Crumpp:
"It is rather easy to line up the numbers to see that the RAF had numerical superiority in single engine fighters for much of the Battle of Britain."
As far as I can see, the lines crossed. At the Fall of France the RAF was down to 400, their aircraft production doing more than patching up through the BoB, while pilot shortage was a more serious issue. I don't think we disagree there.
The day I quote, the 7th of Sept is only exceptional in the way, that is marks the beginning of the London raids, and both sides clashed with full force, so to speak. I have referred to it because I found quite much data on it. Eagle day is well covered also, and 15th of September as well.
Galland chops the battle down into 5 phases, which is pretty fair,- Channel fight, radar strikes, FC strikes, London bombed and then at night only.
It is only at phase 4 that the RAF manages to strike big raids with several squadrons at once,- untill then, for quite obvious reasons (TIME) most of the interceptions were 1-2 squadrons, - 12-24 aircraft. If they made a bounce they had success,- diving through the fighter screen, getting some bursts, and then mixing it with the escorts.
If the were unsuccessful the escorts would chop them up badly.
This here:
"The claim of the RAF single engine fighters holding off vastly superior numbers of Luftwaffe single engine fighters is simply not true."
Who claimed this? Holding off???????
I have given ample quotes on little interceptions against big groups. They existed whether you bang your head against it or not. They existed, and caused big debates within the RAF, - eventually leading to the demotion of Park and Dowding and the rise of Trafford Leigh-Mallory. This is the famous BIG-WING debate, which is well covered in every book about the BoB.
In fact, Johnny Johnsson and Bader never agreed on the issue, - I have read a letter from Bader to Johnny from long long after the war, where they are still debating.
Fact remains: Untill the LW started bombing London, the RAF mostly intercepted in squadron size.
You have yet to show me some authentic quotes on big interceptions.....
But the smaller ones were not totally bad you know. The escorts could not endlessly follow the attackers, for there would be more and more, again and again. The radar saw to that. Although not perfected (read up on the battle of barking hill), the radar made sure that the interceptors made a lot of contact. And when the LW stretched inland and gave the RAF some 20 minutes more to react, the squadrons could finally asseble into bigger packets. This is the famous essence of the BoB day, - all available squadrons (some 40% or so of RAF single engined fighters) were successfully thrown at the full punch of the Luftwaffe, while the Luftwaffe had not realized that the RAF actually had that many. What were available reserve squadrons on BoB day (Another very famous moment) should LW make an extra raid? NONE! Both had the full swing going!
Galland realized, none the less, that the RAF had both fewer fighters and were "technically" inferior to the 109 (slower). He puts this so:
"Ich kann von dem kampf der britischen jagdflieger nicht anderes als mit höchster Bewunderung berichten. Zahlenmessich und auch technisch unterlegen, unermudlich und tapfer kampfend, sind sie in diesen fur England wohl schwersten Zeiten des krieges zweifellos die retter des Vaterlandes geworden"
Why did the LW draw back? Because the shortening daylight made only 1 raid possible per day, the RAF seemed to be growing, the escorts had to short range to do their job properly, and the LW had taken quite a beating.
Galland puts the failiure largely on the limited range of the 109. But it all adds up, doesn't it......
