Originally posted by Edbert1
Dred is able to speak for himself, and quite eloquently I must say. But I took this to mean that the terrorists were all guilty of haven broken multiple laws, any one of which was grounds for their arrest, IF we ever decide to enforce laws already on the books. Enforcing existing laws would obviate the need for new laws in many instances.
Exactly
"Some of the vulnerabilities of the plotters become clear in retrospect. Moussaoui aroused suspicion for seeking fast-track training on how to pilot large jet airliners. He was arrested on August 16, 2001, for violations of immigration regulations. In late August, officials in the intelligence community realized that the terrorists spotted in Southeast Asia in January 2000 had arrived in the United States. "
"Nonetheless, there were specific points of vulnerability in the plot and opportunities to disrupt it. Operational failures-opportunities that were not or could not be exploited by the organizations and systems of that time-included
not watchlisting future hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar, not trailing them after they traveled to Bangkok, and not informing the FBI about one future hijacker's U.S. visa or his companion's travel to the United States;
not sharing information linking individuals in the Cole attack to Mihdhar;
not taking adequate steps in time to find Mihdhar or Hazmi in the United States;
not linking the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, described as interested in flight training for the purpose of using an airplane in a terrorist act, to the heightened indications of attack;
not discovering false statements on visa applications;
not recognizing passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner;
not expanding no-fly lists to include names from terrorist watchlists;
not searching airline passengers identified by the computer-based CAPPS screening system"
"Since the plotters were flexible and resourceful, we cannot know whether any single step or series of steps would have defeated them. What we can say with confidence is that none of the measures adopted by the U.S. government from 1998 to 2001 disturbed or even delayed the progress of the al Qaeda plot. Across the government, there were failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management"
"There were opportunities for intelligence and law enforcement to exploit al Qaeda's travel vulnerabilities. Considered collectively, the 9/11 hijackers
included known al Qaeda operatives who could have been watchlisted;
presented passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner;
presented passports with suspicious indicators of extremism;
made detectable false statements on visa applications;
made false statements to border officials to gain entry into the United States; and
violated immigration laws while in the United States"
Source- Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
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"A Costly Lesson
One of most important lessons that the United States learned on 9/11 was that state and local law enforcement can be the difference between an unsuccessful terrorist plot and a devastating terrorist attack.
Five of the nineteen hijackers had violated federal immigration laws while they were in the United States. Amazingly, four of the five had actually been stopped by local police for speeding. All four terrorists could have been arrested if the police officers had asked the right questions and realized that they were illegal aliens."
"The cases of two of the 9/11 hijackers show just how critical a role state and local police can play.
Lebanese terrorist Ziad Jarrah was at the flight controls of United Airlines Flight 93 when it crashed in rural Pennsylvania. Jarrah first entered the United States in June 2000 on a tourist visa. He immediately violated federal immigration law by taking classes at the Florida Flight Training Center in Venice, Florida—a violation because he never applied to change his immigration status from tourist to student. Jarrah was therefore detainable and removable from the United States almost from the moment he entered the country.Six months later, Jarrah committed his second immigration violation when he overstayed the period he was authorized to remain in the United States on his tourist visa"
Jarrah successfully avoided contact with state and local police for more than fourteen months. However, at 12:09 A.M. on September 9, 2001, just two days before the attack, he was clocked driving at 90 miles-per-hour in a 65-miles-per-hour zone on Highway 95 in Maryland, 12 miles south of the Delaware state line. He was traveling from Baltimore to Newark in order to rendezvous with the other members of his team.
The Maryland trooper did not know about Jarrah’s immigration violations. Had the officer asked a few questions or simply made a phone call to the federal government’s Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC), which operates around the clock from Williston, Vermont, he could have arrested Jarrah. Instead, the trooper issued Jarrah a $270 speeding ticket and let him go. The ticket would be found in the car’s glove compartment at Newark Airport two days later, left behind when Jarrah boarded Flight 93.
Saudi Arabian terrorist Nawaf al Hazmi was the second-in-command of the 9/11 attackers and a back-up pilot. He entered the United States on a tourist visa in January 2000 and rented an apartment, where he lived for more than a year, with fellow hijacker Khalid Almihdhar in San Diego. As with Jarrah, Hazmi’s period of authorized stay expired after six months—after July 14, 2000, Hazmi was in the United States illegally. In early 2001, Hazmi moved to Phoenix, Arizona, to join another 9/11 hijacker, Hani Hanjour.
On April 1, 2001, Hazmi was stopped for speeding in Oklahoma while traveling cross country with Hanjour. Had the officer asked Hazmi a few basic questions or asked to see Hazmi’s visa, he might have discovered that Hazmi was in violation of U.S. immigration law. Once again, the officer could have detained him but did not. The officer also had the authority to detain Hanjour, who had entered the country on a student visa but never showed up for classes.
All of the 9/11 hijackers’ encounters with local law enforcement were missed opportunities of tragic dimensions. If even one of the police officers had made an arrest, the terrorist plot might have been unraveled.
Source -
The Heritage Foundation