5 most influential fighters of WW2

[Naudet]

Eddiek, i took the GO229, cause from my knowledge it was the 1st flying-wing concept for a fighter.

I know that before the GO229 there were other flying-wings, but those were gliders. Such as the Horten flying wings.

[Oldman731]

Originally posted by HoHun
Hi Oldman,

>Sez who, bub?

Do I know you from AW?

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Of course!  "Oldma" in FR.

- Oldman

[Captain Virgil Hilts]

Originally posted by illo
I think germans had more shortage of pilots and fuel in 1944/45 than of planes.

That is indeed the case. While production of aircraft did slow at times, in early 1944, several P-38 raids on the oil fields at Ploesti, combined with other raids on German oil production, and strikes against transportation brought German oil, gas, and diesel reserves to levels so low that there was not enough fuel and oil available to allow new pilots to be trained beyond 40 hours. The Luftwaffe began throwing untrained pilots and their instructors at what were becoming seasoned veteran Allied pilots with plenty of planes, fuel, and seat time. It quickly reached the point where Luftwaffe fighter pilots were, at times, ordered not to engage or even take off unless heavy bombers were the target.

After April of 1944, many engagements were decided by sheer weight of numbers and lack of pilot skill, and not the quality of the aircraft involved. Facing 3:1 odds at best, with wingmen and squadmates who were too green and untrained to even be in a fighter, even the best aces were doomed.

The Allies had so many planes and pilots available that the P-47s and P-38s were redirected towards ground attack, which they were well suited for. The P-51 also flew ground attack missions with success, but the P-47 especially was so near indestructable that they became dedicated ground attack aircraft. After D-Day, the majority of air to air combat seen by the P-47 and P-38 was incidental as part of their ground attack missions.

[Naudet]

Virgil, you the 1st US-Citzen ever i see in this board, that agrees to the fact, that the war was basicly won by numerical superiority and difference in pilots quality between the USAAF and the LW.

The planes and their performance were indeed not the decisive factor.

[Oldman731]

Originally posted by Naudet
Virgil, you the 1st US-Citzen ever i see in this board, that agrees to the fact, that the war was basicly won by numerical superiority and difference in pilots quality between the USAAF and the LW.

The planes and their performance were indeed not the decisive factor.

Savage was over-generalized.  When the critical part of the air war occurred - October, 1943 through March, 1944 - the US fighter force certainly did not outnumber the available Nazi day fighter force.  The US won - and the Nazis lost - because of the tactics they used.

- oldman

[eddiek]

Naudet, I've never disputed the fact that as the war progressed the Allies gained the upper hand in aircraft quantity and overall pilot quality.  That is pretty much evident to anyone who cares to look at history.
What irritates me is when people start acting like that is an excuse for Germany losing the war.
Allied fighter pilots made their mark long before the numbers swung so dramatically in their favor.
Like Oldman said, at the most critical part of the air war, when the numbers were pretty even,the American and German fighters stood toe to toe and slugged it out, and the American pilots gave better than they got.  German pilots had the ability to fly again if shot down and increase their kill total, while Allied pilots were out of the war if they went down in combat, barring a miraculous escape.
Put it this way......what if someone made the statement that Erich Hartmann only ran up his high score because he was facing far inferior planes and undertrained pilots?  Probably true, but it still doesn't take away from the fact the he DID achieve a phenomenal kill total, regardless of who or what he faced, even after being shot down himself how many times?  Sixteen?
You can temporize and try to rationalize from here to eternity, but the truth is the Allies had just as capable fighters in their inventory as anything the LW could put in the air.  Maybe not as technologically advanced in some areas, but still just as capable.

[Seeker]

I can understand the desire to see the noble knights of the Luftwaffe and thier thoroughbred steeds overwhelmed by grubby capitalist production, menial supply inefficiences and an unwashed horde of hoi polloi -

And there may even be a grain of truth in proposing that's indeed how the Allieds won the air war.

Except that's not exactly how the the Luftwaffe lost the war -

From a position of dominance, strength and advantage; over the cliffs of Dover.

One wonders how the Spit avoids being perked, it was so obviously the one single design that exercised the most influence on the course of World War II .

[HoHun]

Hi Oldman,

>Of course!  "Oldma" in FR.

Hehe, I thought you were!

So what's your choice for the fighter that defeated the Luftwaffe? By careful reading between the lines, I got the impression you don't agree with my selection ;-)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[Karnak]

The guys who are selecting all German aircraft for the 5 most influential fighters are either joking or laughably biased.

[HoHun]

Hi everyone,

here's some background on the employment of the three main USAAF fighter types employed by the 8th Air Force:

P-47: It was the first to be used in numbers. 3 Fighter Groups from 04/1943 to 07/1943, increasing to a maximum of 10 in 01/1944, decreasing to 4 in 05/1944 and only 1 at the end of the war.

P-38: The first P-38 Fighter Group entered combat in 10/1943, the second 01/1944, third 03/1944,  fourth 05/1944. The maximum of four groups was help in operation for 3 months before 3 of the 4 groups converted to Mustangs, soon followed by the last one.

P-51: The 354th Fighter Group entering combat 12/1943, 6 weeks after the first P-38 group. (To be accurate, it actually was a 9th Air Force unit. Since the 8th wanted the Mustangs, they virtually swapped the P-47 equipped 358th Fighter Group against the 354th's support.)  The next P-51 Fighter Groups were P-47 fighter groups converting  02/1944, 03/1944, 04/1944, and 06/1944 about half of the 8th Air Force Fighter Groups were equipped with Mustangs.

Here's a breakdown by month and type, including the 354th:

04/1943:  3 FG P-47
05/1943:  3 FG P-47
06/1943:  3 FG P-47
07/1943:  3 FG P-47
08/1943:  4 FG P-47
09/1943:  6 FG P-47
10/1943:  7 FG P-47, 1 P-38
11/1943:  7 FG P-47, 1 P-38
12/1943:  9 FG P-47, 1 P-38,  1 P-51
01/1944: 10 FG P-47, 2 P-38, 1 P-51
02/1944:  9 FG P-47, 2 P-38,  2 P-51
03/1944:  8 FG P-47, 3 P-38,  3 P-51
04/1944:  7 FG P-47, 3 P-38,  4 P-51
05/1944:  6 FG P-47, 4 P-38,  6 P-51
06/1944:  4 FG P-47, 4 P-38,  8 P-51
07/1944:  4 FG P-47, 4 P-38,  8 P-51
08/1944:  4 FG P-47, 1 P-38, 11 P-51

(Deployment according to Francillon's "USAAF Figher Units - Europe 1942 - 45")

From the loss ratios of the heavy bombers, it's obvious that the defeat of the Luftwaffe was completed by 06/1944, but also that the Luftwaffe had hardly lost its abilities to harm the bombers in 04/1944. The turning point appears to have been 05/1944.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[Captain Virgil Hilts]

Originally posted by Naudet
Virgil, you the 1st US-Citzen ever i see in this board, that agrees to the fact, that the war was basicly won by numerical superiority and difference in pilots quality between the USAAF and the LW.

The planes and their performance were indeed not the decisive factor.

Naudet, I think you confused what I was saying slightly.

My point was that no single Allied plane actually brought about the defeat of the Luftwaffe. It was a change in tactics in late 1943, and further changes in that same direction, when Ira Eaker was replaced by Jimmy Doolittle as commander of the 8th AF, that actually turned the corner.

Further, by April, when it is generally accepted that the Luftwaffe was finished as far as air superiority was concerned, the P-51 had just equalled the P-38 in numbers deployed, which was still a lower number than the number of P-47s deployed.

Added to that fact is in the spring of 1944, the German petroleum production and the German transportation system was badly wrecked, and only getting worse. As that situation continually worsened for Germany, it became nearly impossible to train replacement pilots, and to have enough fuel to actually fly missions at all. This was also brought about by the changes in tactics, as petroleum and transportation were increasingly the primary targets of ALL Allied air action.

So you see, when the Luftwaffe was for all intents and purposes reduced to an ineffective struggling air force, the P-51 had not yet even reached the point of making up 1/3 of the Allied fighter force flying over the continent.

It is quite obvious it was not the P-51 that defeated the Luftwaffe, but rather a complete change in tactics over the 5 months between October 1943 and February 1944, along with a build up of ALL U.S. fighters in Europe, and the increased use of larger fuel capacities making long range escorts and deep penetration raids possible.

By HoHun's figures, you can see that in September of 1943, there were only 6 fighter groups, all flying P-47s. By February, there were 13, and still the majority were P-47s. Not until June did the P-51 exceed the P-47 in number of groups deployed, June is a month (or two, depending on how you count) AFTER it is generally accepted that the Luftwaffe was finished.

Once you reach June of 1944, you can safely assume that the final complete decimation of the Luftwaffe was accomplished with superior numbers and better pilots as a group, because Germany simply began to run short of everything, planes, fuel, oil, and quality pilots. But the Luftwaffe was defeated by April, the period from April 1944 until May 1945 was simply a sad waste of men and machines in a war that was already over.

[HoHun]

Hi Hilts,

>Further, by April, when it is generally accepted that the Luftwaffe was finished as far as air superiority was concerned, [...]

The loss ratio of USAAF bombers shows the Luftwaffe's capability to harm the bombers was largely intact in April 1944. The first sign of Luftwaffe weakness came in May, and bomber losses were down to a minimum in June 1944 for the first time.

>[...] the P-51 had just equalled the P-38 in numbers deployed

Have a look of the cumulated Fighter Group months until 06/1944:

P-47: 89
P-38: 21
P-51: 25

The P-51 had as much theatre presence as the P-38 throughout the period that saw the defeat of the Luftwaffe, and thanks to its better servicability, its sortie count should be expected to have been quite a bit higher. Additionally, bad weather and short daylight periods in the winter months meant that the sortie count in these months was low, so most of the decisive action took place from 03/1944 on.

The P-47's 89 in-theatre fighter group months of course dwarve the P-38's and P-51's combined 46, but its range limitations meant that it couldn't bring its strength to bear on the Luftwaffe.

Clearly, the least significant of these three fighters was the P-38.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[Naudet]

I will clear my statement abbout superior allied numbers, just so you dont think i am searching for an excuse why GE lost the war.
I am glad we lost, very glad. But on the other side there are some allieds myths that are often quoted that are simply not ture.


My statement actually just meant the quality of the aircraft designs were not the decisive factor in the ETO.

Numbers, tactics and pilot quality were the decisive fields and on all those 3 fields the GE LW fell behind from mid 1943.

Here now a my view at the airbattle in the west (very generalized).

1941-1942 the westfront LW Geschwaders fight the RAF. Even in this period - there most successful - the LW is outnumbered, there were never more than about 240-280 fighters, against a far greater number of RAF fighters.

1943 the 8th USAAF arrives, the numbers increase in allied favour, many of the LW most experienced westfront pilots die through the attrition (endless missions without rest etc.), the replacement pilots are not trained like the pilots from 1939-42 were

1944 the 8th USAAF increases fast, now the whole "Reich" is the battleground, LW replacement pilots lack even more training

1945 total breakdown of the LW


my intention, is to counter many subjective visions of US-Pilots reports from WW2 especially those of P51 pilots.
You can always find passages like "the P51 was in my eyes the best fighter ever" or "i could outfly any of my adversaries" and so on.
Most people i know use such statements as argument that i.e. the P51 was a way better plane than any LW fighter, but they dont acount for the circumstances. Most fights by P51 pilots were flown with the advantages off greater number and better training on their side.
A LW pilot with 10-20 hours of basic training on his combat ride, cant fly that thing as good as a US-pilot with hundreds of hours of extensive combat training to his credit.

I dont doubt that the P51 (or P47 or P38) was a good fighter and one that did its intended role as a long range escort fighter very well. but it is not the best fighter ever.

Both the tempest and the Spit XIV were better "pure" fighters than the P51 (or P47 or P38), but they both lacked the incredible range of the P51.

That is the thing i want to point out.

[Seeker]

"1941-1942 the westfront LW Geschwaders fight the RAF. Even in this period - there most successful - the LW is outnumbered, "

Again, you seem to forget to mention 1940. Why would that be?

And I disagree with your contention that 1941-42 were the LW's most successfull years; many, many people would say 1938/9 would be counted in that catagory. Or perhaps Poland doesn't count?

[Naudet]

Seeker, 1st i start 1941 cause there teh LW in the west went defensive.

1940 was still an offensive year with the BoB and the BoB was a disaster for the LW.
In BoB the fighter forces were about the same, with a quality superiory to the 109 E4, due to the low number of spits involved.

1941-42 were the most successful years in the WEST. Here is just the K/D decisive the channelsquadrons earned against the RAF.
In those years the channelsquadrons could fight on their terms in a defensive airbattle.  Also important that with the introduction of the FW190 the LW had a huge quality edge, that was ot countered till in 1942 the Spit IX squads grew in number.

Everything above just counts for the west airwar front. Ground, east, africa and so on are not included.