues with the ILS for the runway in question....
There is a potentially significant hazard concerning the ILS to runway 23 in BUF.
Information has been received indicating it is possible to obtain a significant nose pitch up, in some cases as much as 30 degrees, if the glide slope is allowed to capture before established on centerline. Pilots who are preparing to configure and land have the potential to experience abrupt pitch up, slow airspeed, and approach to stall if conditions present themselves in a certain manner.
This effect is the result of an earthen obstruction close enough to the ILS to affect the integrity of the glide slope signal. This has resulted in the issuance of an advisory given on ATIS which states that "the ILS Glide Slope for runway 23 is unusable beyond 5 degrees right of course."
When attempting to intercept the runway 23 ILS from right traffic, the ILS glide slope indication may read full deflection down. Just prior to intercept it may then move up in such as manner as to enable approach mode to capture in such a way as to result in a nose up pitch and loss of airspeed.
Until further notice, when executing the KBUF ILS/LOC Runway 23, DO NOT select Approach Mode until established on the localizer inbound.
This issue is being addressed on several levels in an attempt to address procedures, facilities, and communication regarding this matter.
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That's nothing new to Buffalo and several other airports in the country. The caution and advisory is broadcast over the ATIS as it will be occasionally at other places. Not getting too much into the why's this airplane was not approaching the localizer from the north in the first place. They were given a 260 heading to intercept a 233º inbound course to the localizer. A 27º intercept angle well within normal standards.
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Flying into SLC anytime soon Golfer? :D
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I'm spending most of my time in Florida lately. The golf game is coming around though :)
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(http://www.killsometime.com/Pictures/images/GatorGolf.jpg) :lol
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Not far from it! Here's one from the golf course this past weekend:
(http://i538.photobucket.com/albums/ff345/martinguitarist/Gator.jpg)
I wanted to pet it.
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How'd you manage to screw that up?
That's not being overly dramatic or anything...
I guess you had to be there.
I did the same thing when I was flying Cessna 402's at max gross. My wife flew freight with me for a year. At the start she asked me how she should dress.
I told her to dress to crash.
A Beech 18 at max gross is not climbing after losing an engine. Just like a good single engine pilot I had a plan of where I would go if I lost a motor. Not overly dramatic, just good planning.
I was young and stupid at the time. If that weren't so I would never have flown the damn things in the first place.
I'm assuming you are a professional pilot, Golfer. How many pilots do you know that have experienced engine failure? How many pilots do you know that survived a crash? How many that didn't?
I suspect that your aviation background might be a bit different than mine.
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Hey I'm flying 402s at max gross :lol What model were u flying? Taking off a 4000 ft runway in the Utah's summer at 4,500ft elevation just to transition to a 300 FPM all the way to 13K ... yay! :rock ... or the winter months, all iced up stalling your way down below MEA. Hey that makes me think, I took some vids the last couple days, I'll youtube them. This week end I'm in the Metro, and it's blue sky ... figures :angel:
I lived in FL for 3 years, I ear you there. First time I saw a gator I wanted to pet it. They look so relax and sleepy, they are pretty deceiving. :devil
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I guess you had to be there.
I did the same thing when I was flying Cessna 402's at max gross. My wife flew freight with me for a year. At the start she asked me how she should dress.
I told her to dress to crash.
A Beech 18 at max gross is not climbing after losing an engine. Just like a good single engine pilot I had a plan of where I would go if I lost a motor. Not overly dramatic, just good planning.
I was young and stupid at the time. If that weren't so I would never have flown the damn things in the first place.
I'm assuming you are a professional pilot, Golfer. How many pilots do you know that have experienced engine failure? How many pilots do you know that survived a crash? How many that didn't?
I suspect that your aviation background might be a bit different than mine.
I'm with you. Always a good idea to plan for the worst case but especially when dealing with round engines. I'd rather stab myself in the face than go back to work behind them.
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I've got to agree with Humble. Something was obviously VERY not right. There was nothing unimaginable here, no freak storm. These were relatively normal conditions. As was indicated, the flaps should NOT have been deployed. I understand the statement that the last mistake may not have been the root cause of the accident, but it's obviously a MAJOR speed-bump and the deciding factor in whether you end up on a runway or in the ground.
I'll admit, I've never flown through icing (We just don't have it here in the tropics) but there are other major concerns we have. We have an active volcano I have flown near which has it's own complications. We have nasty winds. Not ice, no, but the point is, we have dangers here, and we have procedures to remain safe while flying in that environment. And if a plane crashes as a result of failing to follow procedure, then it IS pilot error. Now, if all we are looking for is something to point the finger at, we have it. But if we want to avoid this happening again, then we do need to dig deeper and find other things that could have complicated the situation, things that CAN be rectified. But as far as the ultimate cause, it sounds like pilot error.
Wow, how old are you again?
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I'm assuming you are a professional pilot, Golfer. How many pilots do you know that have experienced engine failure? How many pilots do you know that survived a crash? How many that didn't?
I suspect that your aviation background might be a bit different than mine.
The first bit was tongue in cheek about you planned to crash and did not.
A.) Numerous. Myself included.
B.) Who uses the word "crash?" How about accident or incident to qualify them? In that case several. Most of the situations resulted in minimal damage to the aircraft which I'm sure you'd agree is the desired outcome.
C.) Enough. The number grows each year.
I guess I'm surprised at your sensationalization with average folks who might have an anxiety about flying. Dress for the environment you'll be flying over but "dress to crash" is going out of your way to inject drama.
You're probably right about our backgrounds. I have no desire to rival Ernie Gann in stories and I get my kicks behind M-14P's instead of 985s 1340s.
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Gumbeau used to be over dramatic Then you obviously aint done it enough. After the first dozen funerals you begin to realize you would rather be looking back on the 'good ole days' versus taking the long dirt nap. ... and kind of stuck in the old glory days of the Beech 18 flying. :lol
... hey!!!! ... wait a ... minute .... :uhoh
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Wow, how old are you again?
How is it relevant? (I'm assuming that is meant as an insult, If I'm wrong, I apologize)
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Not meaning to bring up an old thread but here is a comment that relates directly to the roselawn incident....from a member of the NTSB team (posted on PPruNe)...
To this we can add a concept that I once termed "automated interference with basic airmanship". During the Roselawn investigation, we determined that the upset initiated when the flaps were retracted following the overspeed warning during the descent. The captain was heard on the CVR to say "I knew we'd do that" in reference to the overspeed warning.
We found the flap handle in the wreckage selected to flaps 15. Simple good airmanship told the crew to restore the configuration to where it was before the upset initiated. Unfortunately, ATR at that time had a system in place that prevented the flaps from extending when the airpeed was beyond the appropriate speed limit. Had this not been in place, there is a chance that a recovery might have been completed.
Now, I am well aware of many other things the crew could have done, having been involved in the investigation from the night of the accident. But I have always been bothered by the idea that those fellows tried to do exactly what we are discussing here...common sense airmanship...and were inhibited by automation./i]