Originally posted by Toad
Tigress, have you ever read the Mishap Investigation Report on that accident?
I don't want you to think I'm picking on you but you probably should read it. Cut to the conclusions for the short version.
I don't have access to her Mishap Investigation Report; just media coverage at this point.
IF you have access to it I would like to read it.
I have always maintained and asserted my motivations are for the complete facts in lieu of needing to feed an ego that wants to avoid being proven wrong at all costs in spite of the facts, known or unknown, liked or not liked.
I may or may not like the facts but facts, by definition, are indisputable.
It's the way of a good engineer.
TIGERESS
EDIT: Check that. I found what appears to be a ligitimate copy of her MIR on
http://yarchive.net/mil/f14_hultgreen_accident.htmlWhat I read in this is two things...
1. There was an engine malfunction
2. The
casual factors of this mishap and injury are a result of overcontrol, external distraction, cognitive saturation, channelized attention, wear debris, complacency and problem not forseeable.
That is to say, it looks to me that the crash was perhaps unavoidable but her death was a result of stress induced brain overload.
F-14A Mishap Investigation Report
(Military City Online note: This is the Mishap Investigation Report into the
Oct. 25, 1994, crash that killed a Navy F- 14A Tomcat fighter pilot, Lt. Kara
Hultgreen. The report, which was released only to a limited number of
members of the aviation community, includes a list of acronyms used in the
text.)
12. Conclusions
A. Mishap narrative: MC flew as wingman during case II recovery for CQ
refresher. After normal break and landing pattern entry, MP commenced
approach turn. Computed wings level on speed was 139 KIAS. MR noticed
aircraft decelerating during approach turn from approx ten kts fast abeam to
eight kts fast at the ninety to ten kts slow during final approach. MP flew
WUOSX, 42 to 45 deg AOB. CLSO and BLSO observed MA exhibit noticeable left
YAW, which was perceived as MP applying left rudder to arrest overshoot. MP
reduced power to maintain on speed while rolling wings level. Additionally,
MCB system on left engine was stuck in bleeds closed position due to wear
debris. These factors combined to cause a left eng comp stall. During
postmishap recollection, MR remembered hearing an almost imperceptible
``pop,'' similar to a ``popcorn stall,'' prior to ma crossing ship's wake.
During final approach MR transmitted on ICS, ``we're ten knots slow, let's
get some power on the jet.'' MP did not respond verbally, but did add power.
There was no further ICS comm by MC during remainder of MF. As MA rolled
wings level at start, black smoke trail appeared from right eng only,
indicating left eng malfunction. MP did not inform MR of eng malfunction.
BLSO initiated waveoff verbally and visually for WUOSX. Black smoke trail
>from right eng ceased, indicating right eng staging to a/b. CLSO echoed
``waveoff'' twice, cutting out BLSO ``level your wings and climb.'' BLSO made
one ``power'' call, two ``raise your gear'' calls and a second ``power''
call. Throughout waveoff, left YAW and rod persisted. MP had applied right
stick and rudder to counter asymmetric thrust. MR did not observe any eng
stall warning lights. MP lost situational awareness, failed to scan AOA,
allowed pitch attitude to slowly increase and exceeded maximum controllable
AOA of 20 units. At approximately flight deck level, MA stalled, departed
controlled flight, and rolled rapidly left. CLSO called ``eject, eject'' as
MR initiated command ejection. MR and MP ejection seats both departed MA.
MR achieved seat-man separation and main parachute deployment. MP seat
fired outside safe ejection envelope, impacted water prior to seat-man
separation, damaging seat and interrupting seat sequence. The causal factors
of this mishap and injury are a result of overcontrol, external distraction,
cognitive saturation, channelized attention, wear debris, complacency and
problem not forseeable.
