P38 a super plane?

[Widewing]

Originally posted by Meyer
Hmm wasn't the He-100 faster?

(Re: Johnson) He wasn't even close in airkills/sortie to the best of the Lw in that regard.

The He 100V-8 was a pure racer without weapons or armor or any of the other required equipment. It incorporated evaporative cooling and had clipped wings. It was not a fighter.

As to Johnson, in their definitive book Fighter Aces, aviation historians Raymond Tolliver and Trevor Constable compared Johnson's record with that of two leading German aces. Werner Molders was the first ace to score 100 aerial victories and Erich Hartmann is the top scoring ace of all time with 352.

The authors noted that Johnson "emerges impressively from this comparison." He downed 28 planes in 91 sorties, while Molders took 142 sorties to do the same, and Hartmann, 194.

If they aren't among the Luftwaffe's best, who is?

My regards,

Widewing

[Crumpp]

He downed 28 planes in 91 sorties, while Molders took 142 sorties to do the same, and Hartmann, 194.

There were lots of guys in the Luftwaffe that had better KD ratios than Molders or Hartmann.  

Can't find my copy to check but I believe Guenther Scheel
achieved more kills (71) than he survived sorties.  Mike Spick does a great analysis of kill to sortie ratio in:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0804116962/002-6039171-4365643?v=glance

Crumpp

[Widewing]

Originally posted by Crumpp

Why do you not read what others write?  Instead you attack with some childish nonsensical garbage.  Just reading one side of history presents just that ONE SIDE.  There is always another point of view and the truth usually lies in the middle.  All you have done is show what a jerk you can be.  Stop being one and you might learn something and so will I.  Nobody has attacked your favorite ride and certainly don't think Pyro is going to rush in here and suddenly pork the flight model on the P38, Chicken Little.

Crumpp

Crumpp, I realize that being obtuse is your personal cross to bear. Nonetheless, you continuously twist stats and deliberately misinterpret what people write to support your lost cause.

I quoted stats for one week in February and you show us the stats for the entire war... Can't you follow even the most simple logic? I doubt that you could pour urine from your boot if the instructions were embossed on the sole.

Fact: Prior to March of 1944, the 8th AF could put no more than 5 groups of fighters over the Reich, less than 200 fighters. Get used to this, its not going to change.

Another fact: In Aces High, the P-38 is not my favorite ride. But that doesn't mean I can't make it dance the nutcracker when I need it to.

You call me a jerk because I point out that nearly every post of yours is in some way an attempt at justifying the Luftwaffe. Just like R.E. Lee cult deifies Lee and the South's lost cause, you do the same for the Luftwaffe and its lost cause. Speaking for myself, I could care less about your personal obsession. I just wish you would confine it to posts related to that topic, and not spam every thread on the forum that even briefly mentions the war in Europe.

My regards,

Widewing

[Crumpp]

I quoted stats for one week in February and you show us the stats for the entire war... Can't you follow even the most simple logic?

Again you post without reading.  It is broken down by month.  You can see every fighter sortie flown in the European Theater in February.

Fact: Prior to March of 1944, the 8th AF could put no more than 5 groups of fighters over the Reich, less than 200 fighters. Get used to this, its not going to change.

Your dead wrong.  That is why I posted.  Facts are you are putting out bad information and some people will read it and believe it.  It's called propaganda.  The thing you seem to want to accuse me of doing.  Feel free to post some facts and sources instead of drivel.

All available AAF fighter escort was provided,17 groups in all--13 P-47, 2 P-38, and 2 P-51--drawn from both VIII Fighter Command and the Ninth Air Force.  In addition to these American escort groups, the RAF provided 16 fighter squadrons, consisting of Spitfires and Mustangs.11

Widewing says:
During "Big Week", the 8th AF put up 3,300 bomber sorties, supported by 1,620 fighter sorties (deep escort). In response, the Luftwaffe put up 4,399 fighter sorties.... Hmm, they don't seem outnumbered by American fighters yet, do they?

Facts are:
 Fighter sorties in support of the heavy bomber missions amounted to approximately 2,548 for the Eighth Air Force, 712 for the Ninth, and 413 for the Fifteenth.

Way more than 1620 sorties you claim.

For a factual account of Operation Argument:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/III/AAF-III-2.html

You call me a jerk because I point out that nearly every post of yours is in some way an attempt at justifying the Luftwaffe. Just like R.E. Lee cult deifies Lee and the South's lost cause, you do the same for the Luftwaffe and its lost cause. Speaking for myself, I could care less about your personal obsession. I just wish you would confine it to posts related to that topic, and not spam every thread on the forum that even briefly mentions the war in Europe.

Whatever spins your world.  Facts are there would have been no need to post anything if you confined yourself to the facts instead of Bull****.  Since you seem to think I am a "Luftwaffe cult" I will tell you I am researching a book on the FW-190.  In the course of traveling to various historical archives I pick up some interesting information about our favourite subject, WWII planes.  Fine with me if you want to stay ignorant and continue to post wrong information.  Simply use the ignore list.  It works.

Crumpp

[Meyer]

Originally posted by MiloMorai
Save the generalizations meyer. Lets have some specifics, like the best, Hartmann who had a 'kill' every 4th sortie.

Maybe you should come back when you  understand what is being discussed

Hartmann didn't have one of the best kills/sortie records, you should know that.


@Widewing: just a few examples:

Günther Scheel 71/70

Günther Rall: 275/621

Emil Lang: 173/403

Otto Kittel: 267/583

Marseille: 158/382


And when I name the He100 I was talking about the D-1 version, who AFAIK did 670km/h.

What was the speed of the P-38 prototype?

[Wotan]

Funny, I didn't see a single excuse in my post.

Sure you did...

P-38s didn't fail in the ETO, they were grossly misused by General Hunter and his cronies, some of whom were fired when Doolittle took over in January of 1944.

Nonetheless, there were real problems with the P-38 in terms of mechanical issues.

While the P-38H proved reliable in general, they used a different type of intercooler than later models (it was located in the leading edge of the wing), and these we prone to leaking after repeated warm to very cold thermal cycles. At high altitudes, these intercoolers were inadequate at cooling the intake charge and pilots had to limit MAP to avoid detonation, and the subsequent risk of engine failure. When the P-38Js arrived in late 1943, they had even greater problems with detonation. However, this was caused by cooling the intake charge too much! P-38Js incorporated new intercoolers in a chin intake below the engines. Since the USAAF had informed Lockheed that the P-38 would not likely see service in the ETO, where the P-47 would be the primary fighter (remember, the USAAF thought at this time that the bombers would not require escort fighters), Lockheed engineered the intercoolers for tropical climates. When it was obvious that the 8th AF bombers did require escorts all the way to the target, two P-38 groups were hastily sent to Britain as the P-38 was the only fighter with the range to fly deep into Germany. These missions would be flown at 30,000 feet or higher and every P-38 pilot knew that this was well above the altitude where the cockpit heater was effective.

So, you can imagine the problems encountered by aircraft optimized for medium altitudes in tropical climates flying at extremely high altitudes over Europe in winter.

Pilots were literally frozen in their cockpits. Canopies and windscreens iced over. At cruise settings, engine temperatures would drop below normal operating temps. Overly efficient intercoolers chilled the fuel so much the tetra-ethal lead separated from the base petroleum. As soon as the pilots pushed up the throttles, engines would begin to detonate and often failed. Later it was determined that the intake manifold design was also faulty, causing some cylinders to run excessively lean, adding the risk of detonation. Early P-38Js had only one generator. If that failed, the nearly frozen battery was useless. Above 20,000 feet, fuel boost pumps are required to provide adequate fuel pressure. Without a generator and having a flat battery meant that the engines starved for fuel and pilots had to descend to get the fuel pressure back up.

There were also serious issues with compressibility. At 30k, a P-38 could exceed Mach 0.68 very easily in even a shallow dive. If speeds exceeded Mach 0.75, recovery would be difficult at best.

Turbo regulators were freezing due excessive oil cooling. Overspeeding turbos usually came apart in spectacular fashion.

Adding to these problems was the large workload associated with the P-38.

Suppose the P-38s are cruising at 30k. Power settings are 33 in/MAP at 2,100 rpm with mixtures in auto lean. Suddenly, they spot a large formation of Bf 109s above them and coming down.

To engage, the P-38 pilot must do the following. Switch the fuel selectors to internal fuel. Select and release drop tanks. Turn on the gunsight and gun warmers. Push both mixture levers into auto rich. Bring the Curtiss Electric props out of cruise pitch. Slowly increase power to MIL power (push up the power before the props and the engines will be damaged, push up power too fast and the engines will detonate and likely fail).

All of this must be done BEFORE they could effectively engage the enemy.

One last factor. Only two Groups of P-38s were available in December of 1943, the 20th and the 55th. While they had a total strength of 70-80 fighters between them, usually only about 60 were available for any given mission. Of these, 15%-20% would be aborts. It was rare for both Groups to get more than a total of 50 fighters into enemy airspace. Facing these 50 fighters were 200-400 Luftwaffe fighters. Yet, despite all the problems, this small group of P-38s not only killed more than they lost, they reduced bomber losses by 50%. Not bad considering that they were tied to the bombers because General Hunter was an advocate of "close escort" tactics. Meanwhile, the USAAF in its infinite wisdom had assigned the first operational P-51B group to the 9th Tactical Air Force. After much yelling and screaming, this unit was "loaned" to the 8th AF.

Adding to the misery was the fact that very few replacement pilots had ever flown the P-38. Some had never even sat in one before they reported to the Groups for duty. Most were trained as P-40 or P-47 pilots. There was little time to train them, they would have to learn on the job. Those that survived the first few missions would usually survive the tour.

When Doolittle took over, he changed priorities. No longer was protecting the bombers the primary mission of the 8th AF Fighter Command. The new orders were to destroy the Luftwaffe where ever it could be found. Close escort was out. Ranging out well ahead of the bombers was in. When fighter groups were relieved of the escort task, they were to return on the deck, with their primary task being to find the Luftwaffe and kill anything in the air or parked on airbases. In this role the P-38 was in its element.

Doolittle also launched an investigation into the woes of the P-38. He discovered the intake manifold problem. He also identified poorly formulated gasolene. Doolittle, who while working for Gulf Oil in the 1930s developed 100+ octane avgas, ordered a custom fuel blend specifically for the P-38s. It proved to be a success. However, the P-51 was proving to be the answer to the 8th AF escort needs. It was easier to fly. It required much less maintenance (only one engine) and offered better combat performance at the altitudes where the bombers flew.

When the P-38L began arriving in the ETO, it found itself without a home. Yet, the P-38L was a different animal altogether. With vastly improved engines, intercoolers and oil coolers designed for cold temperatures and much better cockpit heating, the P-38L was ready for ETO service... Finally. The big L also had dive-recovery flaps, that made high speeds far less dangerous. For the first time, the P-38 had automatic engine controls that greatly reduced pilot workload.

By mid 1944, all P-38s had been transferred to the 9th Tactical AF, where they gave sterling performance. At medium altitudes, the P-38L was more than able to handle anything it would encounter. Kill ratios increased from 2/1 to 6/1 in air to air combat (the P-38 would eventually average 4/1 in the ETO, but did even better in the MTO).

That, in a nutshell is the story of the P-38 in the ETO.

My regards,

Widewing

That post is full of umm. All planes had teething problems and issues that needed to be 'worked through'. The p38 isn't unique in that regard. All the 'what ifs' or 'what could of been' is pointless since we are dealing with reality.

Standard Luftwobble tactics were to attack the escorts and draw them away from the bombers.

No it wasn't.

Even when the US was at its peak in numbers the LW was still able to hit the bombers stream and cause significant damage. They didn't go after escorts and they didn't attack the bombers where they most defended.

Early they would hang back beyond the range of the escorts then attack or attack where the escorts weren't. Later they developed battle formations in which the bomber attackers which were defended by a close escort group and high cover.

These formation grew larger in size and were eventuallly defeated by long range fighters attacking these battle groups as they formed up.

The LW tactics in regards to hitting the bombers never involved 'stripping away' the escorts. They didnt have the planes for that and they didn't need to if they hit the formations where they were least defended.

The LW didn't fly blind in ww2. They had radar, observers and scout aircraft etc...

When the lw upped to intercept bombers, their target and goal was those bombers.  Not the P38s...

Widewing says:
During "Big Week", the 8th AF put up 3,300 bomber sorties, supported by 1,620 fighter sorties (deep escort). In response, the Luftwaffe put up 4,399 fighter sorties.... Hmm, they don't seem outnumbered by American fighters yet, do they?

More of you nonsense here.

4,399 doesn't represent the number of aircraft the lw had in the air at any one time. Many of these are mulitple sorties and most are for aircraft who's duty it was to intercept bombers.

As Crumpp already points out there more then 1,620 fighter sorties flown in Feb '44 by the allies.

Your own distortions and rationaliztions seem to fit:

is in some way an attempt at justifying the P-38.

It was great for smacking down zekes and Betties but in the ETO the p47 and p51 were just much better...

[MiloMorai]

LOL, Herr Goering posting again.

Thanks for the specifics, but as you can read in Widewings post, it is you that lacks the comprehension.


from Freeman's The Mighty Eighth as of Jan 1 '44

P-47 - 56, 79, 352, 353, 355, 356, 358, 358, 361 FG(10)

P-51 - nil

P-38 -  20, 55 FG(2)

In Feb '44

P-47 - 4, 56, 79, 352, 353, 355, 356, 358, 358, 361 FG(9)

P-51 - 4, 357 FG(2)

P-38 -  20, 55,  364 FG(3)

As can be seen, the greatest portion of the available FGs were the 'short' range P-47s.


Feb 20 '44

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 226: The Eighth Air Force
begins "Big Week," attacks on German aircraft plants and airfields. For the
first time, over 1,000 bombers are dispatched; 21 bombers and 4 fighters
are lost hitting 3 areas in Germany, i.e.:
  1. 417 B-17s are dispatched to Leipzig/Mockau Airfield, and aviation
industry targets at Heiterblick and Abnaundorf; 239 hit the primary targets,
37 hit Bernburg, 44 hit Oschersleben and 20 hit other targets of opportunity;
they claim 14-5-6 Luftwaffe aircraft; 7 B-17s are lost, 1 damaged beyond
repair and 161 damaged; casualties are 7 KIA, 17 WIA and 72 MIA.
  2. 314 B-17s are dispatched to the Tutow Airfield; 105 hit the primary and
immediate area, 76 hit Rostock and 115 hit other targets of opportunity; they
claim 15-15-10 Luftwaffe aircraft; 6 B-17s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair
and 37 damaged; casualties are 3 KIA and 60 MIA.
  3. 272 B-24s are dispatched to aviation industry targets at Brunswick,
Wilhelmtor and Neupetritor; 76 hit the primary, 87 hit Gotha, 13 hit
Oschersleben, 58 hit Helmstedt and 10 hit other targets of opportunity; they
claim 36-13-13 Luftwaffe aircraft; 8 B-24s are lost, 3 damaged beyond repair
and 37 damaged; casualties are 10 KIA, 10 WIA and 77 MIA.
  Missions 1 and 3 above are escorted by 94 P-38s, 668 Eighth and Ninth Air
Force P-47s and 73 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; they claim 61-7-37
Luftwaffe aircraft; 1 P-38, 2 P-47s and 1 P-51 is lost, 2 P-47s are damaged
beyond repair and 4 aircraft are damaged; casualties are 4 MIA.
  Mission 227: 4 of 5 B-17s drop 200 bundles of leaflets on Tours, Nantes,
Brest and Lorient, France at 2123-2200 hours without loss.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): 35 B-26s bomb Haamstede Airfield,
The Netherlands, as a target of opportunity, after about 100 B-26s abort
attacks on other airfields because of weather.
  HQ 314th Troop Carrier Group and 32d Troop Carrier Squadron arrive at
Saltby, England from Sicily with C-47s.


Leipzig is beyond the P-47s radius of action which could barely reach the German boarder, as is Brunswick. That leaves 167 fighters, beyond the P-47's range of action, to escort the 689 bombers to Liepzig and Brunswick.

For the rest of Big Week, http://paul.rutgers.edu/~mcgrew/wwii/usaf/html/Feb.44.html


quote: As Crumpp already points out there more then 1,620 fighter sorties flown in Feb '44 by the allies.


Widewing said during Big Week. LOL, some have trouble reading.

[MiloMorai]

quote: 4,399 doesn't represent the number of aircraft the lw had in the air at any one time. Many of these are mulitple sorties and most are for aircraft who's duty it was to intercept bombers.

Did Widewing say in the air at one time?

[Crumpp]

Widewing said during Big Week. LOL, some have trouble reading.

Those numbers ARE the numbers DURING BIG WEEK.

 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/III/AAF-III-2.html

Read please.

4,399 doesn't represent the number of aircraft the lw had in the air at any one time. Many of these are mulitple sorties and most are for aircraft who's duty it was to intercept bombers.

Just where did they get the planes to make that many sorties?

The records have been destroyed AFAIK.  Please post the source for that number.

Otherwise it's just spillage from Widewing.

Crumpp

[Wotan]

Originally posted by MiloMorai
quote: 4,399 doesn't represent the number of aircraft the lw had in the air at any one time. Many of these are mulitple sorties and most are for aircraft who's duty it was to intercept bombers.

Did Widewing say in the air at one time?

He's using that number of sorties to demontrate LW numerical superiority.

From Crumpp's link:

Fighter sorties in support of the heavy bomber missions amounted to approximately 2,548 for the Eighth Air Force, 712 for the Ninth, and 413 for the Fifteenth. Total fighter losses were 28.

[Guppy35]

What's interesting is that if you talk to 38 vets, they all swore by it.  The guys in the MTO certainly didn't mind flying it.  They had solutions to the cold.  One 1st FG pilot told me he wrapped YANK magazines around his legs as insulation to keep warm, yet he loved the 38 and he flew is combat in F,G and H models.  He didn't fly a J or L until he got stateside again.

Clearly they loved it in the Pacific.  The twin engine setup being a nice safety factor for those long overwater flights.

But of course you can find pilots who swore by the P47 or the P51 and on and on.

No one plane was the "Best" in WW2.  Many of them did things very well, but on their own, none of them were war winners.

That's why I think all the arguments over it are pointless as all of them had good points and bad.

Ultimately, I suppose in terms of US planes, you'd have to name the P40 and Wildcat as the most important, as they held the line for so long when things were at their darkest, before the others got into the game.

Dan/Slack

[Guppy35]

Originally posted by Widewing

Adding to the misery was the fact that very few replacement pilots had ever flown the P-38. Some had never even sat in one before they reported to the Groups for duty. Most were trained as P-40 or P-47 pilots. There was little time to train them, they would have to learn on the job. Those that survived the first few missions would usually survive the tour.

My regards,

Widewing

I think that speaks volumes to much of the attitude towards the 38 in the ETO.  

There was a comment made in the daily history of the 436th FS, 479th FG from December 44, that jumped out at me when I read it that speaks to this.

"The first pilot to finish his missions this month was Lt. Herman Hoversten, strictly a P38 boy with an intense dislike of the P51 Spam Can. ...These boys are all from the original group of Palmdale boys and the few who remain can be  counted on the fingers of one hand."

The original 479th guys came over trained as 38 pilots at Palmdale, California.  There is another mention in the history that all the replacement pilots they got while in England were single engined trained and had to be converted to the 38 prior to the 479th converting to the 51.


The MTO 38 Groups were the first into Europe and were also all 38 trained before coming over so they were better able to utilize the 38 to the fullest.

Dan/Slack

[Widewing]

Originally posted by Crumpp
Those numbers ARE the numbers DURING BIG WEEK.

 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/III/AAF-III-2.html

Read please.

Listen genius, if you are going to quote Craven and Cate, at least read the entire section on Big Week. I have a complete set of Craven and Cate sitting on my bookshelves as well as a copy of Carter and Mueller's The Army Air Forces in World War II: A Combat Chronology. In addition, I have the complete combat record of both the 20th and 55th Fighter Groups.

2/21/44, 69 P-38s and 68 P-51 escorted the bombers.

2/22/44, 63 P-38s and 65 P-51 escort the bombers, another 122 15th AF P-38s escort bombers from Italy.

2/23/44, 41 P-38s escort bombers from Italy.

2/24/44, 87 P-38s escort bombers from Italy to targets in Austria
70 P-38s and 88 P-51s (including the double sorties by two Groups escort 8th AF bombers into Germany.

2/25/44  85 P-38s escort 15th AF bombers to Regensburg. One hour later, 42 P-38s and 44 P-51s arrive at Regensburg escorting 267 8th AF bombers. Another 44 P-38s and 45 P-51s escort bombers to Stuttgart.

Counting 15th and 8th AF P-38 and P-51 fighters combined, a grand total of 933 sorties were flown, of which 896 actually penetrated 25 miles beyond the German border. Subtract 87 from the 15th that only went to Austria and you have 809 deep penetration sorties. The balance of of the 1,620 sorties were P-47s that crossed into Germany and immediately turned around or P-38 sorties (second sorties of the day) that only went as far as Paris to escort any stragglers.

The 8th AF flew 2,548 fighter sorties, the 9th AF flew 712 and the 15th AF flew 413. That totals to 3,673 total fighter sorties in support of Big Week. Of those, 1,620 actually crossed the German border, and of those only 809 went beyond the border.

Just where did they get the planes to make that many sorties?

The records have been destroyed AFAIK.  Please post the source for that number.

Otherwise it's just spillage from Widewing.

Crumpp

Well, you don't know much, do you? Go back to Craven and Cate, to that same chapter. You will notice this: "GAF records by agreement with the United States at the close of the war went to Great Britain, where the unavoidably tedious analysis of the full record by the Historical Branch of the Air Ministry is as yet incomplete (at the time of publishing, IE: 1948).

It is these records that most WWII Aviation historians researched for their work in the years immediately following the war. Christopher Shores lists these records in his Bibliography for hsi analysis of Operation Argument (Big Week). He concluded that the Luftwaffe flew 4,399 sorties, of which 808 were by twin-engine fighters. Certainly, many flew two or more sorties a day.

During that week, the USAAF lost 226 bombers and 28 fighters. Luftwaffe losses were extreme. Quoting Craven and Cate: "The historical section of the German high command, in compiling cumulative combat losses for the West (including the Reich) from the time of the invasion of Russia in June 1941, showed a total of 2,581 fighter planes lost up to January 1944 and the loss of an additional 307 during that month. Losses in February jumped to 456. of which number only 65 were night fighters, the type directed chiefly against the missions of the RAF. The initial cumulative entry for March, moreover, shows by comparison with the closing entry for February a discrepancy of 77 additional losses in the category of single- engine fighters, and thus the total for February may well have been 533 planes. The total for the month of March rises to 567, of which 94 were night fghters. A bound record (26FX-36a of the high command), which is stamped with a security mark indicating it was compiled for the information of the high command alone, charts total aircraft losses, beginning with January 1944, at intervals of approximately ten days as follows:


19 Jan. 1944 355   29 Feb, 1944 545
20 Jan. 1944 335   10 Mar. 1944 514
31 Jan. 1944 661   20 Mar. 1944 552
10 Feb. 1944 508   31 Mar. 1944 777?
20 Feb. 1944 388      


The same source indicates that 433 flying personnel were killed in February 1944, that 341 were reported missing, and that 277 had been wounded. Preliminary Air Ministry studies based on German records (AHB 6, No. 132 and AHB 6, No. 133) show the following very tentative monthly totals for all theaters:


Aircraft Destroyed and losses from All Causes
January 1944: 1,050 1,311
February 1944: 1,501 2,121
March 1944: 1,591 2,115


Losses on the Russian front are listed, respectively, as 168, 466, and 431. It will be difficult to reconcile all of these figures, and it is not always possible to determine the exact basis on which the original statistics were compiled, but they do agree in their testimony to an upturn, possibly even a sharp upturn, in attrition as of February 1944 and to results even more disastrous for the following month.

Strong confirmation for such a conclusion is found in the abrupt change which occurred in GAF strategy after February. Although still capable of the stoutest kind of local resistance on occasion, the enemy now refused to commit himself to a policy of full-scale opposition to the daylight bombing campaign. He would send up only token resistance to some missions and then concentrate as large a force as in earlier months against a particular operation. At other times the GAF would try no more than to gain a local superiority by sending overwhelming numbers against one unit, especially a unit that had in some way become separated from its fellows or was left without adequate escort. In short the policy was one of conservation of strength and it conceded to the Allies the vital point of air superiority."

Gee, it's amazing how those destroyed records still exist!

My regards,

Widewing

[Murdr]

A few tid-bits:
Total produced 10,037 (all versions)
First fighter with tricycle gear
First fighter with power boosted controls
First super-turbocharged fighter to enter squadron service
First fighter with speeds over 400mph
and concequently first to encounter compressability problems
First fighter to extend a fuel range over 3000 miles
First USAAF fighter to deploy via air ferry to ETO
First fighter to carry 4000lbs of bombs into combat
First USAAF fighter to perform level bombing mission
First USAAF Fighter to shoot down a German aircraft. -August 14 1942-
Only USAAF fighter in production from Pearl Harbor to wars end
Killed Admiral Yamamoto -April 18 1943-
First American fighter over Berlin. -March 3 1944-
Destroyed more Japaneese aircraft than any other fighter
Was the plane of the top 2 all time American aces.
First American figher to peacfully touch down in Japan -August 25 1945-

Clearification on the J model, it introduced the dive flaps.  The cockpit heat was fixed.  The intercoolers were completely redesigned and optimized.  The turbosupercharger ducting was redesigned to eliminate a detonation cause.  Field mods at squadron level were made to the nacelle fillet, and the intercooler was ganged together with the gun site and gun warmer on a singe switch to optimize the cooling system.


PS. shhhh Kweassa  

[Crumpp]

Well, you don't know much, do you? Go back to Craven and Cate, to that same chapter. You will notice this: "GAF records by agreement with the United States at the close of the war went to Great Britain, where the unavoidably tedious analysis of the full record by the Historical Branch of the Air Ministry is as yet incomplete (at the time of publishing, IE: 1948).

Well It's 2004 Genius!  The exact number of sorties is not available for the Luftwaffe.  Records are missing.

Just like I said the first time.

The 8th AF flew 2,548 fighter sorties, the 9th AF flew 712 and the 15th AF flew 413. That totals to 3,673 total fighter sorties in support of Big Week. Of those, 1,620 actually crossed the German border, and of those only 809 went beyond the border.

So you just counted sorties that crossed the German Border?  Guess the Luftwaffe did not respond to any other attack GENIUS.

Quit splitting hairs.  You were wrong on the number of sorties and painted a false perception.  Since you do own some decent reference material it tells us that:

1.  You're not very bright and can't comprehend what you read.

OR

2.  You're intentionally presenting false information.

3.  You just made a mistake and are not man enough to admit it.

You list the numbers for 2 Fighter Groups?  Lets check out some numbers on some typical raids in February 1944.

03 Feb '44

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 206: 553 of 671 B-17s hit the port area at Wilhelmshaven, Germany; another 56 hit the Emden area; and 1 hits Oldenburg; 1.8 million leaflets are dropped by B-17s; 193 B-24s are dispatched but they abort the mission over the Zuider Zee due to clouds; 0-1-0 Luftwaffe aircraft are claimed; 4 B-17s are lost, 1 B-24 is damaged beyond repair and 47 B-17s are damaged; casualties are 2 KIA, 9 WIA and 42 MIA.Escort is provided by 74 P-38s, 508 P-47s of the Eighth and Ninth Air Force and 50 Ninth Air Force P-51s; they claim 8-0-3 Luftwaffe aircraft  ; 8 P-47s and 1 P-51 are lost, 3 P-47s are damaged beyond repair and 13 P-47s are damaged; casualties are 9 MIA.

Mission 207: 7 of 7 B-17s drop 420 bundles of leaflets on Paris, Rouen, Amiens, Reims, Orleans and Rennes, France at 2110-2146 hours; no losses.

04 Feb '44

Mission 208: 589 B-17s and 159 B-24s are dispatched to attack industry and railroad yards at Frankfurt/ Main, Germany; 346 B-17s and 27 B-24s hit the target; due to weather and navigational problems, 122 B-17s hit Giessen, 51 B-17s hit Wiesbaden, 17
B-24s hit the Trier area, 15 B-24s hit the Arloff area, 2 B-24s hit the Russelheim area, 1 B-24 hits Grafenhausen, 1 B-24 hits Darmstadt, 1 B-17 and 1 B-24 hit Koblenz and 26 B-24s and 23 B-17s hit unknown targets; they claim 4-0-1 Luftwaffe aircraft; 18 B-17s and 2 B-24s are lost, 2 B-17s and 1 B-24 are damaged beyond repair and 359 aircraft are damaged; casualties are
7 KIA, 20 WIA and 203 MIA. Escort is provided by 56 P-38s, 537 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 44 Ninth Air Force P-51s; they claim 8-0-4 Luftwaffe aircraft; 1 P-38 is lost, 1 P-47 is damaged beyond repair and 5 P-38s and 4 P-47s are damaged; casualties are 1 MIA.

Mission 209: 7 of 7 B-17s drop 319 bundles of leaflets on Lorient, Tours, Nantes, Raismes, Lille and Cambrai, France and Antwerp, Belgium at 2102-2132 hours without loss.

22 Feb '44

Mission 230: "Big Week" continues with 799 aircraft dispatched against German aviation and Luftwaffe airfields; 41 bombers and 11 fighters are lost.  

1. 289 B-17s are dispatched against aviation industry targets at Aschersleben (34 bomb), Bernburg (47 bomb) and Halberstadt (18 bomb) in conjunction with a Fifteenth Air Force raid on Regensburg, Germany; 32 hit Bunde, 19 hit Wernegerode, 15 hit Magdeburg, 9 hit Marburg and 7 hit other targets of opportunity; they claim 32-18-17 Luftwaffe aircraft; 38 B-17s are lost, 4 damaged beyond repair and 141 damaged; casualties are 35 KIA, 30 WIA and 367 MIA.

2. 333 B-17s are dispatched to Schweinfurt but severe weather prevents aircraft from forming properly and they are forced to abandon the mission prior to crossing the enemy coast; 2 B-17s are damaged.  

3. 177 B-24s are dispatched but they are recalled when 100 miles (160 km) inland; since they were over Germany, they sought targets of opportunity but strong winds drove the bombers over The Netherlands and their bombs hit Enschede, Arnhem, Nijmegen and Deventer; they claim 2-0-0 Luftwaffe aircraft;
3 B-24s are lost and 3 damaged; casualties are 30 MIA.

These missions are escorted by 67 P-38s, 535 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s, and 57 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; the P-38s claim 1-0-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair and 6 are damaged; the P-47s claim 39-6-15 Luftwaffe aircraft, 8 P-47s are lost and 12 damaged, 8 pilots are MIA; the P-51s claim 19-1-10 Luftwaffe aircraft, 3 P-51s are lost and 3 damaged, 3 pilot are MIA.

2/25/44 85 P-38s escort 15th AF bombers to Regensburg. One hour later, 42 P-38s and 44 P-51s arrive at Regensburg escorting 267 8th AF bombers. Another 44 P-38s and 45 P-51s escort bombers to Stuttgart.

Your creating a false perception again.

Lets look at what actually happenend on the 25th.

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 235: In the final "Big Week" mission, 4 targets in Germany are hit; 31 bombers and 3 fighters are lost.

1. 268 B-17s are dispatched to aviation industry targets at Augsburg and the industrial area at Stuttgart; 196 hit Augsburg and targets of opportunity and 50 hit Stuttgart; they claim 8-4-4 Luftwaffe aircraft; 13 B-17s are lost and 172 damaged; casualties are 12 WIA and 130 MIA.

2. 267 of 290 B-17s hit aviation industry targets at Regensburg and targets of opportunity; they claim 13-1-7 Luftwaffe aircraft; 12 B-17s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 82 damaged; casualties are 4 KIA, 12 WIA and 110 MIA.

3. 172 of 196 B-24s hit aviation industry targets at Furth and targets of opportunity; they claim 2-2-2 Luftwaffe aircraft; 6 B-24s are lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 44 damaged; casualties are 2 WIA and 61 MIA.

Escort is provided by 73 P-38s, 687 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 139 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; the P-38s claim 1-2-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-38 is damaged beyond repair; the P-47s claim 13-2-10 Luftwaffe aircraft, 1 P-47 is lost and 6 damaged, 1 pilot is MIA; the P-51s claim 12-0-3 Luftwaffe aircraft, 2 P-51s are lost and 1 damaged beyond repair, 2 pilots are MIA.


Mission 236: 5 of 5 B-17s drop 250 bundles of leaflets on Grenoble, Toulouse, Chartres, Caen and Raismes, France at 2129-2335 hours without loss.


From the combat reports:

http://paul.rutgers.edu/~mcgrew/wwii/usaf/html/Feb.44.html

Feel free to examine any mission or date as you need to in order to correct the data you have available.

Since you left out the P47 thinking they could not have possibly participated.

Gradually, however, we learnt how to fight in the Thunderbolt. At high altitude she was a 'hot ship' and very fast in the dive; the technique was not to 'mix it' with the enemy but to pounce on him from above, make one quick pass and get back up to altitude; if anyone tried to escape from a Thunderbolt by diving, we had him cold. Even more important, at last we had a fighter with the range to penetrate deeply into enemy territory--where the action was. So, reluctantly, we had to give up our beautiful little Spitfires and convert to the new juggernauts. The war was moving on and we had to move with it.

 

http://www.aviation-history.com/republic/p47.html

1100 mile range on the P47D-15RE with drop tanks according to this site.

1,700 miles according to this site:

http://www.military.cz/usa/air/war/fighter/p47/p47_en.htm

You completely left out the P47's from your assessment.  Guess you don't know the first escort fighter shot down over German soil was a P47.  Your claim they did not escort bombers into Germany proper is just baloney.  

Crumpp